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This research study explores the multi-level regulation of the employment security and social 
security systems.  It applies a systems theory approach based on the understanding of reflexive 
law developed by Gunther Teubner and Ralf Rogowski to analyse the relationship between the 
regulatory systems at the international (United Nations, including the International Labour 
Organisation), European (Council of Europe and European Union) and domestic (Cypriot) 
levels.  This multi-faceted study illustrates that transnational and national labour systems have 
conceptualized and endorsed in different ways the concept of employment security.  From a 
flexicurity perspective, as a form of re-regulation, this thesis argues that employment security 
could be achieved through reflexive communication with social security systems.  The thesis 
discusses the complexity of flexicurity and shows that employment security, which takes the 
meaning of swift transitions in the labour market, sometimes can converge or collide with job 
security, which refers to security in a specific job.  In this context, this thesis argues that the 
budgetary considerations, as part of the austerity measures, which were agreed between the 
Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund ) and the Government of Cyprus, tend to promote the bare notion of employability rather 
than focusing on employment security.  This bare notion of employability, which is the 
commercial aspect of flexicurity, facilitates the transition from unemployment to employment, 
however, it does not necessarily facilitate personal transitions in the labour market (to enter, 
re-enter, or remain in employment of one’s choosing).  In this context, this thesis suggests there 
is a need to promote collective bargaining as a stronger form of social dialogue as a means to 
mediate emerging tensions and power imbalances (such as in the context of economic 
dismissals).   
From a normative analysis, it emerges that transnational regulatory systems are more interested 
in human rights protections and non-discrimination rather than employment security.  For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights has regarded dismissals as actionable under 
articles 8 to 11 of the European Court of Human Rights.  But both the EU and the ILO have 
added to their normative framework prohibitions on discriminatory dismissals.  The EU 
additionally provides detailed procedures to govern economic dismissals, while ILO 
Convention N.158 introduces minimum standards for job security protections.  In terms of 
social security regulation, the ILO sets a baseline of standards for social security protection 
whereas the EU coordinates divergent social security systems to facilitate the freedom of 
movement of workers and their families in the EU labour market.  The CoE endorsed 
contributory and non-contributory benefits in the spectrum of ECHR (article 6 ECHR and 
A1P1 ECHR) and the ESC/RSC (as part of the right to social security).    
Nevertheless, the Cypriot legal system shows its strong capacity to self-produce its own 
procedures and regulate employment security and social security.  This thesis illustrates that 
the Republic of Cyprus did not fully endorse the concept of employment security, as the 
Cypriot Courts adopted a favouring approach towards job security protections.  Whereas, social 
security regulation at domestic level seems to reflect the tensions between economic budgetary 
interests and social security protection.  In this context, this thesis suggests that employment 
and social security regulatory systems, despite their internal differentiation, could converge 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As Cyprus gradually exits its long-term financial crisis, statistics indicate that forty-seven 
thousand economically active people in Cyprus are still facing unemployment.1  The rate of 
unemployment continues to fall (dropping from 11.1% in 2014 to 7.4% of the total population 
in 2017), which shows that employment in Cyprus has been improved but has not yet 
recovered.2  While Cyprus enters the post-crisis recovery phase, an imperative question arises: 
how the transformation of Cypriot legal system can provide a sustainable recovery, ensuring 
that workers can swiftly make transitions in the labour market (that is, enter, remain or re-enter 
the labour market) without being exposed to the risk of unemployment and a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in terms and conditions of employment. 
Voltaire wrote that ‘work keeps at bay three great evils: boredom, vice, and need’.3  Work as 
gainful employment is valuable because it enables workers and their families to obtain the 
wherewithal to preserve life and human dignity.  It is inevitable that unforeseen life 
circumstances and vagaries of the market, also known as social risks, may occur and interrupt 
paid work.  During these periods of income-loss, social security protection aims to alleviate 
poverty by compensating workers for temporary or permanent shortfalls in income and 
redistributing social risks.  In an increasingly flexible labour market, employment security 
remains the Achilles’ heel of the Cypriot labour market because individuals still struggle to 
remain in employment throughout their life cycle.  Employment security is not limited to job 
security.  Employment security entails the ability of workers to make swift transitions in the 
labour market, whereas job security is perceived as the ability of workers to retain a particular 
job.4  The concept of employment security sometimes collides with the rigidities of dismissal 
laws (such as long notice periods), which even if they provide a degree of security, can tie 
workers into a job that does not satisfy their needs (for example, a position with low salary or 
long-working hours).  Employment security also differs from the bare notion of employability, 
because facilitating transition of individuals from unemployment to employment through 
 
1 Eurostat official website <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/med_ps421> accessed 10 
August 2019.  
2 Ibid. 
3 William F. Fleming (tr), Candide (Voltaire 1759) 
 <https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/v/voltaire/candide/complete.html> accessed 10 August 2019. 
4 European Commission, ‘Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility 
and security - Impact Assessment’ SEC (2007) 861 (EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity), p.20. 
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Active Labour Market Policies (ALPMs) does not necessarily mean that workers can swiftly 
transition in the labour market without being exposed to the risk of unemployment.   
The Cypriot legal system shows its strong prevalent nature to self-regulate its own operations 
and the capacity to learn from other economic and structural environments.  The autopoiesis of 
systems, which means self-(re)production, has communications as its core elements.5  
According to the Luhmann’s autopoietic theory of social systems, the legal system self-
reproduces itself and like any other living system (for example, a plant) if a social system ceases 
to reproduce its own operations, it ceases to exist.6  The legal system, as any other social 
system, has two main features: ‘normative closure’ and ‘cognitive openness’.7  These two 
features can justify why the Cypriot legal system is capable of learning from other systems, 
however, the system can function and mediate collisions only through self-reproduction.  
This research project, which contains material available up to and including 31 July 2019, is a 
multi-level study.  It reviews the regulatory systems that are recognized in the Cypriot 
constitutional order and creates transnational standards for labour and social security protection 
at the national context, which are the following: the United Nations (UN), which includes the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) that acts as the pioneer standard-setting actor for 
promotion of decent jobs and full employment, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European 
Union (EU).  This research study examines how legal systems as autopoietic systems observe 
their own operations through their own communications.  In this context, it reviews the 
constraints that are imposed by systems on States and the individuals that participate in them.  
This thesis also makes a detailed exploration of systems jurisprudence to understand what the 
Cypriot legal system has learned from other structural environments. 
I have used the Cypriot domestic legal system as a case-study for two reasons.  Firstly, I have 
a strong personal bond with Cyprus because I originally come from Cyprus and I studied the 
Cypriot monist legal system during my undergraduate studies.  Secondly, I have a research 
interest in learning how reflexive solutions could possibly ease the tensions and strengthen the 
connections between employment security and social security in the post-crisis era.    
 
5 Seidi D., ‘Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems’ (2004) <https://www.zfog.bwl.uni-
muenchen.de/files/mitarbeiter/paper2004_2.pdf> accessed 6 December 2018, p.2.  
6 Ibid, p.4.  
7 Luhmann N., ‘Operational closure and structural coupling: the differentiation of the legal system’ 13 Cardoso 
Law Review (1992) 1420, p.1420. 
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This research project will examine the relationship of regulation between employment security 
and social security systems in the light of flexicurity, an EU-oriented policy strategy that is 
manifest in the European Employment Strategy (EES), which was characterized by Ralf 
Rogowski as ‘a strategy for reflexive deregulation’.8  This is the case where deregulation of a 
system could further lead to re-regulation, as a form of ‘regulation for self-regulation’.9 
Through flexicurity policies, as soft-law means of regulation, the interested actors (such as 
trade unions and employers’ representatives) can be involved in the decision-making processes, 
reflect on the policies and address power imbalances.  The theoretical underpinnings of 
flexicurity stem from the ‘paradigmatic’ flexicurity practices in the Netherlands and Denmark.   
In the Netherlands, flexicurity appeared in the early 2000s as a form of facilitating transitions 
from temporary to permanent employment;10 whereas, the famous Danish ‘Golden Triangle’ 
encompassed three flexicurity elements to fight unemployment: generous unemployment 
benefits, no strict job security and ALMPs.11  In the 2007 ‘Towards common principles of 
flexicurity’ policy document, the European Commission (EC) introduced the four flexicurity 
components:  social security, ALMPs, Life-Long Learning Strategies (LLL) and flexible 
contractual arrangements.  These are considered necessary to achieve the shift from job security 
to employment security.12  The flexicurity components are complex, which show that reaching 
a fair equilibrium between flexibility-security is not an easy task.  Unfortunately, the discussion 
of flexicurity in the EES context, which uses the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), turned 
into a debate over employability that entails the commercial aspect of flexicurity, rather than 
on employment security.13  The OMC could be used as a powerful persuasive tool because it 
can create a forum for constructive dialogue between social actors, but this potential is not 
always realised.   
The normative rationality of the systems embraces common values, which include equality, 
human dignity and fundamental rights, to address wider social goals, such as poverty 
alleviation and elimination of social exclusion.  For example, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Treaty on European Union (TEU) clearly state that equality 
 
8 Rogowski R., Reflexive labour law in the world of society (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013), p.170. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Wilthagen T. and Tros F., ‘The concept of ‘flexicurity’: a new approach to regulating employment and labour 
markets’ (2004) 10(2) European Review of Labour and Research 166, p.173. 
11 Madsen K. P., ‘Flexicurity: a new perspective on labour markets and welfare states in Europe’ (2008) 14 Tilburg 
L. Rev. 57, p.67. 
12 EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity (n.4). 
13 European Council Presidency Conclusions (Lisbon, 23 and 24 March 2000), paras.37-40. 
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and fundamental rights are core values of the regulatory systems.14  The theory of ‘transnational 
juridification’ of labour law system, which was developed by Silvana Sciarra, explains that the 
labour law system has the tendency to communicate with other systems and protect human 
rights.15  The Constitution of Cyprus, the ECHR and the European Union’s Charter for 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) enshrine the right to protect workers against unfair or unjustified 
dismissals and the right to social security.16  In addition, the right to social security (in Greek: 
κοινωνική ασφάλεια), which includes social assistance and social insurance, is fundamental to 
the Constitution of Cyprus.17  The right to social security also exists in other international and 
regional human rights law instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),18 the European Social Charter (ESC)19 and the European Social 
Charter (Revised) (RSC).20  However, each system has its own important procedural 
dimensions, which emphasize the divergence between the systems. 
The shift from job security to employment security remains a complex and controversial issue 
that is not fully accepted in Cyprus.  The Cypriot Law 24/67, which adopted the minimum 
standards of ILO Convention N.158, promotes job security.  Nevertheless, the educational 
benefits in Cyprus are limited and appear as student grants (Law 203(I)/2015), which shows 
that the unemployed people might face a serious risk of poverty, unemployment and social 
exclusion.  Another dissonance is the exclusion of self-employed workers from unemployment 
schemes, which could leave them trapped in unemployment and lead to the vicious cycle of 
precarious work.  In addition, the rate of youth unemployment in Cyprus reached the rate of 
19.1% in 2018,21 which shows that the EU Directive 2000/78,22 which prohibits discrimination 
on the grounds of age in employment and occupation needs to be revisited.  
 
14 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) [2008] OJ C115/13, article 2; European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 
and 14 (4 November 1950) ETS 5, Preamble.  
15 Sciarra S., ‘Collective Exit Strategies: New Ideas in Transnational Labour Law’ in Davidov G. and Langille B. 
(eds) The Idea of Labour Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2011), p.407. 
16 Constitution 1960 of Cyprus, English source <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=189903> 
accessed 5 December 2018; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391.  
17 Ibid (Constitution of Cyprus). 
18 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
19 European Social Charter (ESC) (18 October 1961) ETS 35. 
20 European Social Charter (Revised) (RSC) (3 May 1996) ETS 163. 
21 Trading Economics official website <https://tradingeconomics.com/cyprus/youth-unemployment-rate> 
accessed 14 January 2019. 
22 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (Equal Treatment Directive) [2000] OJ L303/16. 
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This thesis is composed of five main chapters.  Chapter 2 of the thesis explores the concept of 
flexicurity, which is an EU-oriented concept, considering its ‘ingredients’ and their 
complexities.  It discusses the terminological interpretation of ‘employment security’ and ‘job 
security’, which sometimes can converge or collide.  In addition, the chapter explores who 
bears the responsibility to fund the employability programmes for workers and examines the 
meaning of social dialogue in different multi-level contexts, suggesting that social dialogue 
could resolve problems that may arise in the regulation of employment security.  Also, the 
chapter scrutinises the theoretical underpinnings of reflexive theory, as developed by Gunther 
Teubner and Ralf Rogowski, and its potential relevance to communication between 
employment security and social security systems. 
Chapter 3 is focused on international labour standards as they emerged in the ILO, and the 
distinct UN human rights treaty bodies.  This chapter endorses a human rights-based analysis, 
in which the principle of non-discrimination is placed at its core.   The analysis begins with an 
introduction on the raison d’être of the ILO (1919), which then as a UN specialized agency 
shifted towards a proactive approach to promote full employment and achieve social justice 
and tackle inequalities.  The analysis entails: a) ILO Convention N.158 on Termination of 
Employment (1982),23 which sets labour standards for individual and collective dismissals and 
b) the international labour instruments for non-discrimination.  It further examines the 
minimum standards for social security protection as established in ILO Convention N.102 and 
the other specialized instruments.24  The last section looks at the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which is used as soft-law mode of governance and has relevance for future ILO 
activities. 
Chapter 4 primarily focuses on the two landmark instruments of the CoE: the ΕCHR of 1950 
and the European Social Charter, which was revised in 1996 (ESC/RSC).  First, it explores 
how employment security and social security standards are pertained in the evolving 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which primarily protects civil 
and political rights.  Second, it looks at the work-related and social security rights as endorsed 
in the ESC/RSC, which is a unique European legal instrument that sets out a comprehensive 
list of social rights.  In this context, the chapter examines complaints that are intrinsically linked 
 
23 ILO Convention N.158: Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 
(68th ILC session Geneva 68th 22 June 1982). 
24 ILO Convention N.102: Convention concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security (35th ILC session 
Geneva 28 June 1952). 
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to employment security, job security and social security, which are examined by the Charter’s 
monitoring mechanism, the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR). 
Chapter 5 provides analysis of EU labour law and policy.  The regulation of employment 
security as developed in the acquis consists of: first, the regulation of individual dismissals, 
which is closely linked to EU non-discrimination law; and second,  the regulation of economic 
dismissals, as a special type of regulation that could ease transitions in the European labour 
market.  This chapter also examines EU Regulations on coordination of social security systems, 
which set the procedures that facilitate the free movement of workers and their families within 
the EU.  The last section is focused on the European Employment Strategy (EES) and Social 
OMC, which as reflexive policy mechanisms could increase the labour and social security 
standards through transnational labour regulation.  
Chapter 6 is focused on the case study of Cyprus (or Republic of Cyprus).  The aim of this 
chapter is to explore how the Cypriot system has understood the concept of employment 
security and its relationship with social security system. The second section explains the 
contextual framework of the Cypriot legal system.  In this section, the analysis touches upon 
the sources of law, the key concepts of ‘employee’ and ‘salaried worker’ and further provides 
an outlook of the Cypriot Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) and the Post-Programme 
Surveillance (PPS).  The third section explores the forms of social dialogue and discusses the 
Industrial Relations Code (IRC) that regulates social dialogue at domestic level.  The fourth 
section provides insights of employment security regulation and examines the domestic courts’ 
approach over domestic laws, with focus on Termination of Employment Law 24/67.  The last 
section discusses social security regulation, which includes an analysis of the Cypriot Laws on 
social insurance and social assistance. 
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Flexicurity, a nexus of flexibility and security, has been characterized by Ralf Rogowski as ‘a 
reflexive deregulatory strategy for regulation’.1  This is a reflexive strategy that seeks to 
achieve swift transitions in the labour market and secure employment for all, even for the 
vulnerable categories of workers, such as older workers and working mothers.  Reflexivity 
aims to persuade actors for the positive effects of ‘transitional employment’.  Flexibility of 
labour markets sometimes entails removal of so-called ‘rigidities’, which could lead to a race 
to the bottom in labour standards.   
Chapter 2 is composed of three main sections.  The first consists of an introduction, while the 
second section explores the theoretical underpinnings of flexicurity and historical origins of 
flexicurity that are prominent in the Netherlands and Denmark.  Despite the strong presence of 
flexicurity in the European Employment Strategy (EES), the ILO, which is known as the 
pioneer international standard-setting actor for labour protection, has barely reflected on 
flexicurity policies.  The third section discusses the ‘ingredients’ of flexicurity and their 
complexities.  This entails an analysis of the terminological confusion between job security 
and employment security, the funding responsibilities for ALMPs and exploration of the types 
of social dialogue in the ILO and EU context.  The fourth and last section is focused on the 
theory of reflexive law and its core elements, which were developed by Gunther Teubner and 
Ralf Rogowski.  It makes the link between flexicurity and reflexivity, which could bridge and 
ease the tensions between the self-referential systems of employment security and social 
security, through re-regulation. 
 
2.2 History of flexicurity  
 
This section explores the historical development of the concept of flexicurity, which emerged 
as a method of national policy and transnational regulation.  The discussion begins with the 
Dutch and Danish flexicurity models.  It focuses on a Dutch law (i.e. the Flexibility and 
Security Act) and the Danish Golden Triangle, which successfully combined generous 
 
1 Rogowski R., Reflexive labour law in the world of society (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013), p.130. 
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unemployment benefits, ALMPs and flexible working arrangements.  The first sub-section 
provides an historical analysis of flexicurity as conceptualized within the EU regime.  Even if 
the idea of flexicurity is known as an EU-oriented concept, the second sub-section attempts to 
explore the emergence and development of flexicurity in the international domain. 
2.2.1 The origins of flexicurity: the Netherlands and Denmark 
 
The Dutch Model  
The first country that introduced flexicurity policies was the Netherlands.  The term 
‘flexicurity’, a catchy word that someone could easily remember that connects flexibility and 
security, was first coined by Hans Adriaansens, who was a Dutch sociologist and a member of 
the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR).2  During preparatory discussions 
for the new ‘Flexibility and Social Security Law’ and ‘the Act concerning the Allocation of 
Workers via Intermediaries’, Andriaansens used the term ‘flexicurity’ to express the need to 
adopt a new approach, making a shift from ‘job security’ to ‘employment security’.3  
The Dutch flexicurity model initially appeared in the early 20th century, which facilitated the 
transition from temporary to permanent employment.  At that time, the Dutch dismissal law 
entailed strict procedural requirements, which were characterized by the business world as 
‘burdens to business’.4  To explain, an employment contract could only be terminated if the 
employer had followed one of the two procedures: a) either after notifying the Centre for Work 
and Income, which was the regional public employment service; b) or after bringing a claim 
before domestic courts in case of a ‘serious cause’.5  For this reason, the Dutch dismissal system 
was usually characterized as ‘a dual system’.6  The Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Mr. Ad Melkert, understood the dissatisfaction of the business world, which was 
caused by the two procedures, and took the initiative to strengthen labour market flexibility 
and social security, by drafting the Memorandum on ‘Flexibility and Security’ (‘Flexibiliteit 
en Zekerheid’, December 1995).7  According to Keune and Jepsen, the two Acts were ‘a 
product of the Dutch Polder Model’, also known as the ‘purple coalition government of the 
 
2 Keune M. and Jepsen M., ‘Not balanced and hardly new: the European Commission’s quest for flexicurity’ 
(2007) WP 2007.01 <https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-Papers/Not-balanced-and-hardly-new-the-
European-Commission-s-quest-for-flexicurity> accessed 12 August 2019, p.5. 
3 Wilthagen T. and Tros F., ‘The concept of ‘flexicurity’: a new approach to regulating employment and labour 
markets’ (2004) 10(2) European Review of Labour and Research 166, p.173. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, p.172. 
7 Ibid, p.173. 
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1990s’ (i.e. Labour, Liberals and Social Liberals).8  This coalition placed as a high priority the 
objectives to improve labour protection, increase competitiveness and strike a balance of 
employers’ and workers’ interests.9  The Memorandum of 1995 did not lead to the conclusion 
of an agreement.  
In November 1997, the lower house of Parliament finally adopted ‘the Flexibility and Security 
Act’.10  The legislation proposal, which was submitted by the Dutch Government to the 
Parliament in 1997, was based on the two following proposals: the Memorandum of Labour 
Foundation and the ‘Start Agreement’.11  Both proposals raised the issue that plagued Dutch 
labour system in the 1980s-90s, according to which temporary agency workers faced an 
increased risk of employment insecurity.12  The Memorandum of Labour Foundation was 
drafted on 3 April 1996 after the request for advice from the Dutch Government by the Labour 
Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid).13  The Labour Foundation, which acted as the 
consultation body in the Dutch Polder Model, was only comprised by the major workers’ and 
employers’ representative organizations.14  
‘The Start Agreement’ was concluded in April 1993 by ‘ Start’, a Dutch employment agency, 
taking the form of a five-year collective agreement on regulation of temporary agency 
workers.15  This agreement established a ‘four-phase system’, according to which temporary 
agency workers would be gradually granted more rights, such as access to pension schemes.16  
After completing eighteen months in a particular job position or thirty-six months in multiple 
positions, these temporary agency workers were able to transition from temporary to permanent 
employment.17  The Start Agreement introduced a system in which the degree of flexibility and 
security was related to the completed employment period of the temporary agency worker.  
There was also an attempt to provide ‘job’ as opposed to only ‘employment’ security, if 
temporary agency workers stayed in position for the requisite length of time.    
 
 
8 Keune and Jepsen (n.2). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Wilthagen and Tros (n.3), p.174. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, p.173. 
14 Ibid, p.174. 
15 Ibid. 




The Danish Model  
The Danish flexicurity model is known as the ‘Golden Triangle’.  This model, which tackled 
unemployment and social exclusion, was particularly successful because it faced difficult times 
such as the economic distress in the 1970s and 1980s and survived.18  The term ‘Triangle’ is 
used because the model combines three core elements: a) external numerical flexibility, which 
removes the restrictions from dismissal laws to ease the tensions of job security-employment 
security; b) generous unemployment benefits to guarantee an income through the transition; 
and c) ALMPs to increase employability and push workers back to employment.19  The removal 
of restrictions in dismissal laws could also be implied as a removal of employment protections, 
which could mean a decrease in the degree of job security.20  
The Danish model of flexicurity was characterized as a ‘model of a special nature’ because it 
combines low levels of employment protection with high levels of external numerical 
flexibility and income security with ALMPs.21  Madsen sees the Danish model as idealistic 
because it does not fully represent the Danish reality.22  He claims that generous unemployment 
benefits could facilitate the shift from employment to inactivity, since the income security that 
is provided as unemployment benefit could possibly make the individuals unwilling to find a 
job and return to employment.23   
2.2.2 Flexicurity and the European Union  
 
The concept of flexicurity as known today emerged for the first time in the 2007 EC 
Communication titled as ‘Towards Common principles of flexicurity: more and better jobs 
through flexibility and security’.24  This EC policy document defined the term of ‘flexicurity’ 
as ‘an integrated strategy to enhance, at the same time, flexibility and security in the labour 
market’, two concepts which appeared separately in the early 1990s as ‘pillars of national 
systems’.25  The 2007 EC policy document also set out the four flexicurity ingredients (also 
known as ‘components’) to achieve an equilibrium between flexibility-security: flexible and 
 
18 Madsen K. P., ‘Flexicurity: a new perspective on labour markets and welfare states in Europe’ (2008) 14 Tilburg 
L. Rev. 57, p.67. 
19 Ibid, p.64. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p.67. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 European Commission, ‘Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility 
and security - Impact Assessment’ SEC (2007) 861 (EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity). 
25 European Commission, White Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century, COM (93) 700 final (EC 1993 White Paper), p.13. 
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reliable contractual arrangements, Comprehensive life-long learning (LLL), effective active 
labour market policies (ALMPs) and modern social security systems.26  A similar approach 
was adopted in regard to security, where the EC extended the scope of security, which apart 
from employment protection, also covers unemployment benefits and vocational and training 
programmes.27    
The 2007 Communication of the EU laid out eight general principles of flexicurity that shall 
be respected by the Member States.28  These principles expressed the role of flexicurity as an 
EU policy tool in achieving the core mandate of the EU to become the most competitive 
economy in the world.  The EU Communication particularly referred to the need to ‘strengthen 
the European social models’ and ‘implement the Growth and Jobs Strategy’.29  It explained 
that the idea of flexicurity involves complex balances, observing that, apart from the most 
profound one between flexibility and security, the Member States shall strike the right balance 
between rights and responsibilities of different actors.30  The flexicurity principles seemed 
idealistic because they promote the protection and respect of general principles and human 
rights, such as gender equality, universality, labour rights and welfare.  Flexicurity principle 8 
laid out that the flexicurity policies shall be adopted to the extent that they do not create 
excessive ‘budgetary costs’, which shows that pragmatic economic barriers could create 
‘reasonable’ obstacles for the realization of flexicure labour markets.31  This principle shows 
that realization of national flexicurity policies reflect the discretionary budgetary preferences 
of each Member State, which does not necessarily represent their economic situation in terms 
of necessity.  Through the prism of the Europe 2020: Growth and Jobs and the initiative of an 
Agenda for new skills and jobs, which was introduced to increase labour opportunities, 
flexicurity policies have been established as key target.32  
Even before the adoption of the 2007 policy document, the four flexicurity ‘ingredients’ started 
to appear separately in the EU context.  In the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment (1993), the European Commission (EC) flagged up that the absence of internal-
external flexible working arrangements, educational and training programmes and social 
 
26 EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity (n.24), p.5. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, p.9. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, 
November 2010, COM (2010) 682 final. 
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security protection, which were later recognized in the 2007 EC flexicurity policy document as 
‘flexicurity components’, were the root causes of unemployment.    The White Paper of 1993 
recognized the increase of competitiveness as an aim of flexible working arrangements, a form 
of ‘decentralized movement’.33  The distinction between internal and external flexibility, which 
also appears in the ‘Wilthagen matrix’, aims to distinguish the aims of each type of flexibility.  
To explain, external flexibility aims to ease the transition from unemployment to active 
employment, whereas internal flexible working arrangements attempt to reduce the risk of 
redundancy by allowing opportunities for jobs to be performed in potentially unprecedented 
ways, such as, for example, in terms of hours and location.34  In the 2007 EC Document, 
flexibility is described as ‘successful transitions’ through lifetime – e.g. from school to 
employment, from unemployment to employment, from one job to another, from employment 
to retirement.35  The EC adopted a broader concept of flexibility from that applied in the Dutch 
and Danish models of flexicurity, which solely refer to the transition from unemployment to 
employment and from one job to another.36 
The Green Paper on Partnership for a New Organization for Work (1997), which was adopted 
by the EC, also introduced flexibility-security in the policy discussions.37  In the 1997 Green 
Paper, flexibility and security, which again were recognized as two distinct dynamics and 
powers, entailed the introduction of employability policies, as means to facilitate and support 
access to employment for people, who were inactive for multiple reasons, such as lack of 
employability skills.38 
The 2000 Lisbon Strategy, which introduced the EU development plan for the 2000-2020 
period, did not refer to flexicurity.  In an increasingly competitive economy, the discussion 
shifted from employment security to employability.  The EES used the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), which was introduced in 1997 as a policy tool to facilitate exchange of 
information and attain the Lisbon targets, for example fostering employability.39  As Funk 
 
33 EC 1993 White Paper (n.25), p.11. 
34 Ibid, p.17. 
35 EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity (n.24), p.4. 
36 Ibid, p.5. 
37 European Commission, Green Paper on Partnership for a new organization for work COM (1997) 128 final, 
p.12. 
38 Ibid, pp.13-14. 




stressed, the OMC occupies a dominant place at EU-level because it decreases the risk of a 
political conflict and enables the Member States to adopt their own domestic social model.40 
The EU primary goal was to establish the EU as the most competitive and ‘dynamic 
knowledge-based economy’ in the international arena, which will have the highest levels of 
economic efficiency.41  The 2000 Lisbon Strategy set out a list of different sub-targets, which 
included two of the core components of flexicurity (i.e. ALMPs and social security).42   
Employment security, which cannot be found in the text of Lisbon Strategy of 2000 and 
constitutes a key component of flexicurity, might be brought under the umbrella of social 
inclusion.  To explain, paragraph 32 in the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 characterized employment 
as ‘the best safeguard against social exclusion’.43  It seems that this argument is not very strong 
because the statement which is found in paragraph 32 in the Lisbon Strategy might refer only 
to the transition from unemployment to employment through ALMPs, which does not 
necessarily mean to reduce the risk of dismissal and redundancy.  The reference to the three 
key components of flexicurity as separate concepts - i.e. employment security, ALMPs and 
social security - demonstrates that the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 is prima facie a step of minor 
importance towards the conceptualization of flexicurity. 
The Employment Guidelines of 2001, which set out the employment priorities based on the 
Lisbon Strategy of 2000, recognized the two core parts of a flexicurity equilibrium (i.e. 
flexibility and security), however, it failed to recognize the four constituent ‘ingredients’ of 
flexicurity (i.e. flexible contractual arrangements, social security protection, ALMPs and LLL).   
In the 2001 European Employment Guideline 13, the fair balance between flexibility and 
security appeared for the first time.44  In the section on ‘improving employability’, the 2001 
Guidelines just put social security systems and ALMPs as key objectives, but failed to link 
them with the nexus of flexibility and security.45  The EC further added the notion of ‘job 
quality’ in the flexibility and security equilibrium in the 2002 Communication from the EC, 
which reviewed the EES between 1997 and 2001.46  In this 2002 policy document, the EC 
 
40 Funk L., 'European Flexicurity Policies: A Critical Assessment' (2008) 24(3) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 349, p.361.  
41 Lisbon Strategy 2000 (n.39), Preamble. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, para.32. 
44 Council Decision 2001/63 of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States' employment policies for the 
year 2001 [2001] OJ L22/18, guideline 13. 
45 Ibid. 




discussed the current developments for striking a flexibility and security balance.47  Flexibility, 
which took the form of ‘flexible types of employment relationships’ and ‘flexible working time 
arrangements’, was integrated in the pillar of adaptability.48  The 2005 Integrated Guideline 20 
set the flexible arrangements, irrespective of the type of employment, as a goal for productivity 
growth and employment security.49  In the 2005 Guideline 16, social security, which is a 
flexicurity ingredient, was set as a necessary ingredient for social inclusion that is entailed in 
the concept of employment security.50    
In 2010, the EU launched the Europe Strategy 2020: Growth and Jobs, replacing the targets of 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs with new targets that will make the EU a ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economy’.51  In the realm of article 145 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which sets out the importance of collaboration 
between the Union and the Member States in the field of employment, the Council adopted the 
2010 Decision on the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States.52  
Guideline 7 that is annexed to the 2010 Council Decision, prompts the Member States to adopt 
flexicurity policies at domestic level, denoting that flexibility and security ‘shall be both 
balanced and mutually reinforcing’.53  The idea of flexicurity is conceptualized in the 
‘European Guideline 7: Enhancing the functioning of labour markets’ of 2015, which was 
proposed as part of a new package of integrated policy guidelines by the EC and adopted by 
the Council in 2016.  The European Guideline 7 explicitly refers to ‘flexicurity principles’ 
(nexus of flexibility and security).54  It further explains that employment protection should be 
provided to individuals inside and outside the labour market in adequate levels.55  The other 
two key components of flexicurity – i.e. social security, which is brought under the umbrella 
 
47 Ibid, p.13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 European Commission, The new Integrated economic and employment guidelines (Brussels, 12 April 2005) 
<https://2007-2013.espa.gr/elibrary/integrated_guidelines_Growth_Jobs_en.pdf> accessed 12 August 2019 
 Guideline 20; Council Decision 2005/600 on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States 
[2005] OJ L205/21.  
50 Ibid, Integrated Guideline 16. 
51 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth Europe 2020 COM (2010) 2020 final.  
52 Council Decision 2010/707 of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States 
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of ‘socioeconomic security’, and ‘education and training opportunities’ – are strictly linked to 
‘quality employment’.56   
Under the umbrella of Europe Strategy 2020, the EC introduced the Country-Specific 
Recommendations (CSR) through which it gives suggestions to the Member States in many 
fields, which include employment and social policies.57  These CSR, which constitute part of 
the National Reform and Stability Programme, are published every year.58  EU Member States, 
which are under an Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP), are excluded from the CSR 
during the period that participates in the Programme.59  For this reason, the Republic of Cyprus 
was excluded from the CSR from 2011 and included again in this programme in 2016, when it 
successfully exited the EAP.60 
2.2.3 International recognition of flexicurity 
 
According to the principle of hermeneutics, each regulatory system, acting as the receptor and 
listener of the information, decides on the substance of the information.61  In this context, the 
flexicurity concept discretely appeared in ILO policy-making forums.62  The 2009 Report on 
Combining Flexibility and Security for Decent Work, integrates flexicurity in the ILO agenda. 
In the 306th International Labour Conference (ILC) Session, ‘flexicurity’ was discussed in the 
ILO based on the domains that were set in the EU regime.63   
Flexicurity appeared as an ‘element of balanced national growth strategies’ in the 2007 ILO 
discussion paper on ‘Growth, Employment and Social Protection: A strategy for balanced 
growth in a global market economy’, which was prepared for the Informal Ministerial Meeting 
of Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs during the ILC.64  Social security protection, which 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 EU official website, EU Country-Specific Recommendations <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-
semester/european-semester-timeline/eu-country-specific-recommendations_en> accessed 6 December 2018. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Regulation No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening 
of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L140/1, article 12. 
60 Ibid, article 14. 
61 Seidi D, ‘Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems’ (2004) <https://www.zfog.bwl.uni-
muenchen.de/files/mitarbeiter/paper2004_2.pdf> accessed 6 December 2018, p.2. 
62 International Labour Office, Governing Body, Committee on Employment and Social Policy, Third item on the 
agenda: Combining flexibility and security for decent work (306th session November 2009) GB.306/ESP/3/1, p.2 
para.5. 
63 Ibid, pp.2-3. 
64 International Labour Office, ‘Growth, employment and social protection: A strategy for balanced growth in a 
global market economy: A discussion paper for the Informal Ministerial Meeting of Ministers of Labour and 
Social Affairs during the International Labour Conference’ (Geneva 12 June 2007), p.3. 
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was not traditionally developed as an economic measure, was turned into a tool for achieving 
competitiveness and improving economic performance.65  During the 301st Session of the 
Governing Body of the International Labour Office in 2008, the idea of flexicurity was 
discussed and conceived as ‘a tool facilitating adaptation to changes in the globalized 
economy’.66  The Employer Vice-Person saw flexicurity through a slightly different 
perspective, by deploying the idea that flexicurity does not only constitute a useful ‘tool’ but a 
‘strategy’ which deals with major societal problems, such as employment promotion and work 
organization.67 
In the Joint Conclusions of the 7th High-Level Meeting between the EC and the International 
Labour Office (December 2008), the actors expressed their intention and their desire to 
cooperate and assist each other to put forward the flexicurity policies.68  The EC noted inter 
alia that the ILO shall decide the appropriate indicators to examine flexibility and security.69  
The term ‘indicators’ was not defined by the EC, which did not even set out few examples of 
these indicators, showing its reluctance to exchange substantial information on the issue with 
the ILO.  During the 8th European Regional Meeting (ERM) of the ILO in 2009, flexicurity 
took the form of ‘a useful policy mix to balance flexibility and security’.70  Whereas, during 
the 7th ERM in Europe and Central Asia in 2005, the ILO’s constituents agreed on the fact the 
flexicurity, a nexus of flexibility and security, shall be useful for both employers and workers.71  
In the 7th ERM, the participants had also touched upon the importance of social dialogue in 
striking the right balance between flexibility and security.72  
In the 104th ILC Session, the ILO Future of Work initiative was launched to celebrate the 100th 
anniversary in 2019 and reflect on the continuing challenges in the world of work.73 The 
realization of social justice, which is the constitutional mandate of the ILO, still has not been 
 
65 Ibid, p.3. 
66 International Labour Office, Governing Body, Minutes of the 301st Session of the Governing Body of the 
International Labour Office (301st session Geneva March 2008) GB.301/PV, p.3. 
67 Ibid, p.4. 
68 Joint conclusions of the 7th High-Level Meeting between the European Commission and the International 
Labour Office (Geneva 2 December 2008), pp.4-5. 
69 Ibid, p.5. 
70 International Labour Organization, Eighth European Regional Meeting, ‘Working out of crisis: Strategies for 
Decent Work in Europe and Central Asia’, Conclusions of the Eighth European Regional Meeting of the ILO 
(Lisbon, 9–13 February 2009) ERM/VIII/D.5(Rev.). 
71 International Labour Organization, Seventh European Regional Meeting, Conclusions (Budapest 14-18 
February 2005) ERM/VII/D.6. 
72 Ibid. 
73 International Labour Conference ‘Report of the Director-General Report I: The future of work centenary 
initiative’ (104th ILC session Geneva 2015), pp.5-7. 
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achieved as insecurity in employment remains.74  The Director’s General Report also referred 
to the failure of flexicurity, as non-standard forms of employment are linked to a race of bottom 
in labour standards.75  In this ILC session, the Worker Members articulated the view that there 
is no theoretical conceptualization of flexicurity and no clear definition of flexicurity at 
international and EU-level.76  This view is particularly interesting because it shows the level of 
ambiguity (and ambivalence) that exists among ILO members regarding conceptualizing the 
idea of flexicurity.77  Also, the workers’ representatives may disagree because setting out a 
clear definition of flexicurity could be a boost for greater flexibility (as opposed to a shield for 
security). The fact that the concept of flexicurity has not been enshrined in any EU binding 
instrument, led the Worker Members to prioritize ILO instruments over flexicurity, arguing 
that the idea of flexicurity cannot be used by the ILO members as an excuse for non-compliance 
to ILO Conventions and Recommendations.78  The flexibility ingredient is distinct from the 
two types of security (employment security-social security), which are recognized as indicators 
in the Decent Work Agenda (DWA).79 
The 2017 Inception Report for the Global Commission on the Future of Work discusses the 
implications of flexible working arrangements on job security and employment security, as the 
flexibilization of labour market seems to facilitate the transition from non-standard forms of 
employment to unemployment.80  Nevertheless, labour market flexibility has two main 
advantages: a) it has positive effects on jobs creation and b) it helps workers to strike a balance 
between work and family responsibilities.  However, the increasing flexibility of labour 
markets remains a continuing struggle for workers, as it could lead to flexibilization of 
dismissals procedures, leading to a race of bottom of labour standards.81  In the 21st century, 
‘job (in)security matters’ because non-standard forms of employment, as flexible working 




76 International Labour Conference, Third item on the agenda: Information and reports on the application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards (104th Session 
Geneva June 2015). 
77 Ibid, p.123. 
78 Ibid. 
79 International Labour Office, Decent work indicators: guidelines for producers and users of statistical and legal 
framework indicators (Geneva: ILO, 2013). 
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to remain in the labour market.82  The 2017 Report also discusses the deficits of social security 
protection and the current debate for a ‘basic income for all’, which is enshrined in the ILO 
Recommendation on Social Protection Floors (N.202).83 
In the Synthesis Report of national social dialogues, the Representatives from Nigeria stated 
that through this process, the Member States will be able to learn from other countries how to 
strike a balance between flexibility and security.84  Germany’s representatives referred to the 
need to impose limits on external flexibility to ensure security for temporary agency workers.85   
In addition, the 2017 Report stated that collective bargaining should be used to strike a fair 
balance between flexibility and security in Spain.86 
2.2.4 Conclusion  
 
Throughout the historical development of flexicurity, the EU adopts a more dynamic and 
proactive approach towards flexicurity and prompts the EU Member States through indirect 
means (i.e. OMC and CSR) to strike their own balances between flexibility and security.   
Despite the efforts of the EU to set out a clear definition of flexicurity, it seems that its 
definition still appears ambiguous and its application, which will be analysed further in the next 
section, tends to be problematic.  Since there are multiple forms of flexibility and security and 
there is ‘no one size fits for all’,87 the interplay of flexibility and security becomes more 
complex.  In the Danish model of flexicurity, a special combination of low levels of 
employment protection and high levels of external numerical flexibility, is used as a paradigm.  
However, the intersection of the ‘golden’ components could be determined ad hoc based on 
the features of each domestic labour system.  In addition, it appears that job security is not 
treated as priority at all in the 2019 ILO Report ‘Global Commission on the future of work’, 
which  adopted three pillars for ‘a human-centred agenda for the future of work’: a) increasing 
investment in people’s capabilities b) increasing investment in the institutions of work and c) 
increasing investment in decent and sustainable work.88  This is interesting because the ILO, 
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through the adoption of ILO Convention N.158, had already shown its strong desire for 
transnational governance of job security standards.  The 2019 Global Report seems to focus on 
transitions in employment, which could be characterized as a reflection of EU’s flexicurity 
policies, rather than endorsing job security protections.  
 
2.3 Understanding the complexities of flexicurity components  
 
This section explores the deficient theoretical foundations of flexicurity components.  It 
attempts to identify the problematic issues around the ingredients of flexicurity and hence, 
develop a thorough understanding of flexicurity.  The first sub-section discusses the imminent 
need to shift from employment to job security in the discourse of flexicurity and assesses the 
textual and normative complexities of this shift.  The second sub-section examines the 
similarities and differences between Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) and Life-Long 
Learning Strategies (LLL) and attempts to identify who has the responsibility to provide 
vocational training and education programmes, which would enable the individuals to shift 
easily from one job to another, or from unemployment to decent employment.  For this reason, 
the ALMPs as suggested below, shall seek to improve the employability skills of individuals 
to help them to get a decent job.  Lastly, the third sub-section focuses on the role of social 
dialogue in the sphere of flexicurity and particularly examines whether the term ‘social 
dialogue’ encompasses the idea of collective bargaining.  
2.3.1 Employment security and job security  
 
Employment security and job security, as perceived in the EU flexicurity debate, constitute two 
different forms of security.  The terminology of the two concepts, which sometimes can collide, 
is not clear.  The 2007 EC policy document referred to the shift from job security to 
employment security.89  From the EC’s perspective, it seems that there is a clear distinction 
between job and employment security because they differ on the aims and goals that they attain 
to accomplish.  The concept of job security, which has a sensu stricto meaning, aims to secure 
a particular job.90  On the other hand, the mandate of employment security is to ‘preserve 
people’s ability to enter, remain and progress in employment throughout the life-cycle’.91   
 
89 EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity (n.24), pp.20-21.  




Although the words ‘employment’ and ‘job’ are often used as synonyms in colloquial speech, 
‘employment’ in the concept of employment security has a broader meaning which aims to 
enable individuals to transition easily and successfully from one job to another, or from 
unemployment to employment.  Through these transitions, employment security in the broader 
context entails that individuals are provided with adequate social protection.  This approach 
was also adopted in the 2007 EC Communication ‘Towards Common Principles of 
Flexicurity’.92  In this document, the EC emphasized the need to focus on fostering employment 
security rather than job security because in the rise of globalization, individuals struggle to 
retain a job for a lifetime.93 
It seems that embedding the ingredient of ‘employability’ in the concept of employment 
security has caused terminological confusion among scholars.  According to Nina Zekic, the 
increasing need to secure an individual’s ability to remain in the labour market and depend on 
their employability is usually described as ‘employment security’.94  Many scholars also refer 
to ‘employability security’ or ‘labour market security’ or even ‘job security’ in order to 
describe these swift transitions in the labour market (although the latter seems obviously a 
misnomer).95  In the scope of industrial labour and economics, Auer used the term ‘job security’ 
to describe security in the current job position (a particular job) and ‘employment security’ for 
securing employment with the current employer (‘multiple jobs’).96  He has observed that the 
transition from job security to employment security dates back to 1980s.97  He emphasized the 
need for ‘a critical and decisive shift’ from ‘job/employment security’ to ‘labour market 
security’, which refers to swift transitions for individuals in the labour market.98 
Job security and employment security are also recognized as core forms of security in the 
flexicurity ‘Wilthagen matrix’, which was developed by Ton Wilthagen. 99  This Matrix shows 
that combining different types of flexibility and security, as two mutually supportive concepts, 
are inter-related to the transitions in the labour market.  There are four forms of security: job 
security, employment security, income security and combination security.  ‘Employment 
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security’ takes the meaning of remaining in paid work, which does not necessarily mean to 
remain with the same employer or retain the same job, whereas the term ‘job security’ is used 
to describe the security of the current job.100  
In the discourse of flexicurity, it seems that the concepts of ‘job security’, ‘employment 
security’ and ‘labour market security’ are interpreted differently among scholars and standard-
setting actors.  In the ILO regime, job security means to secure a job which is compatible with 
the individuals’ interests and skills, whereas employment security mainly refers to protection 
against unfair or unjustified dismissal.101  The idea of ‘labour market security’ exists in the ILO 
sphere and it has taken a quite similar meaning to Auer’s interpretation of the term, which 
entails other types of security for swift transitions in the labour market (e.g. employment 
protection, social security and  income security).102  In this context, labour market security 
generally refers to ALMPs, which appeared in the ILO Socio-Economic Security Programme 
as ‘opportunities for adequate income-earning activities’.103  The ILO’s perspective on labour 
market policies focuses on employability without ensuring income security through transitions 
in the labour market, as did Auer’s version of ‘labour market security’. 
In the EU regime, employment security and job security seem to appear prima facie as distinct 
concepts.  The 2007 EC staff working document, illustrates that there is a clear-cut 
terminological distinction between job and employment security.  However, the 2008 Report 
of the Mission for Flexicurity shows that vagueness remains at EU level.104  In the 2008 Report 
the term ‘job security’ was used to describe swift transitions of individuals in the labour market, 
while enforcing ALMPs and ensuring income security through these transitions.105 
As an overall conclusion, it seems that there are two main problems in the distinction between 
job security and employment security in the flexicurity discourse.  Firstly, there is the textual 
or terminological confusion between job security, employment security and labour market 
security, which was analysed above.  In the discourse of flexicurity, employment security 
seems to refer to swift transitions in the labour market rather than securing a particular job.  
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The terminological confusion creates additional obstacles to the realization of flexicurity 
policies because it makes it more difficult for standard-setting actors to conceptualize the idea 
of flexicurity.  Since this research deals with the concept of employment security within 
different systems, each section will clarify the terminological use of ‘employment security’ as 
it exists at multi-level regulation.  It would be irrational to adopt a clear-cut definition of 
employment security and disregard the way that employment security is interpreted in various 
contexts, both by standard-setting actors and scholars.   
Secondly, it seems that facilitation of dismissals does not mean that individuals can 
automatically swift easily in the labour market, that is, from one job to another, from 
unemployment to employment.  The empowerment of employment security, which entails 
effective application of flexicurity policies and mediating arising collisions with job security 
standards, is more complex from solely fostering job security.  Below, there are examples of 
successful and unsuccessful flexicurity models, which will help the reader understand why 
employment security is a complex concept.  The Danish model of flexicurity is almost an 
identical paradigm to the idea of EU flexicurity, composed of low levels of job security (being 
able to remain in a particular job) and high levels of employment security (swift transitions in 
the labour market).106   
Whereas, the Spanish Labour Market Reform of 2012, which inter alia facilitated dismissal 
procedures, increased the number of precarious temporary contracts and did not manage to 
tackle the problem of unemployment.107 This ‘thoroughly unbalanced implementation of 
flexicurity’ was described by Julia López, Alexandre de le Court and Sergio Canalda as 
‘flexiprecarity’.108  In addition, the case of Greece illustrates that removal of jobs protections 
can have serious adverse effects on the effective application of flexicurity policies.  In the 2014 
CEACR’s Observation Comment on the application of ILO Convention on Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) (N.111), the CEACR criticized the implications of Acts 
N.4024/2011 and N.4093/2012 and urged Greek authorities to ‘end the flexibilization of 
employment relationships in the private and the public sectors’.109  Greek Act N.4024/2011, 
which provided that certain categories of workers can be dismissed without prior notice, could 
be conceived as a form of external numerical flexibility.  Whereas, Greek Act N.4093/2012 
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seems to endorse internal flexibility because it has provided conversion from full-time to part-
time public employment contracts and ‘rotation work contracts in the private enforcement 
contracts’.110  This shows that removal of employment protection (or in the language used 
above within the EU, job security) barriers could facilitate the transition from employment to 
unemployment, instead of transition from one job to another.  It seems that the divergence of 
theoretical conceptualization of employment security makes the realization of flexicurity more 
complicated.  The major problem, which needs to be addressed at domestic level, is to 
strengthen the inter-connection between facilitation of dismissal procedures and transition from 
one job to another.  The facilitation of dismissal procedures could act as an essential pre-
requisite for fostering employment security protection and the level of this facilitation could be 
linked to the level of employment security and social security.  
2.3.2 Who pays for the training? 
 
In 2007, the EC established that Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) and Comprehensive 
Lifelong Learning Strategies (LLL) shall constitute two ‘core policy components’ of 
flexicurity.111  Both flexicurity components endorsed the concepts of adaptability and 
employability, reflecting an EU old practice to promote adaptability-employability as means 
to reduce the risk of unemployment.  The Essen Council set vocational training as a ‘priority 
area’, prompting the Member States to adopt policies and enhance employability at domestic 
level.112  Similarly, the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs 2005-2008 urged the 
Member States to adapt their education and training systems to existing competition 
challenges.113  As Wilkinson commented, ALMPs are mainly focused on addressing 
‘unemployability’ rather than ‘unemployment’.114  In the Joint Employment Report of 2001, 
the EC articulated the view that employability policies, which are adopted under the 
employability pillar and aim to reduce the skills gap, can cause adverse effects on job security 
(i.e. ‘security in a specific job’).115  Before the EC recognized ALMPs and LLL as core 
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components of flexicurity, Diamond Ashiagbor had already conceptualized the interconnection 
between ALMPs and flexibility, characterising ALMPs as a ‘logical complement to flexible 
labour markets’.116  
Through the lens of the EC, the mandate of LLL is conceived as the ‘continual adaptability and 
employability of workers’, whereas the ALMPs aim to make workers to adapt to ‘rapid 
changes’ and facilitate the transition from one job to another.117  It seems that LLL are aiming 
at a long-term impact on individuals’ abilities and educational level, whereas ALMPs are used 
as driving force which pulls individuals out from unemployment and build bridges between 
jobs, preventing individuals to trapped into unemployment.  LLL could be conceived as an 
investment to quality education and technical expertise of the worker, which will make the 
workers able to adapt and cope with the challenges in the stiff and long run of competitive 
firms. 
ALMPs are mainly distinguished in four broad categories in the literature: job search 
assistance, (labour market) training, private sector employment incentives, and public sector 
employment.118  With regard to job search assistance, these are programmes that aim to 
facilitate the transition of the unemployed individual back to employment.  Jochen Kluve 
observed that these schemes, which are run by the governmental authorities, are low-cost.119  
In contrast, the Governmental authorities seem more tempted to invest in labour market 
training.120  With regard to private sector incentive programmes, the core mandate is to create 
incentives for employers to recruit and/or retain their existing employees, for example by wage 
subsidy.121  Lastly, employment programmes in the public sector, which usually last for a short 
period, are costly for the governmental authorities.122 
As employability policies (ALMPs and LLL) are generated and developed at domestic level, 
States can reflect the peculiar characteristics of their own labour market and tackle their 
concurrent challenges.  In this context, the absolute discretion, which is left to Member States, 
might create problems as to universal application of flexicurity policies.  It seems that 
employment status plays a decisive role in accessing both ALMPs and LLL.  Although the 
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principle of universality entails employment opportunities for everyone, there are concerns 
over the types of employment to which employability policies are applied.  In the 2007 
Communication, the EC recognised that temporary workers are often excluded from 
employability programmes.123  It seems that the root cause for excluding specific categories of 
workers is dependent on the funding body of the programme.  Employers are generally 
interested in improving the competitiveness of their company and reducing their cost however, 
some employers appear reluctant to invest in LLL because they fear that workers that 
participate in training schemes, which are funded by the enterprises, can be recruited by other 
employers.124 
LLL is in the interest of both workers and employers – for workers, as an opportunity to 
increase their skills and avoid the risk of being exposed to unemployment and poverty and for 
employers, to increase competitiveness of their company.  Taking into consideration the 2007 
Communication where the EC observed that LLL strategies are primarily focused on high-
skilled workers, it seems that employers tend to invest only when there is limited risk.125   
Employers could limit the risk of losing money by requiring employees to stay for period after 
training or pay back a proportion of course fees if they leave.  This might raise issues regarding 
the discretion that is left to individuals to decide whether they want to participate in the 
programme.  If the worker is required to attend a training programme outside working hours, 
there might cause problems to individuals that have family responsibilities (such as take caring 
of old-people, single parents), to individuals that have two or more jobs or to workers with pro 
rata salary, since participation in a training programme could reduce the amount of their salary.   
Even in cases where training is provided within working hours, travelling expenses and 
distance are two factors that shall also be considered for facilitating workers to get access to 
the educational and vocational training programmes.  High-skilled workers seem to be those 
who are less likely to be subjected to dismissal. Eurostat statistics indicate that the rate of 
unemployed people in the EU, who had only primary or lower secondary education, reached 
14.8% (in 2017).126  Whereas, the rate of unemployed people in the same year, who finished 
upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education, is below 7%.127 
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Inevitably, being registered as unemployed can give an individual access to ALMPs.  It seems 
that there is problem in cases of partial employment and partial unemployment.  In these cases, 
there are situations where individuals are not registered as unemployed and their income is 
very low.  This means individuals are excluded from ALMPs programmes and they are trapped 
in low-income employment.  This is linked to the idea that the ALMPs should set as an aim not 
just to tackle unemployment, but to increase employability of individuals and help them to get 
a decent job.  There are also situations where individuals are registered as unemployed even if 
they keep their jobs (this phenomenon is known as ‘hidden unemployment’).  The role of 
ALMPs shall be emphasized at this point, since ALMPs shall create incentives to individuals 
to obtain an ‘official’ job, so that ‘hidden unemployment’ will be tackled and the risk of 
exposing individuals to poverty will be avoided. 
The creation of ‘incentives for workers and employers’ could play a dominant role in the 
realization of LLL.128  The EC speaks of ‘incentives’ but, it does not set out any indicators, 
principles or conditions that shall be considered in their determination.  To explain, it does not 
specify who shall introduce these incentives, which criteria shall be met in their determination, 
who shall act as the funding body of these incentives and which body shall have the supervisory 
role in order to assess the quality of these programmes and the role of enterprises in their 
realization.  For employers, ‘financial contributions and tax credit’ could motivate them to 
engage more actively in the realization of LLL.129  In this context, there are concerns over the 
effectiveness of LLL strategies and the actual role of employers.  It seems that there could be 
problems in cases where these incentives prompt the employer to participate but do not actively 
engage the employer in the effective application of LLL.  For example, the employer could 
officially accept participation in the scheme and gain the benefits, however, the employer could 
still appear reluctant to provide adequate training to employees by giving them time off work, 
for example.  This means participation in these schemes will not improve employees’ skills 
and employers would reduce the risk to invest in an employee that will be recruited by another 
employer.  It seems that a supervisory body, such as the public employment services (PES), 
could ensure the effective application of LLL.  However, it might not be easy to convince an 
employer to invest and engage in LLL if the application of the LLL will be supervised by 
another body. 
 




Cost sharing between different stakeholders, such as public authorities, workers, enterprises 
and social partners, could also prompt interested parties to participate in the realization of 
employability policies.130  Whereas, ALMPs are mainly promoted by the governmental 
authorities in order to tackle unemployment and enhance employability of job-seekers.131  This 
does not mean that governmental authorities shall act on their own in order to foster 
employability.  The PES, acting as ‘active promoters, strategic partners and/or coordinators’, 
could develop employability programmes so that employers could recruit employees under 
these schemes, pay a proportion of their salary and cover their needs.132  This is particularly 
beneficial in cases where employers struggle to recruit new members of staff due to a shortage 
of money.  In this context, it is important to acknowledge that the realization of ALMPs and 
LLL could increase employability skills of workers and tackle poverty.  These schemes need 
not be intended to just create a vicious circle of short-term recruitment and exposure of workers 
to unemployment.  Regarding ALMPs, public authorities can play the role of the supervisory 
body so that this will be avoided, whereas, in cases of LLL, it would be more efficient to 
accredit an independent body that would also take the role of the mediator. 
2.3.3 Social dialogue and collective bargaining  
 
The design and implementation of flexicurity policies have been linked to the idea of social 
dialogue.  Among the Common Principles of Flexicurity, the EC denoted the decisive role of 
social actors in the design and implementation of flexicurity policies.133  In the EU discourse 
of flexicurity, social dialogue is promoted as an over-arching method that could create a climate 
of trust among the interested parties and make them reach a consensus. Building an 
environment of trust, the social partners would be given the opportunity to strike a right balance 
between their rights and responsibilities.134 
Before assessing the role of social dialogue in the spectrum of flexicurity, it is important to 
understand the conceptualisation of ‘social dialogue’ and detect any complexities at EU and 
ILO regimes.  Predominantly, social dialogue is recognized as a core principle in both regimes.  
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Article 151 TFEU recognized it as a core principle for the promotion and respect of social 
rights, referring to ‘dialogue between management and labour’.135  Whereas, the ILO defined 
‘social dialogue’ as all forms of ‘negotiation, consultation or exchange of information between 
or among’ public authorities, employers and workers.136  The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia 
of 1944 has recognized the right to collective bargaining and, instead of using the term ‘social 
dialogue’, made reference to ‘cooperation of management and labour’ and ‘the collaboration 
of workers and employers’.137 
In the EU regime, social dialogue contributes to the development of EU social policies and 
takes the form of tripartite (social actors and EU institutions) and bipartite dialogue (employers 
organizations and trade unions).138  The Council Decision 2003/174 established the Tripartite 
Social Summit for Growth and Employment, which is ‘the highest level of tripartite social 
dialogue’ as part of cross-industry dialogue.139  According to article 3 of Council Decision 
2003/174, the Council of Presidency and the two subsequent Presidencies, the EC and the 
social partners shall participate in the Tripartite Social Summit.140  The Ministers of the 
Presidencies and the Commissioner on Labour and Social Affairs could also participate in the 
Summit.141  It is important to note that the number of worker’s representatives (maximum of 
10 people) shall be equal to the number of employers’ representatives that participate in the 
Summit.142  Apart from the Summit, there are also a number of tripartite Advisory Committees, 
such as the European Social Fund Committee, in which ‘European social actors are able to play 
an informal coordination role’.143 
With regard to bipartite dialogue, the Social Dialogue Committee, which was established in 
1992, brings together social partners and representatives of national member organisations 
(such as European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as workers’ organization representative 
and UNICE as employers’ organization representative) in order to discuss and negotiate issues 
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of common interest in the field of labour and social affairs.144  The EC Decision 98/500 
introduced the Sectoral Dialogue Committees, which shall consist of representatives of the 
social partners (i.e. national organizations that can conclude agreements).145  The 
Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy (1993) sets out 
a list of criteria that need to be fulfilled to determine if an organization is able to participate in 
consultations based on article 154 TFEU.146  Such an organization shall be a national 
representative of ‘cross-industry or relate specific sectors or categories’ that is able to 
‘negotiate agreements’ and has ‘adequate structures’ that would facilitate its participation in 
the consultation process.147 
Social actors shall submit an opinion or a recommendation to the Commission, as a form of 
consultation to the EC before any proposal submission on social policy (article 154(2)-(3) 
TFEU).  According to article 155 TFEU, social actors may conclude an agreement and either 
implement this based on their domestic rules or jointly ask the Commission to submit the 
proposal to the Council which is responsible to adopt a decision on implementation – known 
as ‘autonomous agreements’ (article 155(2) TFEU).  In cases where social actors failed to reach 
an agreement, then the Commission will still be able to take into account the issues raised by 
the social actors. 
Apart from bilateral dialogue, the EU Directive 2009/38 on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups 
of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees promotes bipartite 
social dialogue in enterprise-level.148  The over-arching aim of Directive 2009/38 is to ‘improve 
the right to information and consultation of employees in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings’.149  The Directive is applicable only to a specific 
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category of multi-national enterprises (i.e. with minimum 1000 employees within the Member 
States and two group undertakings in different Member States, of which each of the 
undertakings will have minimum 150 employees).150 
In the ILO regime, social dialogue can be tripartite (governmental authorities, workers’ and 
employers’ representatives) and bipartite (workers’ and employers’ representatives).  In 
regards to tripartite social dialogue, ILO Convention on Tripartite Consultation (International 
Labour Standards) of 1976 (N.144) established that workers’ and employers’ representatives 
which are entitled to participate in the consultation process regarding specific activities of the 
ILO (as subscribed in article 5 of ILO Convention N.144) are ‘enjoying the right of freedom of 
association’.151  Tripartite social dialogue appears in various forms, which include exchange of 
information, consultations (i.e. ‘ask the opinion of the other parties and give them the 
opportunity to respond’) and negotiations (i.e. discussions which aim for the conclusion of 
agreement).152 
In this context, bipartite social dialogue takes the form of ‘collective bargaining’, which could 
be conceived as tougher collective bargaining compared to EU bipartite social dialogue (i.e. 
discussions, exchange of information and negotiations among workers’ and employers’ 
representatives).  ILO Collective Bargaining Convention of 1981 (N.154) defined ‘collective 
bargaining’ as ‘all negotiations’ between employers’ and workers’ organizations.  These 
negotiations shall resolve issues on: a) employment terms and conditions, b) regulation of 
employment relationships between: i) employers and workers or/and, ii) employers or 
employers’ organizations) and workers’ organization(s).153 
Social dialogue could contribute to the realization of flexicurity policies, because it could 
resolve the power imbalances between the actors, however, there is still confusion around the 
form that it shall take.  Through the lens of the EC, it is obvious that national authorities have 
absolute discretion to decide the form of social dialogue.154  The over-arching aim of this 
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discretion is to give the opportunity to the Member States to reflect the socio-economic 
situation of each Member State and represent the interests of all parties in their own national 
flexicurity pathway.155  For example, in the flexicurity national pathway 4 that was proposed 
by the EC and aims to facilitate the transition from informal to formal employment, collective 
bargaining is promoted as the method that the national authorities shall use to help employers 
understand the advantages of in-job training and convince them to seriously consider investing 
in such training schemes for their workers.156  
It seems that interests of workers would be better represented through collective bargaining 
(ILO model) than mere information and consultation (EU model) that could neglect their 
interests.  Collective bargaining enables the employers and workers to develop a constructive 
relationship and through this continuing dialogue both parties can engage in the decision-
making process so that the policies would reflect their interests, addressing issues on an equal 
standing.  
It seems that even the concept of collective bargaining has developed its own peculiarities in 
each domestic system.  Eichhorst et.al, in their 2011 study, which was submitted to the EP, 
explained that the idea of collective bargaining is not homogenously conceived among EU 
Member States.157  According to the 2010/2011 Study on the Implementation of the Flexicurity 
Concept in the EU24, the role of social dialogue in the realization of flexicurity policies is 
overemphasized since the effectiveness of flexicurity policies at domestic level is strictly 
dependent on the level of social dialogue between social actors.158  The 2010/2011 Study, 
which showed that the density and level of social dialogue differs from country to country, 
characterized the role of social dialogue as ‘weak or symbolic’ because some Member States 
did not embrace the idea of social dialogue in the determination of their flexicurity policies.159   
It has distinguished the Member States based on the role of social dialogue in developing and 
enforcing flexicurity policies at domestic level, showing that social dialogue varies from 
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country to country.160  For example, social partners did not reach a consensus on flexicurity 
policies and subsequently, the Government of Spain adopted on its own the content for 
flexicurity policies in Real Decree 2/2009.161  Whereas, the social partners in Germany were 
actively involved in the adoption of flexicurity policies for internal flexicurity and employment 
security.162 
2.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The idea of flexicurity through the lens of the EC, entails a shift from job security to 
employment security.  As regards the textual confusion around employment-job security, the 
absence of a clear distinction between the two concepts might leave room to the States to adjust 
it on their own domestic needs.  Apart from this textual confusion, there is also a significant 
problem because employment security does not necessarily follow a facilitation of dismissals.   
The issue becomes more complex because the enforcement of ALMPs, which are deemed as 
the ‘driving force’ from unemployment to employment, or from one job to another, is strictly 
dependent on their funding bodies.  Hence, there is an interplay among interested actors that 
are willing to make their interests be represented through these flexicurity policies.  It seems 
that the ‘golden recipe’ of this realization is social dialogue.  Through social dialogue, all the 
interested parties are brought together and make effort to reach a consensus around issues of 
flexicurity.  However, if this social dialogue takes the form of discussions and information and 
consultations (without meaningful negotiations), it is very likely that flexicurity policies could 
lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, increase poverty and unemployment levels and exacerbate social 
exclusion; whereas, collective bargaining would enable the employees and workers to be heard 
and more effectively negotiate their interests during the process.  These complexities of 
flexicurity ingredients demonstrate that the idea of flexicurity still remains an idealistic policy 
that is ‘intangible’ in practice.  It further shows that standard-setting actors (the EU, the ILO 
and governmental authorities) play a dominant role in the effective application of flexicurity 
policies, so that flexicurity will not become identical to employment insecurity and poverty. 
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2.4 Flexicurity and reflexivity  
 
This section focuses on the theoretical domains of reflexive law and Luhmann’s theory of 
autopoietic systems.  The first section explores the main features of reflexive law, which 
include functional differentiation and proceduralization.  The second section deals with 
reflexivity and flexicurity, which are not necessarily deregulatory.  It explores the reflexive 
communication between employment protection and social security systems, as integrated in 
the idea of flexicurity.  Since this research study aims to explore the relationship between 
employment security and social security, this section attempts to explore how reflexive law 
sees the communication (function and performance) of these systems.  It is particularly 
important to understand the theoretical (reflexive) foundations of this relationship, before 
examining their performance and detecting their systemic limits at international (ILO), regional 
(EU/CoE) and domestic (using the case of Cyprus) levels. 
2.4.1 Introduction to reflexivity   
 
The domains of reflexive law theory were introduced by Gunther Teubner, a German legal 
scholar, who examined the evolution of law and ‘rematerialization of law’.163  Reflexive law 
aims to coordinate different self-regulatory systems, which are also described by Teubner as 
‘forms of social cooperation’.164  In his article ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern 
Law’, Teubner explored the concept of ‘legal rationality’ and defined its three consisting parts: 
formal, substantive and reflexive rationality.165  Teubner has referred to Habermas to explore 
the differences between the three types of legal rationality, which are: the norm, the system and 
the internal rationalities.166  He thereby attempts to explain the way that ‘legal norms should 
govern human actions’ through ‘norm rationality or justification of law’.167  ‘System rationality 
or external functions of law’, which is the second constituent part of legal rationality, means 
the extent to which law is capable to ‘respond’ to societal problems.168  Reflexive law, which 
‘structures and re-structures’ the self-regulatory systems, embeds in the concept of 
‘decentralized integration’.169  This means integration into these self-regulatory systems is 
facilitated by establishing ‘supporting integrative mechanisms’ that do not prescribe 
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authoritative means of regulation.170  It is important to understand the difference between the 
concepts of decentralization, which entails to devolution of governmental control from a single 
place to several ones, and deregulation, which means the process of removing government 
controls from a business or other activity.171 
As social systems are distinctly different from ‘natural social orders’, reflexive law attempts to 
‘design’ these self-regulatory systems through procedural norms.172  The social systems 
encompass ‘processes, organization, and the distribution of rights and competencies’.173  The 
regulation of all these elements is achieved through ‘indirect and abstract’ procedural norms, 
also known as ‘proceduralization’.174  According to Teubner, the idea of ‘internal rationality’ 
or ‘internal structure of law’ has important procedural dimensions.175  This idea refers to the 
creation of ‘general conceptual categories’ and arrangement of law in a system, which is 
characterized as ‘the systematization of doctrine’.176 
The reflexive law theory is based on the Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems.  According 
to the sociological theory of autopoietic systems, a system, such as the legal system, is 
simultaneously ‘normatively closed’ and ‘cognitively open’.177  With regard to law, 
normatively closed system means that the legal system produces its own internal rules, which 
are called ‘elements’.178  The legal system, as a self-referential system, is only capable to ‘lend 
normative quality’ to its elements.179  In other words, the production of internal legal rules 
(‘self-production’) can only be accomplished by the legal system itself – i.e. ‘only law can 
produce law’.180  These ‘self-referential systems’ are capable of communication with their 
internal elements (i.e. internal interaction), however, they cannot communicate with the other 
systems (i.e. interaction with their environment).181  Because of this ‘closedness’, the internal 
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elements of the legal system are developed in relation to its external environment (i.e. 
‘cognitively openness’).182  In these terms, the legal system produces internal rules that will 
enable it to become reflexive and ‘cope’ with functionally differentiated autopoietic systems.183   
Since the legal system, as a self-referencing autopoietic system, produces its own internal 
elements, reflexive law is embedded in the idea of ‘increasing legalization’, instead of 
‘delegalization’.184  The ‘quality of this legalization’ can be changed because the internal legal 
elements are adaptable to the norms of other systems in order to facilitate the interaction 
between different social systems.185  It is important to understand how the concept of flexicurity 
encompasses this idea of ‘legalization’, which means obligatory authorization, rather than 
‘delegalization’, which means removal of obligatory authorization.  For example, the EES-
employment guidelines (in particular, Integrated Guidelines 16 and 20 that integrate aspects of 
flexicurity), which are analysed in section 2.2.2, set out common principles that EU Member 
States shall adopt at domestic level.  Although these principles might take the form of hard-
law or soft-law (through indirect means – e.g. social dialogue), the governmental authorities 
by integrating these principles give to different actors (e.g. trade unions, social actors) official 
permission to adopt flexicurity policies that would make workers more adaptable to labour 
market changes. 
Reflexive structures are the main mechanisms that facilitate integration with social systems as 
societies have become ‘functionally different’ because of the over-production of norms and 
values within a system.186  These reflexion structures are capable to mediate and ‘reconcile 
tensions between function and performance’ of social systems.187  In order to mediate collisions 
between function (i.e. function of the whole system) and its ‘input and output performances’ 
with other systems, reflexion structures impose limits on function and performance.188  The 
reflexivity of legal system is identified in Teubner’s articulation that law encompasses the 
‘structural premises for reflexive processes’ in other systems.189 
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Rogowski and  Wilthagen introduced the theory of reflexive labour law to explore the 
complexities of labour law system.190  This labour law theory explores the elements that the 
labour law systems produces to regulate itself (i.e. self-regulatory capacities).191  Apart from 
this, reflexive labour law also examines the performance of the labour law system with other 
social systems, such as the economy and industrial relations, and detects its ‘systemic limits’ 
with regard to regulation of other social systems.192  
The core elements of labour law system are communications, which Rogowski and Wilthagen 
conceived as ‘the autopoietic basis of reflexive labour law’.193  The term ‘communication’ 
describes genuine information-sharing, which means the elements of labour system do not take 
the form of ‘interactions’ (i.e. action-reaction).194  On the basis of ‘self-modelling’, which was 
primarily developed by Ladeur and further applied to the field of labour law by Rogowski, 
legal communications are assisted by other self-regulatory systems, such as the autopoietic 
system of industrial relations.195  For example, the emergence of collective bargaining as a 
negotiating method between interested parties in the system of labour law, derives from the 
autopoietic system of industrial relations.196  In this context, the communication of legal system 
with other self-regulatory systems leads to ‘the internal differentiation of the legal system’ and 
the design of other sub-systems.197  For this purpose, the labour system, an autopoietic system 
of ‘communications’, constitutes a sub-system of the legal system and reflects these ‘new forms 
of legal communication’ with other systems.198 
The internal and external complexities of the labour legal system, which need to be effectively 
addressed, are connected to the idea of ‘deregulation of labour law’.199  In terms of ‘reflexive 
deregulation’, deregulatory policies aim to strike a fair balance between the reduction of 
internal complexities of the labour law system (that are to facilitate its function) and reaching 
wider social goals that are related to its environment (so as to make its performance more 
effective).200  According to Rogowski, reflexive deregulation, which can be characterized as ‘a 
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form of regulation for self-regulation’, aims to ease systemic complexities.201  In this context, 
reflexive deregulation shall complement reflexive re-regulation in order to strike the right 
balance between flexibility and security.202  In other words, deregulatory policies could be 
described as ‘the means’ for achieving the over-arching aim of re-regulation. 
Someone could argue that flexicurity, as a policy tool, removes government controls and offers 
the equivalent to social actors.  Rogowski characteristically observed that flexicurity 
constitutes ‘a strategy of reflexive deregulation’.203  However, it seems that such an argument 
describes only a part of the idea of flexicurity.  Regarding social security that constitute one of 
the core components of flexicurity, governmental authorities are the ones that adopt the legal 
framework.  In this context, social actors, such as workers’ and employers’ representatives, can 
negotiate and detect any problems or improvements that are needed.  Then, these negotiations 
could be communicated to governmental authorities and get the formal approval so that 
systemic procedures could be changed.  Similarly, the dismissal rules (denoting that flexicurity 
aims to facilitate employment transitions while ensuring employment security) are decided by 
governmental authorities.  These rules include also deregulatory policies which give room to 
enterprises and social actors to restructure an employment security system. 
Since reflexive labour law entails a shift from substantive to procedural law, these self-
referential communications are also regulated by ‘mechanisms of interest coordination’.204  The 
labour law system provides the legal framework for establishing these mechanisms of self-
regulation.205  In this context, the legal instruments are conceived as ‘procedural devices’ for 
self-regulation rather than ‘external control’.206  In other words, reflexive law uses indirect 
means of regulation, such as collective bargaining.207  These mechanisms of interest 
coordination, which entail an interplay of different actors that seek to cover their needs, are 
particularly interesting with regard to flexicurity and distribution of power/balances (this point 
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2.4.2 Communication between employment security and social security  
 
The current research project is focused on the reflexive relationship of regulation between 
employment security and social security systems.  According to Chantal Thomas, the 
development of different sub-systems, which reflects on the theory of legal pluralism, has led 
to a debate.208  On one hand, there is the proposition that the international community responds 
with ‘consolidation’ to the existing divergence between the ‘self-contained systems’.209   
Whereas, the opposite argument sets forth that the problem of ‘doctrinal divergence’ is solved 
through ‘normative convergence’, which means through ‘customary international law, national 
implementation processes and state cooperation’.210  Flexicurity, as deregulatory policies, 
could bridge the normative chasm that exist between the two systems.  In the 2007 EC policy 
document, flexicurity entails a shift from job security to employment security, while providing 
adequate social security benefits.211  To explain, an employment security system aims to 
facilitate employment transitions, which might entail removal of job protection.   During this 
transition, a social security system acts as a safety net, providing unemployment and 
educational (ALMPs) benefits. 
In the Wilthagen matrix, the concept of flexicurity encompasses internal and external types of 
flexibility.  Regarding internal flexibility, effective communication or the performance of 
employment security and social security systems could enable individuals to retain their job 
position.  Whereas, favouring external flexibility, which is related to the transition from one 
job to another, the unemployment benefit shall act as protection and prevent individuals from 
being exposed to the risk of poverty and unemployment. 
The question which arises is to what extent flexicurity, as a form of re-regulation that also 
embraces deregulatory policies, could promote job security through reflexive interaction 
between employment security and social security systems.  Job security protections respond to 
the social security system, which acts as a safety net in different cases and contingencies (such 
as employment injury, medical care, maternity and family responsibilities) so that a worker 
will be able to overcome the risk and return to the job position.  In the spectrum of employment 
security-social security systems, promotion of job security could be achieved through 
deregulation.  Removing governmental controls from regulating employment security could 
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enable social actors (e.g. enterprises, trade unions) to negotiate the terms of employment so 
that the worker could be adaptable to labour market changes and stay in a job.  According to 
the EC, one of the core components of flexicurity is to secure contractual arrangements and 
make them more flexible.212  In other words, promotion of job security does not necessarily 
mean that it would impede employment transitions.   
Where the concept of flexicurity, which focuses on employment transitions, did not encompass 
at all the concept of job security, workers would transition easily from one job to another, but 
they wouldn’t be given any protection of their ability to retain a job.  In contrast, flexicurity 
aims to make workers adaptable to labour market changes in order to be able to either retain a 
particular job or transition to another job.  As to proceduralization, adaptability of workers 
could be achieved inter alia through flexicurity deregulatory policies.  For example, ALMPs 
and LLL (core components of flexicurity), which are mainly regulated by social actors (e.g. 
enterprises), could enable workers to retain a job.  In cases where this is not possible for 
workers, flexicurity policies would enable workers to transition to another job. 
Reflexive interaction of employment security and social security seems to promote 
employment transitions in order ‘to engender responses’ to internal and external complexities 
and attain wider social goals – for example, to foster employability and eradicate poverty.213 
‘Proceduralization’ forms the basis of reflexive interaction among systems.  The Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) constitutes one the main soft-law procedures of regulating flexicurity 
policies.  According to article 5 TFEU, the EU is competent to ‘provide arrangements within 
which EU Member States must coordinate policy’ in the fields of employment policy and social 
security.  The OMC provides the regulatory framework (procedures) in order to adopt 
flexicurity policies, while at the same time facilitate and respect domestic regulation 
procedures.214 
The regulation of job security and social security at domestic level, which constitute two of the 
main flexicurity components, is dependent on hard law.  Regarding job security, the norms for 
employment protection against unfair/ arbitrary dismissal normally take the form of hard law 
(e.g. convention or legislative act).  In case of Cyprus, the Termination of Employment Law, 
 
212 Ibid, p.5. 
213 Barnard C., Deakin S. and Hobbs R. ‘Reflexive law, Corporate Social Responsibility and the evolution of 
labour standards: the case of working time’ ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, 
Working Paper N.294 <https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-
research/downloads/working-papers/wp294.pdf> accessed 3 April 2019, p.5. 
214 Rogowski (n.1), p.197. 
40 
 
which was enacted on 27 May 1967 and entered into force on 1 February 1968, sets out the 
conditions for the termination of employment. 
It seems that there might be problem with the protection of individuals in cases where 
flexicurity deregulatory policies, (which in the specific case means removal of government 
controls from regulation of employment security and social security policies) do not provide 
any procedures through which the individual could enforce his or her legal entitlements.  This 
is because regulation, which is removed from the governmental authorities, is left to policy-
based measures. 
At this point, the question which arises is how power imbalances that exist in employment 
relationships are accommodated within proceduralization.  The power to prevent dismissal 
derives from ‘the perceived ability and willingness to impose costs’.215  The lack of 
enforcement creates room for greater power imbalances.  For example, if employees’ 
termination cost is high, the employee is likely to be reluctant to terminate the employment 
contract to avoid to pay the cost.216  In such a case, if the worker cannot enforce his or her 
entitlements, it means that the worker has two options: either to remain unwillingly in that 
particular job position, which could leave the worker trapped into jobs or pay the costs and 
terminate employment.  If a worker decides to do the latter (i.e. pay the costs and terminate 
employment) this exposes the worker to the risk of unemployment.  On the other hand, an 
employer could also decide to reduce the costs for termination of employment, ease the 
procedures and hire cheap labour.  This flexibilization of the labour market procedures could 
leave workers exposed to unemployment and lead to a race to the bottom of labour standards. 
The power imbalances regarding flexibility and security, which exist among interested actors 
(e.g. employers, government and employees), could be regulated through procedural aspects 
of systems.  In this research study, these procedures entail the different interactions of 
employment security and social security systems through legal instruments and policies.  In 
order to handle power imbalances, it is important to constrain the powers of certain actors.  This 
could be achieved through social dialogue that could bring all interested parties together to 
communicate their interests.  In this context, it is important to note that the form of social 
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dialogue matters a lot because if social dialogue does not truly enable actors to express their 
beliefs, the power imbalances could be reflected in the scope of social dialogue. 
Reaching a consensus on flexicurity policies could be achieved through social dialogue.   
Catherine Barnard et al. expressed the view that reflexive law can prompt attempts to 
‘deregulate rule-making authority to self-regulatory mechanisms’ through social dialogue.217   
With regard to the strategy of the OMC, the relevant stakeholders are entitled to reach a 
consensus also through social dialogue.  The participation of the interested actors shall play a 
crucial role in order to represent their interests and ensure effective communication between 
employment and social security systems.  In this context, it is not clear whether social dialogue 
means collective bargaining or genuine negotiations among stakeholders.  Regarding genuine 
negotiations (EU model of social dialogue), social dialogue might involve social actors and EU 
institutions (tripartite dialogue) or employers’ organizations and trade unions (bi-partite 
dialogue).  It seems that the interplay of social actors might not be able to manage power 
imbalances, which already exist in the systemic performance and function.  If social dialogue 
takes the form of collective bargaining (ILO model of social dialogue), it is more likely that 
the actors will have equal bargaining power and they would be able to change the existing 
procedures. 
The concept of flexicurity entails procedures through which actors are capable to pursue their 
interests.218  The transitional labour market, which entails a swift transition from one job to 
another, relies on the idea of ‘win-win situation’.219  This idea refers to cases where flexicurity 
policies aim among others to persuade both employers and workers that they can be benefited 
from the transitional labour market.220  Employers, putting efforts to make their company more 
adaptable and reduce their exposure to risks, might need to implement employability policies 
(ALMPs and LLL) to increase adaptability skills of their employees.  On the other hand, 
workers seek to remain in the labour market and receive proper social security benefits that 
would avoid the risk of being exposed to poverty. 
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In the absence of a ‘pre-determined outcome’, interested actors attempt to design flexicurity in 
a manner that would cover their interests.221  The view of Pochet is very interesting as he 
observed that the adoption of the OMC shifts the focus from ‘traditional actors’ (i.e. EU 
institutions) to social actors.222  This view illustrates the idea of deregulation as a means to 
achieve re-regulation.  In the context of this research project, these actors are the international-
setting actors (ILO), regional mechanisms (EU institutions, CoE), social actors (representatives 
of management and labour), governmental authorities and enterprises/companies.  The latter 
might give the impression that the responsibility to resolve these complexities is shifted from 
judicial courts to the interested actors.  Rogowski observed that the shift from judicial courts 
to social actors illustrates the main feature of reflexivity, where social systems are ‘regulated 
through self-determination’.223  Although he articulated the view that the traditional route of 
judicial courts is supplanted with indirect means of regulation, it seems that judicial means are 
complementary to indirect means of regulation.  For example, the right to collective bargaining, 
which is enshrined in binding legal instruments, can be claimed through a judicial route, such 
as the ECtHR. 
2.4.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
Employment security and social security systems, as cognitively open self-regulatory systems, 
can be mutually reinforced (in other words, communicate between each other) to attain wider 
social goals, for example to tackle unemployment and eradicate poverty.  These social self-
regulatory systems, which produce procedures, communicate with each other.  This thesis will 
examine the implications of interaction between employment security and social security 
systems for job security.  Although the Commission has referred to a transition from job to 
employment security, it appears that flexicurity policies could make workers more adaptable 
to labour market changes in order to retain a job.  It seems that flexicurity and reflexivity 
encompass the concept of deregulation, as a consisting part of re-regulation. In this context, 
the thesis shall examine how social dialogue can be integrated in the proceduralization 
framework, ideally taking the form of collective bargaining to handle power imbalances among 
certain actors.  
 
 
221 EC 2007 Communication on Flexicurity (n.24), p.39. 




2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the theoretical domains of reflexivity and flexicurity, which act as 
a framework for analysis in the rest of the thesis. The concept of flexicurity, as an equilibrium 
of flexibility and security, synthesises many ingredients to ensure that individuals can remain 
in the labour market.  The EU ‘ingredients’ of flexicurity, which were introduced by the EC in 
the EES, are complex and create controversies.  The so-called shift from job security to 
employment security was unfortunately turned into debates over social security and 
employability.  The terms of employment security and job security remain ambiguous.  The 
facilitation of dismissals is often conceived as removal of job protections, which is linked to 
‘the race to the bottom’ in cases where employers can easily dismiss an individual and the 
system fails to secure swift transitions of workers in the labour market. This is what happens 
when employment and social security systems are under-developed or inadequate.  
Employment security and social security are conceived as two separate self-referential systems, 
whose convergence could be eased by flexicurity policies.  Flexicurity is often characterized 
as a ‘win-win situation’.224  Different types of social dialogue could ease the tensions and 
mediate the arising collisions, seeking for a balanced solution.  Social dialogue might take the 
form of negotiations (EU model of social dialogue) or collective bargaining (ILO model of 
social dialogue).  Flexicurity entails deregulatory mechanisms for re-regulation, which means 
that all interested actors theoretically can participate in the creation of standards, which are 
more likely to be procedural than substantive.  In the following chapters, the thesis deals with 
the reflexive solutions to deal with the communication between employment security and social 








224 Madsen (n.18), p.4. 
44 
 




This Chapter consists of five main sections. The first section provides an overview of a range 
of UN entities for transnational labour regulation: the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the UN human rights bodies.  The second section examines international labour standards 
and attempts to understand to what extent job security and employment security were 
conceived at international level.  The analysis is focused on ILO Convention N.158 on 
Termination of Employment (1982) and the related UN human rights treaties, which promote 
non-discrimination in the world of work.  The third section explores social security, as a 
constituent component of the right to non-discrimination in the UN human rights treaties.  In 
addition, the chapter investigates ILO Convention N.102 and other specialized ILO 
instruments, which introduced minimum social security standards for transitional employment.   
It looks at maternity, unemployment, educational and health-related benefits, which could be 
used to facilitate transitions of workers in the labour market.  Lastly, the fourth section is 
dedicated to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as soft-law mode of governance 
through which the actors seek to raise international labour standards. 
The ILO is an international organization for transnational labour regulation.  It is unique 
because of its tripartite structure, which means it brings together governments, employers’ and 
workers’ representatives (trade unions) in the decision-making process.  The ILO, which was 
established in 1919, has become a UN specialized agency since 1946.1  The ILO Constitution 
of 1919, which was signed in November 1919 as Part XIII of the Versailles Peace Treaty and 
became independent from the Peace Treaty in 1934, established three core propositions: a) 
social justice is the only means to bring peace, b) the ILO aims to regulate various aspects of 
work and social security, such as ‘prevention of unemployment’ and ‘protection against 
sickness, disease and injury’; and c) the standard-setting of labour standards is a matter for the 
global community.2 
 
1 ILO, Protocol concerning the Entry into Force of the Agreement between the United Nations and the 
International Labour Organization, (Vol.XXIX, No.6, 20 December 1946) 
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_433792.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019. 
2 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (1 April 1919). 
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James Shotwell, who was a delegate in the 1919 Peace Conference, wrote that the first 
proposition was just seen as ‘a formula which would enable [the participants in the drafting 
process of the Peace Treaty] to tie [the] institution into the structure of that new world order 
which the League of Nations symbolized’, which was the forerunner of the UN.3  The UN 
Charter of 1945 sets as a core aim to ‘maintain international peace and security’, an aim that 
was also established as a core mandate of the League of Nations and enshrined in the Treaty of 
Versailles as Part I: ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’.4  The first proposition of the 
ILO 1919 Constitution shows that industrial peace and international peace as conceived in the 
broader UN regime were inter-linked.5  Carter Goodrich also argued that ‘it [was] the UN that 
[provided] the greatest part of the [ILO’s] membership, leadership and support’.6 
Nevertheless, the ILO 1919 Constitution established the institutional basis for the adoption of 
international labour standards, which are embodied in ILO Conventions (hard-law) and 
Recommendations (soft-law).  The Declaration of Philadelphia 1944, which was adopted in the 
26th session of the usually annual International Labour Conference (ILC) and further integrated 
in the ILO Constitution, reshaped the aims of the ILO in the post-war era.7  In the 1944 
Declaration of Philadelphia, social justice and economic security were incorporated as two 
inter-linked fundamental aims of the ILO.8 
The 1998 ILO Declaration for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and its follow-up 
mechanism, which were adopted unanimously by the ILC (in its 86th session) on 18 June 1998, 
recognized four fundamental rights that include the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.9  According to the 1998 ILO Declaration, the obligation to 
respect, promote and realize these principles arise ‘from the very fact of membership in the 
Organization’, which means the Declaration has reaffirmed the values of the ILO.10  Erica de 
Wett argued that the 1998 ILO Declaration reflected the concerns that emerged in the 1990s 
over the new economy of globalization.11  The ‘quest for more flexibility’, which could have 
 
3 Langille B., ‘Re-Reading the Preamble to the 1919 ILO Constitution in Light of Recent Data on FDI and Worker 
Rights’ (2003) 42(1) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 87, p.95. 
4 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, article 1(2); Treaty of Versailles (Paris Peace 
Conference, 28 June 1919) Part I, Preamble.  
5 Wet d. E., ‘Governance through Promotion and Persuasion: The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work’ (2008) 9(11) German Law Journal 1429, p.1431. 
6 Goodrich C., ‘International Labor Conference of 1944’ (1944) 58 Monthly Labor Review 490, p.491. 
7 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 (26th ILC session 10 May 1944). 
8 Ibid.  
9 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (86th ILC session Geneva 18 June 1998). 
10 Ibid, para.18. 
11 Wet (n.5), p.1435. 
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led to a race to the bottom in labour standards, was reflected in the 1998 ILO Declaration.12   
To explain, the focus of the ILO 1998 Declaration is based on the four principles as integrated 
in the international labour standards, rather than on ‘the detailed standards themselves’.13 
The 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, which reaffirmed ILO 
constitutional aims, was unanimously adopted to address the challenges in the new globalized 
economy.  The challenges of globalization have been characterized by Francis Maupain as ‘a 
threat to the ILO’s raison d’être’.14  In this context, the 2008 Declaration set the following four 
‘strategic objectives’, which shall be ‘inseparable, interrelated and mutually supportive’: a) 
promotion of sustainable employment b) promotion of social protection, which includes social 
security protection c) respect of core fundamental rights and principles, which includes the 
principle of non-discrimination and d) promotion of social dialogue and tripartism.15  The 2019 
ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work called upon the ILO Member States  ‘to 
develop its human-centred approach to the future of work’, which could be achieved inter alia 
by ‘strengthening the capacities of people’ (e.g. through ‘effective LLL’ and social protection), 
‘strengthening the institutions of work to ensure adequate protection to all workers’ (while 
respecting workers’ fundamental rights) and ‘promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full employment and decent work for all’.16 
The ILO has limited enforcement powers because its existing so-called supervisory 
mechanisms, such as the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR), cannot force the Member States to comply with the ILO 
standards.17  The ILO’s enforcement deficits have been discussed among labour law scholars.  
For example, Maupain stated that the ILO standards ‘lack of teeth’, whereas Thomas Payne 
referred to ‘weak enforcement powers of ILO’.18 
The labour-related human rights approach can be found in the UDHR and the UN human rights 
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Maupain F., ‘New Foundation or New Façade? The ILO and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization’ (2009) 20(3) EJIL 823, pp.826-827.  
15 ILO Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (97th ILC session Geneva 10 June 2008).  
16 ILO Centenary Declaration 2019 for the Future of Work (118th ILC session Geneva 21 June 2019). 
17 See examples of the CCAS Report at <https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-
publications/WCMS_190528/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 17 February 2019.  
18 Maupain (n.14), p.827; Payne T., ‘Retooling the ILO: How a New Enforcement Wing Can Help the ILO Reach 
its Goal Through Regional Free Trade Agreements’ (2017) 24(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 597. 
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(CEDAW).  The UN human rights treaties and supervisory bodies partly adopted ‘compatibility 
clauses’ to avoid collisions with the ILO labour standards.19  For example, the UN General 
Comment N.18 (2006) on the right to work, which was produced by the CESCR, refers to ILO 
Convention N.158 to define the normative content of the valid reasons for dismissal and the 
relevant procedures (e.g. the right to redress for unlawful or unfair dismissals).20  In addition, 
the UN CESCR General Comment N.19 on social security (2007) refers to the social security 
branches as set out in ILO Convention N.102 (e.g. unemployment and maternity leave), which 
shall be endorsed in the national social security systems.21  The ILO and the UN human rights 
treaty bodies set international labour standards for all the relevant actors through hard-law and 
soft-law instruments, an argument that deviates from Maupain’s opinion, according to which 
the ILO’s normative operation is solely focused on traditional actors.22 
As the third proposition of the ILO Constitution describes, the UN and the ILO as its 
specialized agency have also acquired a core mandate: to enhance the international cooperation 
for the full realization of the purposes of the UN.  In the UN Charter 1945, international 
cooperation is understood as a way to resolve inter alia socio-economic problems, promote 
human rights and tackle inequalities.23  The UN Resolution 23/3 of 2013, which was adopted 
by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), reaffirms the importance of multi-level cooperation 
among different actors, including States, specialized agencies and intergovernmental 
organizations.24  In this context, the ILO does not aspire ‘to solve a global, rationally-created 
dilemma’, but helps States to develop their own regulations, which would correspond to the 
domestic realities and avoid the race to the bottom in labour standards.25  Brian Langille has 
also discussed the ‘spill-over effects’ of national laws and policies, which can create obstacles 
for transitions experienced by workers in an era of globalization.26 
The ILO’s cooperation with other international organizations is based on articles 12(1) and 
12(2) of the ILO 1919 Constitution.  The ILO works in collaboration with the CoE and the EU, 
 
19 Saiko H., ‘International Labour Organization (ILO)’ 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e490> accessed 14 
January 2019. 
20 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘General Comment N.18’ (6 February 
2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18, p.4. 
21 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘General Comment N.19’ (4 February 2008) 
UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19, p.4, para. 12. 
22 Maupain (n.14); Charnovitz S., ‘Reinventing the ILO’ (2015) 154(1) International Labour Review 91, p.55.  
23 UN Charter, article 1(3). 
24 UNGA Res 23/3 (21 June 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/23/3.  




which are the two regional (European) systems that are examined in this research project.  The 
ILO signed its cooperation agreement with the CoE in 1952, which describes the nature of their 
relationship.27  First, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE may propose items that will be 
discussed in the agenda of the ILO.  Second, the CoE and the ILO shall consult each other on 
topics that are related to their broader aims and exchange information and documents.  Third, 
the CoE may request from the ILO to provide its technical assistance on matters that fall within 
the scope of the ILO’s expertise.  In this context, the European Social Charter (ESC) sets the 
obligation of the CoE to invite representatives from the ILO to participate as consultants in the 
deliberations of the Committee of Experts.28  In addition, the European Code of Social Security 
(ECSS), whose core text is based on ILO Convention N.102, obliges the Secretary General to 
send a report and request from the International Labour Office to consult the appropriate ILO 
body on the matter that arose in the said report.29 
The ILO also signed an agreement for mutual consultation and cooperation with the EU.  These 
two organizations, despite their different historical origins, share mutual aims.  Their 
cooperation dates from 1953 when the ILO signed an agreement with the European Coal and 
Steel Community, which set the origins of the EU’s institutions as known today, to ‘develop 
employment and improve standard of living’.30  In 1958, the ILO concluded an arrangement 
with the EU, according to which ILO’s representatives could be invited as consultants in the 
so-called ‘Social Committee of the Western European Union’.31  The ILO Director-General 
and the EU Commissioner on Employment and Social Affairs renewed their cooperation after 
a formal exchange of letters in 2001 and agreed to hold annual high-level meetings.32  In the 
14th High-level Meeting between the ILO and the EC (11-12 October 2018, Brussels) 
discussed, among other issues, the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Future of Work 
 
27 ILO Official Bulletin (Vol.XXXV, N.1, 20 June 1952), Agreement between ILO and Council of Europe  
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440247.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019.  
28 ESC, article 26. 
29 European Code of Social Security (ECSS) (16 April 1948) ETS 48, article 74(4).  
30 ILO Official Bulletin (Vol.XXXVI N.1, 1 June 1953), Agreement concerning Co-operation between the 
International Labour Organisation and the European Coal and Steel Community 
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440253.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019. 
31 ILO Bulletin (Vol.XLI N.1, 1958) <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440269.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019.  
32 Exchange of letters between the Commission of the European Communities and the International Labour 
Organization [2001] OJ C165/23. 
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Initiative.33  According to the Standing Orders of the ILC, the EU is also entitled to participate 
(without vote) in the ILC discussions (plenary and technical committees).34  The EU plays a 
key role in the adoption of multiple ILO Conventions and Recommendations, such as ILO 
Recommendation N.200 (HIV/AIDS) and ILO Recommendation N.202 of 2010 (Social 
Protection Floors).  For example, the Government Member of Denmark, as representative of 
the EU, stated inter alia that ILO Recommendation N.202 respects fundamental EU values and 
expressed the concern that the ‘floors should not act as ceiling’ for social protection.35  
According to the Orders of the ILO Governing Body (section 1.9.1), the EU as a public 
international organization, which is represented by the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and other officials, also participates in the Governing Body.36  In addition, the ILO 
and the EU share the same development plan (SDGs 2030).  In the 2017 Joint Statement ‘The 
New European Consensus on Development’, the EU agreed to implement the SDGs in their 
internal and external policies for eradication of poverty and sustainable development, which 
will constitute the EU global strategy.37 
 
3.2 Job security, employment security and equality  
 
3.2.1 Introduction  
 
The shift from unemployment prevention to the promotion of full employment is reflected in 
the constitutional aims of the ILO.  The Preamble to the 1919 ILO Constitution sets ‘prevention 
of unemployment’ as a foundational aim of the Organization to promote ‘peace, social justice 
and harmony of the world’.38  In the first session of ILC, the General Conference of the ILO 
adopted the Unemployment Convention (N.2) to establish free public employment agencies 
 
33 See more details about the 14th High-Level Political Forum, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=85&eventsId=1355&furtherEvents=yes#navItem-
praticalInformation> accessed 17 February 2019. 
34 Standing orders of the ILC, article 14(9). 
35 ILC, 101st session, May-June 2012, Fourth item on the agenda: Elaboration of an autonomous Recommendation 
on the protection floor, <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_182950.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019, p.5 para.19. 
36 Council Decision 2010/427 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service [2010] ΟJ L201/30. 
37 EU, Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, ‘The new European consensus on 
Development: Our world, our dignity, our future’ <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-
consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019. 
38 ILO Constitution, Preamble.   
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under the governmental authority and prevent unemployment.39  In the 1944 ILO Declaration, 
there are added two core propositions: a) the ‘promotion of full employment and raising of 
standards of living’ and b) the promotion of ‘economic security and well-being development 
for all human beings irrespective of race, creed or sex’.40  
The term ‘economic security’ is comprised of different types of security, which include ‘job 
security’, ‘employment security’ and ‘labour market security’.  These different types of 
security, which are explained in the 2004 ILO Socio-security Report, were previously 
discussed in chapter 2.41  Just to briefly remind: ‘job security’ appears as securing a particular 
job, ‘employment security’ means to find a job adjusted to the worker’s skills and ‘labour 
market security’ and refers to employability.42  The list of the three non-valid grounds for non-
discrimination (‘race, creed and sex’) was further extended in the 1998 ILO Declaration, which 
recognized the principle of equality and non-discrimination as one of the core fundamental 
aims of the ILO.43  In addition, the 2008 ILO Declaration reinforced the shift in the ILO’s 
mandate from tackling unemployment to the promotion of productive and full employment and 
decent work for all.44  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) enshrines the 
right to gainful employment (article 6), the right to fair and equal treatment in employment 
(article 7) and the right to decent living of workers and their families (article 7).  The ICESCR 
was adopted on 16th of December 1966 by the UN General Assembly (UNGA).45  In the early 
stages of the drafting process of the two Covenants, the UN Commission on Human Rights did 
not want to include social, economic and cultural rights.46  The UNGA, which overturned the 
UN Commission on Human Rights’ decision, stated: ‘when deprived of economic, social and 
cultural rights, man does not represent the human person whom the [UDHR] regards as the 
 
39 ILO Convention N.2: Convention concerning Unemployment (1st ILC session Washington 28 November 
1919).  
40 ILO Constitution, Annex.  
41 ILO Socio-economic Programme, ‘Definitions: What we mean when we say “economic security”’ (ILO, 
September 2014), <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/definition.pdf> accessed 14 
January 2019. 
42 Ibid. 
43 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (86th ILC session Geneva 18 June 1998)  
(ILO Declaration 1998), article 2(2).   
44 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), p.3. 
45 Ibid.  




ideal of the free man’.47  Mashood Baderin  argued that social, economic and cultural rights, 
which are characterized as ‘second-generation rights’, are not ‘second-class rights to civil and 
political rights’.48  The ICESCR was therefore adopted alongside the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 and has been ratified by most of the UN Member States 
(169 out of 197 UN States),49 which shows the strong desire of the international community to 
protect, respect and fulfil the so-called ‘rights of the second generation’.50  In the Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights (1993), the participants reminded the international community 
that ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’, a maxim that 
was initially stated in the Preamble of the ICESCR.51  After the Vienna World Conference, the 
number of ratifications was significantly increased.52  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which is the supervisory 
Committee of the ICESCR, was founded in 1987 by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1978/10.53  The CESCR has two main monitoring functions: 
a) the Concluding Observations, through which the Committee outlines its concerns and makes 
suggestions and recommendations for the implementation of the Covenant, and b) the General 
Comments, which reports on the current reporting procedures and the rights, and reflect on 
general issues that the UN Member States, the specialized agencies (including the ILO) and 
other stakeholders, for the full realization of the rights, which are enshrined in the ICESCR.   
The ILO CEACR facilitates the inter-state communication between the Government and the 
UN Committee, although the two supervisory mechanisms are at least in theory distinct.  In 
addition, the Optional Protocol to ICESCR (OP-ICESCR), which entered into force in May 





47 Ibid, p.6. 
48 Ibid. 
49 ICESCR ratified by Cyprus on 2 April 1969 (Law N.14/1969).   
50 Baderin and McCorquodale (n.46), p.6. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Resolution 1988 (LX) of 11 May 1976, 
decision 1978/10 of 3 May 1978. 
54 UNGA Res 63/117 ‘Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(5 March 2008) A/RES/63/117 (OP-ICESCR). 
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3.2.2 ILO Convention N.158 concerning Termination of Employment  
 
ILO Convention N.158, which was adopted by the ILC on its 68th session (1982), regulates 
specific aspects of individual and collective dismissal procedures to ensure job security and 
employment security for workers, including inter alia: the scope of protection, valid and non-
valid reasons for dismissals, notice period, prohibition for constructive dismissals, severance 
pay and consultations of workers’ representatives.  According to the Preamble to the 
Convention N.158, the ILC adopted ILO Convention N.158 because of the implications of 
economic systems and technological advancements on employment protection.  According to 
Rogowski, ILO Convention N.158 inspired the development of dismissals laws across the 
globe.55  This argument is reinforced by the case of Cypriot Law 24/67, which will be analysed 
further in chapter 6 (case study of Cyprus), which integrated the minimum labour standards of 
ILO Convention N.158. 
ILO Convention N.158 integrated the principle of universality and laid out a clear-cut 
statement: these rules are applicable to all workers in all economic activities.56  In article 2(b) 
of ILO Convention N.158, the States are eligible to exclude the following categories of 
workers: a) temporary, periodical or fixed-term workers b) workers under probation c) casual 
workers d) workers, who are employed ‘under special arrangements’, and e) workers,  who are 
facing ‘special problems of a substantial nature’ in terms of their employment conditions, the 
size or nature of the undertaking that employs them’.57  It seems that ILO Convention N.158 
created double standards because workers, who fall in categories (d) and (e) could only be 
excluded with prior consultations with workers and employers.58  In the 2016 Research Paper 
for the International Labour Office, it is evident that States have exempted many categories of 
workers from the scope of application (e.g. domestic workers, agricultural workers and 
seafarers).59  For example, the Cypriot legal system does not include public (and semi-public) 
workers, police officers and army under the scope of ILO Convention N.158.60 
The CEACR requested from the Governments of Ethiopia (2000) and Latvia (2001) to provide 
further information about the domestic law on the prior consultations for workers that fall in 
 
55 Rogowski R., Reflexive labour law in the world of society (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013), p.95. 
56 ILO Convention N.158: Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 
(68th ILC session Geneva 22 June 1982) (ILO Convention N.158), article 2(a). 
57 ILO Convention N.158, article 2. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See online:<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---




categories (d) and (e), but did not issue any ‘General Observation’ or ‘Direct Request’ about 
consultations for workers that fall in the categories (a), (b) and (c).61  This seems to be a 
normative gap, which can create divergence of job security standards between standard and 
non-standard forms of employment. 
The valid reasons for termination of employment under ILO Convention N.158 are related to 
the performance, conduct of employee or the so-called ‘operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service’ that are conceived in the ILO context as reasons of 
‘economic, technological, structural or similar nature’.62  For economic dismissals, there are 
specific procedures that need to be followed: firstly, consultations with workers and employers’ 
representatives and secondly, send a notification to the competent authority.63  For example, 
economic reasons, which might slowdown business activities or lead to organizational changes 
at enterprise-level, cannot exclude workers from the scope of protection and justify worker’s 
dismissal without following the two procedures. In case of constructive dismissals, which 
means change of working conditions by the employer forcing him to resign (such as increase 
of working hours or working tasks or reduction in wages), the burden of proof rests on the 
employer.64 
Full-time workers, whose employer temporarily reduced their normal working hours due to 
economic, technological or structural factors (a phenomenon known as ‘partial 
unemployment’), are not considered as part-time workers.65  This has implications for 
application of the ILO Convention on Part-time workers (N.175), which established that part-
time workers and their ‘comparable full-time workers’ are entitled to equivalent protection in 
terms of inter alia:  termination of employment, sick-leave, maternity protection, paid annual 
leave and discrimination in occupation and employment.66  For example, Member States may 
adopt legislative measures for social security protection, e.g. educational benefits for on-job 
training for full-time employees, which means part-time workers would be excluded from the 
training scheme.  ‘Comparable full-time workers’ means workers that have the same 
 
61 CEACR Direct Request on ILO Convention N.158, Ethiopia (adopted 2000, published 89th ILC session 2001). 
62 ILO Convention N.158, articles 4 and 13. 
63 ILO Convention N.158, article 13. 
64 ILO Convention N.158, article 9(2). 
65 ILO Convention N.175: Convention concerning Part-Time Work (81st ILC session Geneva 24 June 1994), 
article 1(d).  
66 ILO Convention N.175, article 7. 
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employment relationship, or they are engaged in the same or similar type of activity or 
employed in the same undertakings (i.e. establishment/enterprise/branch).67 
3.2.3 Equality, employment security and unfair dismissals  
 
ILO Convention N.158 sets out a comprehensive list of invalid reasons for dismissals, which 
is further extended by the ILO Recommendation N.166 that guides the application of the 
Convention.  The list, which is set in ILO Convention N.158, consists invalid reasons for 
dismissals that are related to specific workers’ rights: the right to organize and collective 
bargaining, the right to appeal against unfair or unlawful dismissal and the right to non-
discrimination.  The prohibited grounds of discrimination for unfair dismissals are: race, 
colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin.68  The same grounds were also enshrined in ILO 
Convention N.111 of 1958 that prohibits discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation, which includes access to employment, employment terms and conditions and 
access to vocational training.69  ILO Convention N.111 is one of the eight fundamental ILO 
Conventions, which were identified by the ILO’s Government Body.70 
The Preamble of ILO Convention N.111 refers to the principle of equality as established in the 
UDHR, which illustrates the convergence of the international regulatory systems (ILO and UN) 
to address inequality as a wider societal goal.71  The UDHR, which was adopted as a (soft-law) 
Resolution of the UNGA,72 set the principles of equality and freedom from discrimination as 
its main themes.  Marking fifty-years from the adoption of UDHR, Kofi Annan, who was 
Secretary General of the UN, stated: ‘Human rights belong not to a chosen few, but to all 
people’.73  ILO Convention N.111 sets forth the rules for promotion of equality to ensure 
transitions in the labour market.  Whereas, ILO Convention N.158 sets job security rules, which 
could either facilitate the transitions in the labour market or create rigidities and obstacles for 
such transitions, which are needed to facilitate the transitions in the labour market. 
 
67 ILO Convention N.175, article 1 
68 ILO Convention N.158, article 5. 
69 ILO Convention N.111: Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 
(42nd ILC session Geneva 25 June 1958), article 1. 
70 See the link <https://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/lils-7.htm> accessed 17 
February 2019. 
71 ILO Convention N.111, Preamble.  
72 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR). 
73 Annan K., ‘Foreword’ in Dias C.J., Stamatopoulou, E., and Danieli, Y. (eds) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond (Baywood Publishing Company 1999). 
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The ICESCR and the labour-related UN human rights treaties enshrined similar prohibited 
grounds for dismissals in ILO Conventions N.111 and N.158.  This section deals with the 
different grounds for discrimination in the context of employment security and job security. 
Sex and sexual orientation 
ILO Conventions N.111 and N.158, as well as the ICESCR, recognize ‘sex’ as a prohibited 
ground.  In addition, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), which was adopted on 18 December 1979, set out specific 
measures that the State shall take and prevent discrimination.74  Article 11(1) of CEDAW 
enshrines that female workers shall have the same employment opportunities and entitles their 
right to promotion of employment and the right to job security.  In addition, article 6 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) also enshrines the right of female 
workers with disabilities to non-discrimination.75  According to the 2018 Report of the ILO 
Director General, it appears that there are obstacles for female workers in the science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) disciplines, who struggle to enter ‘male-
dominated fields’.76 
Sexual orientation is not included in the list of prohibited grounds in ILO Conventions N.111 
and N.158, which shows that there is a normative gap at the international level.  Sexual 
orientation is only prohibited in the context of ILO Recommendation N.200 (People with 
HIV/AIDS) and ILO Convention N.188 (Private Employment Agencies).77  The 2011 Global 
Report, as the follow-up report to the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, referred to sexual orientation as a discriminatory ground.78  By way of contrast, 
the EU Directive 2000/78, which promotes non-discrimination in employment and occupation, 
explicitly prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.79  The reason for this 
 
74 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (18 December 1979) 1249 
UNTS 13 (CEDAW).  
75 UNGA Res 61/106 Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (24 January 2007) A/RES/61/106. 
76 ILC, 107th session, 2018, Report I(B) of the Director General, ‘The Women at work initiative: the push for 
equality’, <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_629239.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019, p.2. 
77 ILO, Governing Body, 319th session, October 2013, ‘Discrimination at work on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity: Results of a pilot search’ <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_221728.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019.  
78 ILO, Report of the Director-General, 100th session, 2011, Report I(B)‘Discrimination at work 
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_166583.pdf> accessed 6 March 2019, p.51. 
79 EU Directive 2000/78, article 1.  
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divergence between the EU and the ILO could be that there are still some non-EU countries, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen, which still criminalize same-sex relationships.80 
Maternity leave 
The reasons related to maternity leave are solely recognized in the ILO Conventions N.158 and 
183 as invalid reasons for discrimination.  ILO Convention N.183 of 2000 replaced one of the 
first ILO Conventions (i.e. ILO Convention on Maternity Leave N.3) and raised the labour 
standards for maternity protection.81  The scope of protection includes all workers, including 
atypical workers, whereas, ILO Convention N.158, as explained above, enables States to 
exclude some categories of workers.  In addition, the term ‘child’, in contrast to EU Directive 
92/85, does not describe whether it means a biological or adopted child and the term ‘woman’ 
refers to all female workers, without specifying whether it means biological, adoptive or 
surrogate mother.  ILO Convention N.183, which seems to reflect EU Directive 92/85, provides 
the right of female workers to return to work after maternity leave, which shows notion of 
internal flexibility to ensure employment security.  In article 11(2) of CEDAW, States are also 
obliged to ensure that female workers are not prevented from exercising their right to work for 
reasons related to maternity leave. 
Family responsibilities 
‘Family responsibilities’ are also recognized as a prohibited ground against discrimination in 
the ILO Conventions N.111 (as part of non-discrimination), N.156 and N.158 (as non-valid 
reason for dismissal).  According to article 4 of ILO Convention N.156 of 1981 for Workers 
with Family Responsibilities, individuals with family responsibilities are entitled to the right 
to free choice of employment and the right to enjoy the same protection with other workers 
regarding the employment terms and conditions.82  ‘Workers with family responsibilities’ refer 
to ‘men and women with responsibilities in relation to their dependent children, or other 
members of their immediate family that clearly need their care and support’.83  ILO Convention 
N.156 integrated the concept of transitional employment.  The national measures shall provide 
 
80 UN for LGBT Equality, Free & Equal, Fact Sheet: Criminalization, <https://www.unfe.org/system/unfe-43-
UN_Fact_Sheets_-_FINAL_-_Criminalization_(1).pdf> accessed 17 February 2019. 
81 ILO Convention N.3: Convention concerning the Employment of Women before and after Childbirth (1st ILC 
session Washington 29 November 1919); ILO Convention N.183: Convention concerning the revision of the 
Maternity Protection Convention (Revised) (88th ILC session Geneva 15 June 2000). 
82 ILO Convention N.156: Convention concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women 
Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities (67th ILC session Geneva 23 June 1981), article 4.  
83 Ibid, article 1. 
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employment security and enable the workers with family responsibilities to enter, remain or 
re-enter in the labour market.84 
Race and nationality 
‘Race’, as an invalid ground for discrimination, was enshrined in the 1944 ILO Declaration, 
which was further integrated in ILO Conventions N.111 and N.158.  The UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which prohibits direct or 
indirect discrimination on grounds related to race, also enshrined inter alia the right to work, 
the right to free choice of employment and the right to be protected against unemployment, 
which refers to employment security.85  In regards to ‘nationality’, the ICESCR refers to 
‘national or social origin’, whereas ILO Conventions N.111 and N.158 prohibit discrimination 
on grounds of ‘national extraction’.86 
Disability 
‘Disability’ is not included in the lists of prohibited grounds for discrimination under ILO 
Conventions N.158 and N.111.  Nevertheless, in cases of temporary absence of work due to 
injury or disease, ILO Convention N.158 provides that States are eligible to set specific 
limitations (for example, request for a medical certification).87  The UN Convention on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD), which was adopted by the UNGA on 13th 
December 2006, enshrines the right of workers with disabilities to work.88  It is the first UN 
instrument that was ratified by the EU, which can explain why the EU Directive 2000/78 also 
included the ground of disability in the prohibited grounds against discrimination in occupation 
and employment.  The CRPD sets out the obligation of the States to prohibit discrimination 
against workers with disabilities in relation to ‘conditions of recruitment, hiring and 
employment, continuance of employment [and] career advancement’.89  In other words, the 
CRPD, like the other UN treaties for protection of vulnerable workers, aim to facilitate the 
transition of workers with disabilities in the labour market (i.e. foster employment security), 
while promoting the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
84 ILO Convention N.156, article 7. 
85 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965) 660 
UNTS 195 (CERD), article 5. 
86 ICESCR, article 2. 
87 ILO Convention N.158, article 6.  
88 CRPD, article 27. 




ILO Recommendation N.200 (2010) particularly covers people with HIV/AIDS under the 
protection of ILO Convention N.111, according to which real or perceived HIV/AIDS shall not 
constitute a valid reason for discrimination in occupation and employment.90  The States shall 
adopt the appropriate measures to support people with HIV/AIDS and help them remain, enter 
or re-enter the labour market.  In the EU context, HIV/AIDS status has not explicitly been 
accepted as invalid reason for discrimination, however, it could fall under the scope of 
‘disability’ of EU Directive 2000/78.  The fact that there is no clear definition of ‘disability’ in 
the UN CRPD, which was also signed by the EU, could create implications.  As Peter McTigue 
observed, there are two models of defining ‘disability’: the medical model and the social 
model.91  The medical model conceives disability as ‘a medical condition,’ whereas, the social 
model adopts a broader meaning of the term, according to which disability refers to ‘any 
societal factor that imposes restrictions on disabled people’.92  The 2018 GNP+ study, which 
was supported by the ILO, shows that people living with HIV/AIDS are stigmatized and often 
excluded from the labour market.93  In Greece, 80% of people with HIV were dismissed or lost 
an employment opportunity because of HIV status.94  Infection with HIV does not necessarily 
affect the functionality of the individual, which means HIV status fits into the social model of 
disability, as McTigue explained.95  
Age 
The ground of ‘age discrimination’ was also added in the list of non-valid grounds for dismissal 
by ILO Recommendation N.166, which as soft-law instrument leaves the discretion to the 
States to include or exclude it in the domestic legislation.96  Whereas, in ILO Convention N.111 
and ICESCR, the ground of age is potentially included in the open-clause of ‘other status’.97  
The ILO Recommendation on Older Workers (N.162), which identified the normative gap of 
 
90 ILO Recommendation N.200: Recommendation concerning HIV and AIDS and the World of Work (99th ILC 
session Geneva 17 June 2010). 
91 McTigue P., ‘From Navas to Kaltoft: The European Court of Justice’s evolving definition of disability and the 
implications for HIV-positive individuals’ (2015) 15(4) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 241, 
p.243. 
92 Ibid.  
93 ILO and GNP+, ‘HIV Stigma and Discrimination in the World of Work: Findings from the People Living with 
HIV Stigma Index’, (June 2018) <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_635293.pdf> accessed 17 February 2019. 
94 Ibid, p.15.  
95 McTigue (n.91). 
96 ILO Recommendation N.166: Recommendation concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the 
Employer (68th ILC session Geneva 22 June 1982). 
97 ILO Convention N.111, article 1(b); ICESCR, article 2(2).  
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ILO Convention N.158 regarding age, sets out that older workers shall have equal protection 
with other workers in terms of ‘employment security’.98  The use of ‘employment security’ to 
describe dismissal laws rather than swift transitions in the labour market shows that at the time 
when the Recommendation was adopted ‘employment security’ seems to be identical to ‘job 
security’.  To explain, article 5(c) of ILO Recommendation N.162 refers to employment 
security and further states that this is ‘subject to national law and practice relating to 
termination of employment’, which refers to dismissal laws.99   
The non-inclusion of ‘age’ in the invalid grounds for dismissals of ILO Convention N.158 
illustrates two core issues.  First, there is a normative gap in the international regime, which 
could leave young or older workers exposed to the risk of unemployment and poverty.  In the 
2017 UN Report, the statistics indicate that the world is ageing.  For example, the people in 
Europe, of sixty years old or over, will be increased from 25 to 35 percent in 2050.100  It seems 
that it is time to fill this normative gap, which will be intensified in the following years due to 
demographic changes, and adopt a new approach for creating an inclusive labour market.  In 
addition, young workers in many countries (such as Cyprus, Spain and Greece) are also facing 
a continuing challenge with unemployment.101  Secondly, this normative gap reflects the 
divergence between the ILO/UN systems and the EU, which prohibits dismissals for reasons 
related to age.  The EUCFR and the Framework Directive 2000/78 prohibit discrimination on 
grounds related to age in terms of employment and occupation.102  
 
3.3 Social security regulation   
 
3.3.1 Introduction  
 
Social security is an integral part of the modern societies, which emerged in the late nineteenth 
century in Europe to provide income security and maintain the quality of people in response to 
social risks.  The term ‘social risk’, which is known as ‘contingency’ in the ILO context, is 
 
98 ILO Recommendation N.162: Recommendation concerning Older Workers (66th ILC session Geneva 23 June 
1980). 
99 Ibid, article 5(c). 
100 UN World Population Prospects 
<https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf> accessed 14 January 2019. 
101 Eurostat official website, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics#Youth_unemployment> accessed 14 January 2019.   
102 EUCFR, article 21; Directive 2000/78, article 1.  
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described by Patrina Paparrigopoulou as ‘a future and uncertain event, which is against the will 
of the person, that causes damages and creates needs’.103  When the ILO was established in 
1919, social security was set in its preamble where the realization of social justice in the global 
community was linked to the regulation for protection of workers against specific social risks:  
unemployment, sickness, old-age, disease and injury arising out of employment.104 
In the 1944 ILO Declaration, the reshaped fundamental aims established a maxim: ‘poverty 
anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere’.105  In this context, it further referred 
to 'the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such 
protection and comprehensive medical care'.106  The 1944 Declaration’s approach towards a 
universal social security scheme, which aims to alleviate poverty, prevent inequalities and 
tackle social exclusion, integrates the core features of Beveridge Plan.  The Beveridge Plan for 
Social Security was adopted in the UK after the end of World War II (1946), which included 
the National Health Service for free medical treatment for all.107  The Beveridge Report was 
adopted to ‘address “five giant evils”: want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness’.108  The 
ILO 2008 Declaration for Social Justice and Globalization, which introduced the Decent Work 
Agenda, introduced ‘the idea of dynamic and positive social security protection’.109  It further 
stated the need to adjust the social security protection on ‘the new needs and uncertainties 
generated by the rapidity of technological, societal, demographic and economic changes’.110  
This approach reflects the capacity of autopoietic systems to be cognitively open and address 
societal problems through their internal procedures.  In an era of ‘transformative change in the 
world of work’, the 2019 ILO Centenary Declaration calls upon the Member States to provide 
‘universal access to comprehensive and sustainable social protection’ and ‘support people 
through the transitions they will face throughout their working lives’.111 
The right to social security is enshrined as part of socio-economic rights and non-
discrimination.  The UDHR declares the universality of the right to social security and 
interlinks it to the realization of human dignity and ‘free development of [his] personality’.112   
 
103 Paparrigopoulou P., Social Insurance Law (2nd edn, Nomiki Vivliothiki 2016), p.17. 
104 Constitution of the International Labour Organization (1919), Preamble. 
105 ILO Declaration 1944.  
106 Ibid, Annex, Part (III(f)). 
107 BBC official website, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/beveridge_william.shtml> accessed 14 
January 2019.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Giddens A., Europe in the Global Age (Polity Press 2007), p.96; Maupain (n.14), p.834. 
110 ILO Declaration 2008.  
111 ILO Centenary Declaration 2019 for the Future of Work, Parts I and III.  
112 UDHR, article 22. 
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In addition, the ICESCR, which also enshrines the right to social security, states that social 
insurance is included in the wider scope of social security protection.113  There are also other 
UN treaties, which provide the right to social security for vulnerable groups of workers.  The 
CEDAW prohibits discrimination against women and enshrines the following social-security 
related rights: the right to vocational education and training (article 11(c) CEDAW), the right 
to social security, which includes income security for unemployment, sickness, invalidity other 
incapacity to work and the right to paid-leave (article 11(1) CEDAW) and the right to maternity 
leave and benefit (article 11(2) CEDAW).  The CRPD prohibits discrimination for people with 
disabilities and particularly provides: the right to social security and adequate standard of living 
(article 28 CRPD), the right to vocational training and education (article 27 (1)(k) CRPD) and 
the right to health care and health insurance (article 25 CRPD).  The CERD enshrines that all 
workers, irrespective of their race, are entitled to the right to social security, medical care, 
public health and the right to education and training (article 5 CERD).  In addition to this, ILO 
Convention for Workers with Family Responsibilities (N.156) enshrines the right of workers 
with family responsibilities to social security (article 4(b) ILO Convention N.156). 
ILO Convention on Social Security (Minimum Standards) (N.102) of 1952, is a landmark ILO 
instrument, which was also inspired by the Beveridge Plan, and introduced minimum standards 
for social security protection.  In the period of 1929-1934, the ILC concluded various bilateral 
agreements to regulate compensations for employment injuries, sickness, old-age and 
unemployment.114  After the conclusion of Atlantic Charter (1941), the ILC in its 26th session 
adopted the ILO Recommendation on Income Security of 1944 (N.67), which set out the 
different branches of social security.115  This seems an effort, which was adopted by the ILC 
to recognise the specific contingencies of social security for the first time, rather than 
introducing detailed standards.116 
The dynamic role of the ILO for social security regulation is illustrated in the adoption of 
multiple Conventions (26) and Recommendations (22) of the ILO.  The specialized ILO 
Conventions (for example, ILO Convention N.130 on sickness and medical benefit of 1969) 
raise the social security standards from ‘the principal legal instrument’, ILO Convention N.102.  
 
113 ICESCR, article 9.  
114 See <http://boletin.ciess.org/boletines/2015/12/pdf/social-security-minimum-standards.pdf> accessed 10 
January 2019, p.2.  
115 ILO Recommendation N.67: Recommendation concerning Income Security (26th ILC session Philadelphia 12 
May 1944), Preamble.  
116 ILO Recommendation N.67, article 7. 
62 
 
ILO Convention N.102 sets the following branches of social security, which address particular 
‘contingencies’ (also known as social risks): medical care, sickness, unemployment, old-age, 
employment injury, maternity, invalidity and survivors’ benefit. 
Each State has developed its own model for social security protection.  According to the ILO 
Report 2010/2011, ‘social security takes a range of forms and is provided as social transfers 
from one group in society to another group in cash or in some other way (e.g. goods or 
services)’.117  In other words, national social security system is functionally closed because of 
the complicated way that it operates - e.g. tax on income and income source.  ILO Convention 
N.102 introduced a two-tier protection, which sets priorities that seem to correspond to the 
foundational aims of 1919 ILO Constitution, as explained in the Preamble (i.e. unemployment, 
sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, old age and injury’).  ILO 
Convention N.102, which has been ratified only by 55 ILO Member States out of 187, requests 
from the States to: a) comply with at least three branches in total, b) the one branch shall be 
selected from the following branches: unemployment, old-age, employment injury, invalidity 
and/or survivors’ benefits.118  For example, Greece, which ratified Convention N.102 (1955), 
selected medical care (Parts II), sickness (Part III) and unemployment (Part IV), maternity (Part 
VIII), invalidity (IX) and survivor’s benefit (X).  Whereas, Cyprus selected the branches of 
sickness (Part III), unemployment (Part IV), V, VI, IX and X.119  This two-tier protection could 
be translated as the ILO’s efforts to convince States to comply with some of the minimum 
standards.  The rest of this section is focused on the different branches of social security. 
3.3.2 Maternity Benefit  
 
The ILO transnational labour regulation for maternity benefit integrates the idea of transitional 
employment.  ILO Convention N.102, which established that maternity benefit shall be 
provided during ‘pregnancy, confinement and their consequences’,120  provides that maternity 
medical benefit should enable the woman to ‘maintain, restore or improve her health status and 
her ability to work’ and to cover her personal needs.121  Whereas, ILO Convention N.183 of 
 
117 ILC, 100th session, Report VI: Social security for social justice and a fair globalization 
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/-
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118 ILO Convention N.102: Convention concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security (35th ILC session 
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119 ILO official website <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300 _INSTRU 
MENT_ID:312247> accessed 14 January 2019. 
120 ILO Convention N.102, articles 47 and 49. 
121 ILO Convention N.102, article 49(3). 
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2000 prescribes that benefits shall ensure that the woman can ‘maintain herself in adequate 
health conditions and a suitable standard of living’, however, the period of maternity leave 
shall not be less than six weeks.122  Regarding the scope of application, ILO Convention N.183 
is applicable to ‘all employed women’, a definition which also includes atypical forms of 
employment.123  On the contrary, ILO Convention N.102 provides that maternity benefit is 
granted to women depending on their class.124  Article 48 of ILO Convention N.102 prescribes 
that Member States should cover in the scope of protection all women in prescribed classes 
(that are set out in the Annex of ILO Convention N.102), which classes constitute not less than 
50 per cent of all employees or not less than 20 per cent of all residents. 
Nevertheless, the family and maternity benefits serve distinct aims, which sometimes can 
overlap. The family benefit refers to the cash benefit that is provided to ‘maintain the children’ 
whereas, the maternity benefit is paid to ‘maintain the mother of the children and her child’.125  
The CEACR emphasized the strict bond between the mother and maternity benefit in the 2011 
‘Direct Request’ to Latvia,126  when stressing that the maternity benefit shall be provided to the 
mother even in cases where the child has died so that the mother will be able to receive the 
medical care and return to work.127  It further reiterated that the maternity benefit belongs to 
the mother and aims to restore or improve her health status.128 
ILO Conventions N.102 and N.183 also differ as to the connection between maternity benefits 
and employment security.  ILO Convention N.102 provides that maternity benefit shall be 
provided to ensure that the female worker will be able to work.129  Whereas, ILO Convention 
N.183, which seems to adopt the same regulatory framework with EU Directive 92/85,130 
provides that: a) the female worker has the right to return to work to the same or equivalent 
position with the same rate of pay;131 b) the burden of proof that the reasons are unrelated to 
pregnancy, maternity or consequences from nursing rests on the employer; 132 and c) prohibits 
any discrimination against working mothers or pregnant workers with regard to access to 
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employment.133  ILO Recommendation N.191, which facilitates the implementation of ILO 
Convention N.183, also endorses the right to paternity leave in cases where the mother is 
sick/hospitalised or died, however, it does not provide for the right of working fathers to return 
to work.134 
3.3.3 Unemployment benefit  
 
The preamble to ILO Convention N.168 of 1988 states that the level of social security 
protection concerning unemployment benefit as enshrined in ILO Convention N.102, which 
aims to eradicate poverty, has been surpassed by the most developed countries.135  ILO 
Convention N.102 merely sets out the core principles of unemployment benefit, but ILO 
Convention N.168 goes a step further and recognizes that social security systems are of great 
significance for involuntarily unemployed people.136  Most importantly, article 16 of ILO 
Convention N.168 established a link between unemployment benefit, wellbeing and welfare.  
Particularly, it prescribes that States have the obligation to ensure that the amount of 
unemployment benefit in conjunction with other benefits shall provide ‘healthy and reasonable 
living conditions [to unemployed people] in accordance with national standards’.137 
ILO Conventions N.102 and N.168 have adopted similar provisions concerning the cases where 
unemployment benefit could be suspended.  For example, being absent from the territory and 
obtaining unemployment benefit fraudulently constitute valid reasons for suspending the 
unemployment benefit.138  Nevertheless, there is a core difference among the two ILO 
Conventions regarding redeployment programmes.  Article 69(h) of ILO Convention N.102 
refers to employment services in general which if an unemployed person has ‘failed to make 
use’, unemployment benefit may be suspended.  Whereas, article 20(f) of ILO Convention 
N.168 sets out the different facilities, which includes redeployment programmes, that an 
unemployed person should use.  Most importantly, the protection which is provided in ILO 
Convention N.168 is higher concerning the use of redeployment programmes.  Specifically, 
article 69(h) of ILO Convention N.102 states that the individual shall not be entitled to receive 
unemployment benefit if the person ‘failed to make use of the employment services’.139  
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Whereas ILO Convention N.168 provides that the individual shall be not entitled to 
unemployment benefits only if the person ‘failed without just cause to use the facilities 
available for placement, vocational guidance, training, retraining or redeployment in suitable 
work’.140  This shows that States under ILO Convention N.102 can place pressure upon workers 
to join or cooperate with a redeployment scheme and take any job offer or participate in any 
training scheme, even where this does not necessarily satisfy the individual’s own interests or 
needs.  The individual may accept such offers to ensure that he or she will not end up without 
a job but also to avoid being excluded from unemployment benefits. Under these 
circumstances, it seems that there is a risk of exposing individuals to precarious employment, 
as the individual may accept to work under poor working conditions (e.g. low pay, working 
long hours, undertaking excessive working tasks) or training without future prospects (i.e. after 
the end of training, the individual might end up unemployed again because the skills that has 
acquired through training cannot increase employability).  Whereas, an individual under ILO 
Convention N.168 might not feel the same level of pressure as under ILO Convention N.102 
because the individual has the right to refuse to take up a job or training if there is a ‘just cause’, 
which is a term that is interpreted at domestic level.141 
It is interesting that in the case of Cyprus, which only ratified ILO Convention N.102 (not ILO 
Convention N.168),142 inactive people or people that refuse to cooperate with a redeployment 
scheme without just cause are also excluded from the minimum guaranteed income scheme 
(MGI), which was introduced by Cypriot Law 109(I)/2014 as an economic security measure to 
tackle poverty.143  This means that individuals in Cyprus may be excluded from unemployment 
benefits in compliance with ILO Convention N.102 if they refuse to take up a suitable job 
(Cypriot Law N.59(I)/2010),  but they could still be granted a basic allowance under the MGI, 
if there are serious personal circumstances (such as, severe family circumstances, family 
responsibilities and childcare), in which the individual is incapable (in Greek: ‘ανίκανος προς 
εργασία) to take up the job offer or participate in a training scheme.144 
The CEACR has noted that article 69 of ILO Convention N.102 shall be interpreted in 
conjunction with article 20 of ILO Convention N.102, which describes unemployment as lack 
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of ‘suitable employment’.145  In 2006, the CEACR has sent a Direct Request to the Government 
of Denmark by which it has distinguished the term of ‘suitable employment’ from ‘reasonable 
employment’.146  It also explained that ‘reasonable employment’ means a job position which 
might not be in conjunction with the occupational expertise of the unemployed person.147  The 
CEACR criticised section 63 of the Danish Unemployment Insurance Act, which prescribes 
that in case where a person refuses the offered job position without a fair reason, this person is 
not entitled to be granted the unemployment benefit.148 
The CEACR pointed out that using the term ‘reasonable employment’ instead of ‘suitable 
employment’ may create major issues.149  It further explained the implications of the problem 
and referred to a case in which a number of 352 unemployed people refused to turn up to job 
interviews, in which they were obliged to pay a fee, or refused the offered job.150  The reason 
that these people did not accept the job was related to the fact that the job offers were not within 
their occupational field.151 
Since the term of ‘suitable employment’ was not explicitly defined in ILO Convention N.102, 
contracting States have the discretion to interpret it in accordance with their national 
standards.152  Through a Direct Request to Belgium by the CEACR, the Belgian Government 
has been prompted to take into consideration the ‘Guide to the concept of suitable employment 
in the context of unemployment benefit’ in order to determine the concept of ‘suitable 
employment’.153  Since the Guidebook was published by the former Council of Europe 
Committee of Experts on Social Security (CS-SS), a technical committee of the CoE, whose 
mandate was to evaluate the ILO CEACR’s conclusions (disbanded in 2012), the ILO has 
prompted Belgium to determine the definition of ‘suitable employment’ based on the CS-SS’s 
guidebook..154  In 2011, Belgium adopted the Ministerial Order by which it has redefined the 
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concept of suitable employment.155  This Order prescribed that a job position is considered as 
suitable only if it is within the distance of 60 kilometres, regardless the amount of travel time.156  
The CEACR emphasized that job position is suitable only if the distance and the travel time 
are reasonable.157  It further reiterated that the Government of Belgium should take into 
consideration not only the distance but also the travel time in order to determine suitability of 
employment.158 
Both Conventions prescribe that voluntary termination of employment, which is not based on 
fair grounds, may constitute a valid reason for suspending unemployment benefit.159  ILO 
Convention N.168 inserted an additional exception regarding dismissals, which stipulates that 
the unemployment benefit may be suspended in case where ‘the person has deliberately 
contributed to his or her own dismissal’.160  This case sometimes could be blurred in practice 
with constructive dismissals, which are prohibited by ILO Convention N.158.  The CEACR 
lastly clarified that the termination of employment based on economic reasons or the expiration 
of fixed-term contracts are not considered as fair reasons for suspending unemployment 
benefit.161 
3.3.4 Educational benefit  
 
The benefit for vocational education and training is not included in the branches of ILO 
Convention N.102 and the specialized Conventions.  According to the concept of flexicurity, 
ALMPs and LLL that provide the opportunity to individuals (workers or unemployed people) 
to enhance their acquired skills and improve their employability, are essential to strike a fair 
balance and reduce the risk of poverty and unemployment.  The 2008 ILO Declaration on 
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization recognized the vital role of acquiring the appropriate 
capacities and skills for the ‘personal fulfilment and the common well-being’.162  ILO 
Convention on Paid Educational Leave of 1974 (N.140) refers only to paid educational benefit 
for workers, whereas ILO Convention on Human Resources Development of 1975 (N.142) 
imposed obligations on States to provide vocational guidance and training for youth and adults 
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in all sectors and regardless their level of ‘skill and responsibility’.163  Although ILO 
Convention N.142 refers to ‘sectors’, which seems only applicable to workers, ILO 
Recommendation on Human Resources Development of 2004 (N.195) introduced the right to 
education and training for all.164  The Recommendation laid out the three actors that play a 
crucial role in the enforcement of the right to education: Governmental authorities, enterprises 
and individuals.165 
According to ILO Convention N.140, States may also take additional measures to ensure that 
particular categories of workers who struggle to ‘fit into general arrangements’ are entitled to 
educational benefit.166  This Convention also stipulates that the level of amount of the paid 
educational benefit shall be ‘adequate’ and shall be paid regularly.167  The term ‘adequate’ is 
used as a threshold which obligates States to provide a sufficient level of amount to give effect 
to the aims which are set out in article 3 of ILO Convention N.140.  However, these aims, 
which include ‘promotion of employment and job security’, are quite broad.168  This means the 
threshold of ‘adequacy’, which is a vague threshold that was introduced in article 7 of ILO 
Convention N.140, cannot actually protect the right to vocational education and training (as 
enshrined in the various UN treaties, which were discussed before) and ensure that the amount 
of educational benefit is sufficient enough.169 
According to the 2013 ILC Report, ageing places a heavy burden on social security systems, 
through increased dependency rate for pensions support and a smaller working population that 
contributes to the social security schemes.170  This shows that it is important to focus on the 
realization of LLL, adjusting older workers’ capabilities to the demands of the labour market, 
so that they will be able to remain in the labour market as long as possible.  The Human 
Resources ILO Recommendation N.195 (2004), which recognized that education and training 
as a right for all, sets as a core obligation for States and other stakeholders (social actors, 
 
163 ILO Convention on Human Resources Development, 1975 (No.142), article 4; ILO Convention on Paid 
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enterprises) to invest and create training opportunities.171    Educational and training schemes 
shall increase employability, which means that individuals will be able to ‘secure and retain 
decent work, to progress within the enterprise and between jobs, and to cope with changing 
technology and labour market conditions’.172  In the ILO context, States are responsible to fund 
education and training schemes, whereas employers shall provide the appropriate training to 
their workers.173 
3.3.5 Health-related benefits 
 
The health-related benefits for transitional employment consist medical, sickness and 
employment injury benefits, which are regulated by ILO Convention N.102 and the specialized 
Conventions (Conventions N.130 and N.121).  In the UN CESCR’s General Comment N.14 of 
2000, the right to health includes economic accessibility (affordability), which means that 
States are responsible to ensure that individuals will get the funds as social security benefits to 
access the health-care services and get the appropriate medical treatment.174  The ILO aims to 
ensure medical care for workers to ‘maintain, restore or improve health status’ and 
subsequently enable them to remain in the labour market.175  ILO Conventions N.102 and 
N.130 regulate specific aspects of medical benefit, which includes cost-sharing, the qualifying 
period and the types of medical care. 176  Sickness benefit shall be provided to the worker due 
to ‘incapacity for work resulting from a morbid condition and involving suspension of earnings, 
as defined by national laws or regulations’.177  ILO Conventions N.102 (Part III) and N.130 set 
specific rules for sickness benefit, such as the duration of the benefit and the method for 
calculating the amount. 
The employment injury benefit, which is regulated ILO Conventions N.102 and N.121, provide 
income security for workers ‘due to an accident or prescribed disease, which resulted from 
employment’.178  The employment injury benefit aims to ‘maintain, restore or improve the 
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worker’s health and his ability to work but also to cover his personal needs’.179  The ILO 
Conventions inter alia set out the norms for calculating the benefit based on the severity of loss 
(i.e. total loss, substantial partial loss, non-substantial partial loss or slight degree of 
incapacity).180 
These health-related social security standards, which facilitate the worker’s transition from 
incapability to employment, integrate in their core the promotion of human dignity.  However, 
these standards do not ensure that the worker will return to the same or equivalent job.  Instead, 
these benefits focused on the individual and his or her capabilities, which will enable the 
transition in the labour market, rather on individual return to the position possessed before 
injury or disease occurred.  It seems that only for maternity has the ILO established a link 
between health protection and job security, as the female worker (after pregnancy) has the right 
to return to the same or equivalent position.  
 
3.4 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
 
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a set of 17 goals in the UN Development 
Agenda.  The UN Resolution 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’, which was adopted by the UNGA presented these 17 SDGs that came into force 
on 1 January 2016.181  The SDGs 2016-2030 replaced the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) 2000-2015,182  which were focused more on developing States.183  The SDGs 
set universal goals that apply to all States, regardless of the level of development.184   
SDGs, which are inter-connected, have a three-fold mandate: to promote economic growth, 
social inclusion and environmental development.185  Extreme poverty remains ‘the greatest 
global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development’, which 
justifies why it appears as SDG 1 (eradicate poverty).186  SDGs might seem to entail low level 
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obligation and little enforcement, although they are to be mainstreamed into all aspects of the 
UN system.187  SDGs as soft-law modes of governance are used for ‘integration purposes’, 
respecting the principle of sovereignty.188  Similarly, the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), as an EU policy-tool for reflexive regulation in the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) and Social OMC, also set broad targets, in which multiple actors can participate.  This 
shows that these two systems converge because they use broad agendas as soft-law modes of 
governance, which are forms of deregulation that could further lead to re-regulation. 
The 2030 SDGs provide a labour-related human rights-based approach.  Rakhyun E. Kim 
observed that SDGs and targets derive from already existing international (intergovernmental) 
law norms.189  SDG 8 (‘Decent work and economic growth’) deals with many topics that fall 
in the scope of the ILO’s mandate.  However, this does not mean that the ILO is the only UN 
body that is responsible for SDG 8.  According to the 2016 UNGA Report, UN institutions 
cannot be responsible for a specific SDG.190  SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) enshrined 
‘the vehicles for delivery on SDGs’, which entail collaboration and partnerships of many actors 
(i.e. international organizations, governmental authorities, civil society and enterprises), 
whereas MDGs just involved international organizations.191  The ILC Report ‘Towards 2030: 
Effective development cooperation in support of the Sustainable Development Goals’ (107th 
session, 2018) discussed the role of the ILO for ‘development cooperation’, which was 
characterized as ‘a strong supporter, a team player, and a stakeholder in the UN reform 
process’.192  In this context, the ILC Report of 2018 recalled the two-fold role of social dialogue 
and tripartism: as a fundamental objective of the ILO and as a means to achieve other 
constituent goals of the ILO (such as, social security protection).193 
SDG 8 is focused on employability as part of economic growth rather than on employment 
security.  The rate of unemployment, which is used as one of the core ILO indicators, just 
shows ‘the inability of an economy’ to provide job opportunities to people that are available to 
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accept a job offer.194  It seems that it is a pitfall that SDG 8 and its follow-up reports do not 
examine the normative regulation of job security, which could expose workers to the risk of 
unemployment or precarious work.  For example, the 2017 Report of the UN Secretary-General 
refers to labour productivity and the unemployment rate.195  It suggested that employability 
(tackle unemployment and underemployment), could possibly be achieved through green jobs, 
such as in renewable energy sectors.196 
SDG 8.5 target sets as an aim to achieve full employment for all men and women by 2030.   
This target is related inter alia to SDG4 (education), SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 10 
(reduce inequalities).  SDG 4’s mandate is to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education 
and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’.197  SDG 4 is related to target 8.6, according 
to which the rate of young people that are excluded from employment, education or training 
shall be reduced by 2020.198  Target 5.1. calls upon all the relevant actors to end discrimination 
against women.199  Target 10.2. refers to the promotion of socio-economic inclusion for all, 
regardless of their status (i.e. age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic 
or other status).200  SDGs target adopted a broader list of discriminatory grounds than those in 
the list in ILO Convention N.111 (e.g. age is not included in ILO Conventions N.158 and 
N.111), which shows the ambitious plan of SDGs for achieving sustainable development.  The 
follow-up reports also provide some suggestions, which could be used to reach SDGs and 
targets.  For example, according to the 2016 Global Sustainable Development Report, inclusive 
labour markets for people with disabilities could be achieved through creating incentives for 
employers (such as tax credits or work modifications).201 
The 2019 Expert Group Report on SDG8 before the HLPF 2019 flagged up the key global 
challenges that were also discussed in the 2016 High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), which 
include lack of employment opportunities, informal employment and labour market 
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inequality.202  The HLPF was established by the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development and replaced the Commission on Sustainable Development.203  According to the 
UNGA Report of 2016, the HLPF, which works under the auspices of the ECOSOC, is a 
follow-up mechanism for SDGs.204  It is a reflexive mechanism because the Member States, 
the UN entities, major groups and other stakeholders are involved in the consultation process, 
before the adoption of the final Report by UN Director-General.205  In 2016, the EU also issued 
a statement, in which it stated that the EU and its Member States support the review and follow-
up framework of the HLPF, which will promote inclusivity and accountability.206 
The HLPF derives information from: a) the annual thematic reports b) the Global Sustainable 
Reports and c) the voluntary national reviews.  The 2017 Synthesis Report on Voluntary 
National Reviews (VNRs), as follow-up mechanism for SDGs, conceives of social security and 
employment as two distinct parts in the SDG context.  On the one hand, the Report pointed out 
that many States flagged up how sustainable social security systems could progressively 
eradicate poverty levels (SDG 1).207  On the other hand, it stated that young and older workers 
in Belgium, Portugal and Slovenia struggle to enter or return to the labour market, whereas, 
workers in Thailand face problems with job insecurity.208  The 2016 Global Sustainable Report 
reflected on social security systems in the context of SDGs.  The 2016 Report stated that social 
protection, which includes contributory and non-contributory funds, means: ‘capturing how 
members in societies support each other in times of distress’.209  SDG 10 encompasses social 
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security protection, which is seen as a means to tackle global inequalities (target 10.4).210  It 
further reflects on weak social protection schemes in many countries, since only 27 percent of 
the global population have access to the so-called ‘comprehensive social protection system’.211  
Moreover, SDG 16 endorsed the participatory engagement and capacity-building to create 
inclusive institutions for all, which established the link between social dialogue and the future 
of work.212 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
The systems of employment security and social security appear as two distinct concepts in the 
international regime.  They both encompass the principle of non-discrimination, which is 
recognized as a fundamental aim in the ILO Declaration 1998 and the UN Charter.  The UN 
entities, the ILO and the UN human rights-related bodies, developed strong relations with the 
EU and the CoE.  Transnational labour regulation for employment security, which could be 
understood as part of the ILO’s mandate for full employment (ILO Declaration 2008), is 
governed by ILO Convention N.158 and the UN labour-rights based treaties such as the 
ICESCR and CEDAW.  ILO Convention N.158, the centrepiece for job security regulation that 
covers individual and collective dismissals, has two important deficiencies.  First, the States 
can exclude workers from its scope of protection, such as public workers.  This could be 
mediated to an extent through SDGs, which adopted a holistic and universal approach towards 
decent work for all, with the slogan: ‘no one left behind’.213  Second, the category for collective 
dismissals, which are brought under the concept of ‘operational requirements’ is not precise.  
This means that regulation for collective dismissals shall be further clarified at regional and 
domestic level (e.g. EU Directive 98/59).    In addition, the UN human rights-based treaties 
and ILO Conventions promote employment security as part of the right to non-discrimination.  
ILO Convention N.111 adopted an open list for discriminatory grounds, which shows that it is 
adjusted to the universal character of the UN human rights-based regime. 
ILO Convention N.102, as the landmark instrument for social security protection, is divided 
into different branches and adopted a two-tier level of protection, which reflects the diversities 
of the national social security systems.  It is interesting that the EU participated in the ILC 
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discussion for ILO Recommendation N.202 (Social Protection Floors) because EU Regulations 
have not endorsed minimum standards for social security protection.  ILO Convention N.183 
(maternity leave) could be characterized as the most modern specialized ILO instrument 
because it promotes transitional employment through internal flexible working arrangements 
at enterprise level. 
It seems a milestone that the educational benefit is integrated in the UN/ILO context as part of 
the right to education and vocational training, which is an aspect of transitional employment 
that does not explicitly appear in the regional (European) regime.  Due to demographic 
changes, it is crucial to invest on the LLL and ALMPs.  As the Future of Work Reports flags 
up, the global challenges (e.g. green economy and artificial intelligence) could create jobs, 
which the individuals could take up after getting the adequate training and remain in the labour 
market.  The labour-rights based approach is further strengthened in the SDGs and the Future 
of Work Initiative, which focus inter alia on LLL, ALMPs, gender equality and transitions in 
the labour market.  The question that remains is to what extent these soft-law modes of 















Chapter 4: Council of Europe 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) was founded in May 1949 as one of the Cold War initiatives to 
promote human rights, pluralist democracies and the rule of law.1  After the end of World War 
II, the Western European States had serious concerns over the spread of fascism and 
communism in Europe, which at that time was ‘a war-shattered continent’.2  In the early 1950s, 
the ‘European Movement’, which was an international organization that promoted European 
unity, proposed the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as an 
‘alarm bell’  to protect Europe against the rise of totalitarian regimes and oppression.3  Michael 
O’Boyle, the Deputy Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) characterized 
the ECHR ‘as one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of international law’,4 
which seems to manifest the aspirations of the UDHR as it is also indicated in the ECHR 
travaux préparatoires.5  According to the ECHR Preamble, the ECHR promotes the ‘collective 
enforcement of certain of the rights enforced in the UDHR’.6  It appears that the ECHR, which 
was described by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe (one of the founding leaders of ECHR) as ‘a light’ 
and ‘a beacon in totalitarian darkness’,7 primarily focused on political and civil rights.  This 
means that the ECHR was not directed at the protection of social and economic rights, that 
include the right to work and the right to social security, which both were subsequently 
protected under various UN/ILO instruments (e.g. ICESCR and ILO Convention N.102) as 
analysed in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless, ECtHR adopted an evolutive interpretative approach over the ECHR, according 
to which the ECHR as ‘a living instrument’ contains non-static rights that reflect social 
changes.8  This ‘living principle’ that was initially introduced in the Tyrer v. UK case (1976),9 
established a normative framework, according to which socio-economic rights are protected if 
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they fall in the ambit of civil and political rights as guaranteed in the ECHR.  In Airey v. Ireland, 
the ECtHR explained that it may extend its interpretation into the sphere of socio-economic 
rights as civil and political rights, which are the main elements of the ECHR, may also have 
social and economic implications.10  It further stated that ‘there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the field covered by the ECHR.11  The latter phrase, that was 
expressed by the ECtHR, could illustrate a link between the ECHR and the UDHR maxim, 
according to which human rights are universal, indivisible, interdepended and interrelated.12  
In N. v. UK (2008), the ECtHR gave more emphasis on the primary role of the ECHR (i.e. to 
protect civil and political rights) rather than its implications, which might entail protection of 
social and economic rights.13 
Rolv Ryssdal, who was former President of the ECtHR (1991), had already expressed that the 
Airey case shall be used as a remarkable case of reference.14  He explained that ‘the democratic 
State under the rule of law, […] must […] necessarily be a social State under law.’15  He also 
clarified that the ECHR does not explicitly fulfil such social aims,  however, the ECtHR is not 
restrained from ‘taking increased account of the social dimension in the interpretation and 
application of the rights and freedoms, where this is required by social conditions in our 
countries’.16  In regards to this research project, this chapter explores to what extent the ECtHR 
teleological approach led to the embodiment of employment security and social security 
standards in the realm of other political and civil rights. 
This chapter also seeks to identify and evaluate the employment security and social security 
(contributory and non-contributory) standards that are developed in the European Social 
Charter (ESC) of 1961 and the European Social Charter (Revised) (RSC), which revised the 
original Charter in 1996.  The ESC and the RSC set binding legal obligations and cover a 
comprehensive list of work-related and social security rights - such as, the right to work, the 
right to maternity leave, the right to social security and the right to protection against unlawful 
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13 N. v. the UK App no 26565/05 (ECtHR, 27 May 2008), para.44. 
 ‘the [ECHR] is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights’ even if there are socio-economic 
implications. 
14 Ryssdal R., ‘The Protection of Social and Economic Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms – Written Address’, in Franz Matscher (ed) Die Durchsetzung wirtschaftlicher und 





dismissals.17  Unlike the ECHR, it is not compulsory for States to ratify the ESC/RSC as a 
condition of their membership.  For example, Cyprus, which is used as case study in this 
research project, ratified the ESC on 7 March 1968 by Cypriot Law N.64/1967 and the RSC 
on 27 September 2000 by Cypriot Law N.27(III)/2000.  However, the Member States of the 
CoE have also the capacity to select discrete provisions for ratification.  For example, Cyprus 
accepted 63 of its 98 paragraphs at the time of ratification and further accepted to be bound by 
nine additional provisions in 2011 (by Cypriot Law N. 17(III)/2011).  In this context, Cyprus 
did not accept inter alia the provision, which protects the right to information and consultation 
(article 21 RSC) and the right to social assistance for reasons related to sickness (article 13(1) 
RSC).18  As the compliance with the ECR/RSC is solely monitored through the European 
Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), a non-judicial monitoring mechanism, the ECSR is only 
able to monitor and influence the creation of standards at the domestic level. 
Over the years, the CoE has developed strong external relations with the transnational 
regulatory systems that are examined in this research project (i.e. UN/ILO and EU).  In 1951, 
the CoE and the UN concluded the Agreement between the Secretariat General of the Council 
of Europe and the Secretariat of the UN, which was renewed in October 1989.19  Since 2000, 
the two systems have adopted a bi-annual Resolution, flagging up the key challenges and 
specifying their working methods.20  In 2016, Ban Ki-Moon, who was the UN Secretary 
General, characterized the CoE as ‘instrumental in advancing the principles of democracy and 
human rights in Europe’.21  In 1952, the ILO as a UN specialized agency also concluded an 
Agreement with the CoE, whose details were analysed in the previous chapter.22  ILO 
 
17 European Social Charter (18 October 1961) ETS 35 (ESC); European Social Charter (Revised) (3 May 
1996) ETS 163 (RSC). 
18 Official Website of CoE <https://rm.coe.int/pdf/1680492884> accessed 15 April 2019. 
19 UN-CoE Agreement between the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe and the Secretariat of the United 
Nations (15 December 1951) < 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168059ac
d8> accessed 10 March 2019; UN-CoE Arrangement on Co-operation and Liaison between the Secretariats of the 
United Nations and the Council of Europe (19 November 1971). 
20 UNGA, 33rd session, Res ‘Observer status for the Council of Europe in the General Assembly’ (1989) UN Doc 
A/RES/44/6. 
21 Letter of 2 December 2016 of UN SG Ban Ki-Moon to CoE SG <https://rm.coe.int/der-inf-2018-1-rev-
e/16808d5afd> accessed 10 March 2019. 
22 ILO and CoE Agreement <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440247.pdf > accessed 10 March 2019.  
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representatives participated in the Committee on the European Social Charter (or Charte-Rel), 
which prepared the text of the RSC.23 
Since 1958, the CoE has also developed a close relationship with the EU. The bilateral 
Agreement described the nature of their mutual activities.  The EC, representing the EU, may 
be invited by the CoE to participate in the Committees of the Council of Ministers or other 
conferences of specialized ministers.24  Second, the EU can become a contracting party to the 
CoE’s treaties.25  In this context, the EU ratified seven CoE Conventions, although none of 
them regulate topics related to employment security and social security.26  In 1996, the two 
European organizations exchanged letters for consolidation and intensification of their 
cooperation.27  In the next chapter, I also discuss Opinion 2/13 and accession of the EU to the 
ECHR, which still remains a theoretical debate.28 
 
4.2 Employment security, job security and human rights 
 
4.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
The ECHR, as explained in the first section, primarily focused on civil and political rights.  In 
the ECtHR jurisprudence, it is shown that there are certain aspects of the right to work, as a 
social right,29 that implicitly fall in the ambit of ECHR (article 6 and articles 8-11 ECHR), such 
as the protection against dismissal for unlawful reasons.  For example, dismissal of an 
employee because he had extra-marital relationship (Obst v. Germany), which is analysed in 
section 4.2.1.2, was examined by the ECtHR in the spectrum of article 8 (the right to private 
 
23 Official website of the CoE 
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=25171
96&SecMode=1&DocId=2039078&Usage=2> accessed 10 March 2019. 
24 CoE and EU Agreement 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168064c
45d> accessed 10 March 2019. 
25 Ibid. 
26 CoE official website, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-states/-
/conventions/treaty/country/1> accessed 10 March 2019. 
27 CoE, ‘Exchange of letters between the Secretary General of the CoE and the President of the Commission of 
the European Communities on 5 November 1996 supplementing the ‘Arrangement’ between the CoE and the 
European Community concluded on 16 June 1987’  
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168064c
45d> accessed 10 March 2019. 
28 Opinion 2/13 of the Court pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU [2014] OJ C65/2. 
29 Mantouvalou V. (ed), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017), p.2. 
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life).30  As Hugh Collins explained in his chapter entitled ‘Is There a Human Right to Work’, 
the right to work has ‘hybrid quality’.31  Τhe negative aspect of the right to work, which entails 
protection from unjustifiable discrimination and barriers from employment, takes the form of 
a traditional civil liberty.32  Whereas, the positive aspect of the right to work has characteristics 
of social and economic rights.33  The right to work, as a composite right, has different 
ingredients that could promote employment security – such as the right to access labour market 
and job security standards.  To embark on this investigation, this section draws on the evolving 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  First, it begins with the right to fair trial (article 6 ECHR), which 
entails analysis of the State’s obligation and immunity for civil servants.  Second, it looks at 
employment security standards as a means for protecting the following human rights that are 
guaranteed in the ECHR: the right to respect for private life (article 8 ECHR), the right to 
manifest one’s religion (article 9 ECHR), the right to freedom of expression (article 10 ECHR) 
and the negative right not to join a trade union (article 11 ECHR). 
4.2.1.1 Employment security, State immunity and public sector employment 
 
The right to fair hearing, as a civil right guaranteed in article 6 of ECHR, has recognised State 
immunity disputes in employment matters that include public employees.  In Fogarty v. UK, 
the ECtHR observed that State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes is subject 
to limitations,34  but latitude is given to ‘sensitive and confidential issues related to the 
diplomatic and organizational policy of a foreign State’.35  Complaints related to ‘the 
recruitment, careers and termination of services of public servants’ also tend to be excluded 
from the scope of article 6(1) ECHR.36  For example, in Neigel v. France, the ECtHR stated 
that the applicant who was employed by the city council requesting reinstatement, did not fall 
in the ambit of article 6(1) ECHR.37 
The ECtHR has however adopted a new ‘functional criterion based on the nature of the 
employee’s duties and responsibilities’ to determine whether article 6(1) ECHR applies to 
public servants.38  In Pellegrin v. France,39 the ECtHR explained that the State as part of its 
 
30 Obst v. Germany App no 425/03 (ECtHR, 23 September 2010). 
31 Mantouvalou (n.29), p.26. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Fogarty v. the UK App no 37112/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001), para.37. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Massa v. Italy App no 14399/88 (ECtHR, 24 August 1993), para.26.  
37 Neigel v. France App no 18725/91 (ECtHR, 17 March 1997).  




sovereign power has ‘a legitimate interest in requiring of these servants a special bond of trust 
and loyalty’ for some public-sector posts that are regulated by public law.40  In this context, the 
ECtHR referred to the EC 1988 Communication, which explicitly sets out the activities that 
are included in the public service and safeguard the interests of the State (such as police and 
public health services).41  It further stated that article 6(1) ECHR does not apply in disputes 
between administrative authorities and employees who occupy posts involving participation in 
the exercise of powers conferred by public law.42  As the applicant had responsibilities which 
were within the State’s sovereign power, the applicant’s case did not fall in the ambit of article 
6(1) ECHR.43 
The Cudak v. Lithuania case indicates that the ECtHR was more willing to examine cases on 
job security rather on employment security.  In Cudak, the applicant was employed as secretary 
and switchboard operator by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lithuania,44 and had 
lodged a sexual harassment complaint before the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman which was 
upheld and sick leave granted.45  She was not however admitted back on the Embassy premises 
after taking sick leave and the Embassy’s assertion that she was barred from brining a civil 
claim for dismissal on grounds of diplomatic immunity was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Lithuania.  The ECtHR held that there was violation of article 6(1) ECHR because the measure 
of dismissal was not proportionate, placing emphasis on the incidence of sexual harassment.46  
This suggests that there can be limited but still residual protection from dismissal (namely of 
job security) under article 6 ECHR even where State immunity might often be invoked. 
4.2.1.2 ECHR rights and dismissals: articles 8-11 ECHR 
 
Employment security standards, which either appear in the form of protection against unfair or 
unlawful dismissal, are indirectly integrated in the ECHR regime in cases that entail protection 
of non-absolute rights, which are protected under articles 8-11 ECHR.  These rights consist of: 
the right to respect of private and family life (article 8 ECHR), the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (article 9 ECHR), the right to freedom of expression (article 10 ECHR) 
 
40 Ibid, para.65. 
41 EU Communication from the Commission of the European Communities published in OJEC no. C 72 of 18 
March 1988, “Freedom of movement of workers and access to employment in the public service of the Member 
States – Commission action in respect of the application of Article 48(4) of the EEC Treaty”. 
42 Pellegrin v. France (n.38). 
43 Ibid, paras.70-71.  
44 Cudak v. Lithuania App no 15869/02 (ECtHR, 23 March 2010). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, paras.71-75. 
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and the freedom of assembly and association (article 11 ECHR).  These provisions sometimes 
are examined in relation to article 14 ECHR, which safeguards the right to non-discrimination 
that can only be invoked in conjunction with other substantive provisions.  In addition, Protocol 
12 to ECHR, which entered into force in 2005, which was also ratified by Cyprus (Cypriot Law 
13(III)/2002), has guaranteed a self-standing principle of non-discrimination.47   The State has 
the power to interfere and restrict individual’s rights under articles 8-11 ECHR, if the taken 
measure fulfils one of the following criteria/exceptions, as mutually set in the second paragraph 
of articles 8-11 ECHR: a) the interference shall be in accordance with law b) the measure shall 
be necessary in a democratic society.  This section looks at examples of cases, which deal with 
rights under articles 8-11 ECHR, and seeks to explore the set of controls that are established in 
relation to employment security. 
I. Article 8 ECHR: right to respect private and family life 
Article 8 ECHR, which as a multi-faceted right pertains to a range of individual’s interests, 
places on States the obligation to respect for private and family life.  Dismissal might entail 
repercussions on individuals’ private lives or be based on private information.  In such 
circumstances article 8 ECHR is engaged.  In Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, the 
applicants were excluded from the labour market.48  The ECtHR held that the right to choose 
occupation does not explicitly fall within the ambit of article 8 ECHR.  However, it was found 
that the ban on taking up private sector employment because both applicants had the status of 
‘former KGB officers’ did affect their private life.49  The publicity of the issue and its 
application to them affected their ability to engage and create professional networks.  The status 
of ‘former KGB officers’ acted as an impediment for the applicants in the search of job, which 
excluded them from the labour market. 
The ECtHR further examined whether the duty of loyalty that is imposed by a church can 
restrict the right to private and family life but could justify the dismissal of employees.  There 
are multiple church cases, in which the ECtHR held that the individual cannot be dismissed 
because he beached his duty of loyalty by having extra-marital relationship.  In Schüth v. 
Germany, the applicant, who was a priest at a Catholic parish church, was dismissed because 
 
47 Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Prohibition of 
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he was going to have another child with his new partner.50  The Catholic parish church claimed 
that the applicant breached his duty of loyalty, because he had an extra-marital relationship 
with another woman.51  The ECtHR held that the domestic tribunals failed to explain the 
reasons why the interests of the Catholic Church as a collective right outweighed the 
applicant’s individual right to respect for his private and family life (article 8 ECHR).52  A duty 
of loyalty towards the Catholic church did not mean ‘a personal unequivocal undertaking to 
live a life of abstinence in the event of separation or divorce’.53  The ECtHR identified  a 
normative gap in the German legislation (transposing EU Directive 2000/78),  according to 
which German General Equal Treatment Act did not enshrine a provision to protect difference 
in treatment if the religion constituted a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational 
requirement.54 
II. Article 9 ECHR: the right to manifest religion or belief 
This section looks at complaints, which arose in transnational workplaces, that entail State 
interference in the forum externum of the right to freedom of religion: the right to manifest 
religion or belief.55  The analysis seeks to explore the cases in which  restriction to manifest 
religion or belief could act as a legitimate justification for dismissals.  In the context of 
employment, workers sometimes seem to voluntarily accept to limit their right to manifestation 
of religion or belief, by accepting a job offer that sets as a condition that entails the restriction 
of their right to manifest religion or belief.  This voluntary acceptance was described by Lucy 
Vickers as ‘a specific situation rule’.56  However, the individual might have accepted to limit 
the right to manifestation because he or she felt pressure that if he or she had refused to do so, 
his or her application would have been rejected, which means that he or she would have being 
exposed to a serious risk of unemployment. 
The ECtHR has examined inter alia whether the manifestation of religion at the workplace, 
which led to employment sanctions that included dismissals, constituted violation of article 9 
in conjunction with article 14 ECHR and has sometimes found that it does so.57  Nevertheless, 
 
50 Schüth v. Germany App no 1620/03 (ECtHR, 23 September 2010); Obst v. Germany App no 425/03 (ECtHR, 
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55 Barras A., ‘Transnational Understanding of Secularisms and Their Impact on the Right to Religious Freedom – 
Exploring Religious Symbols Cases at the UN and ECHR’ (2012) 11 Journal of Human Rights 263, pp.264-265. 
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it seems that it plays a key role whether the employee was aware about the specific working 
tasks, which entail restriction of the employee’s rights to manifest religion or belief, before or 
after accepting the job offer.  The claim made by Mr McFarlane (as the fourth applicant in 
Eweida), who was dismissed for gross misconduct by private company because he did not 
provide counselling services to same-sex couples, was rejected by the ECtHR.58  As the ECtHR 
explained, the applicant, whose application was also dismissed by the Employment Tribunal, 
had voluntarily accepted to take part in the ‘post-graduate training programme in psycho-sexual 
counselling’.59  Before his admission to the programme, the applicant was aware that it would 
not be possible to exclude clients due to their sexual orientation because the programme 
launched ‘an Equal Opportunities Policy’.60 
III. Article 10 ECHR: the right to freedom of expression 
Article 10 ECHR enshrines freedom of expression ‘as one of the cardinal rights guaranteed 
under the Convention’, and has led to cases where employees are dismissed because they 
exercised their right to free speech.61  As established in Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, the applicant’s 
dismissal by a private enterprise (TVE) because he publicly criticized his manager’s behaviour, 
was not ‘reasonably proportionate’ to the legitimate aim pursued.62  The ECtHR’s approach 
was not affected by the fact that the decision for dismissal was imposed as penalty under 
disciplinary proceedings.  As the ECtHR explained, the State under certain circumstances has 
a positive obligation to protect the right to freedom of expression, even if the case involves a 
private law undertaking.63   
It seems that the approach of the ECtHR was altered in Predota v. Austria, in which it stated 
that the applicant’s dismissal was necessary in democratic society because the applicant used 
strong language to criticize the provided services and performance of his employer.64  As the 
ECtHR further added, the applicant discussed issues, which were not within the interest of the 
general public.65  It appears that the way that the individual expresses criticism can be decisive.  
In Predota, the applicant had infringed ‘the Disciplinary Regulations of the Railways’ by 
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distributing leaflets, which criticized the nature of his job.66  The Vienna Labour Court, before 
which the applicant lodged a claim, characterized this behaviour as breach of professional duty 
of loyalty by ‘disseminating the company’s internal matters to the public’.67  The Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court further rejected applicant’s appeals and confirmed the Labour 
Court’s decision.68  This shows that there are cases, as the ECtHR showed, in which there is 
breach of professional duty of loyalty, which could justify the termination of employment 
under the ESC/RSC (article 1) and also ILO Convention N.158.  To explain, article 4 of ILO 
Convention N.158 refers to ‘conduct of worker’, which constitute a valid reason of termination 
of employment.   In addition, article 1 ESC/RSC, as interpreted by the ECSR in the Concluding 
Observation to Spain, integrated the reasons for dismissal identified by the ILO as valid in the 
context of the ESC/RSC.69 
IV. Article 11 ECHR: freedom of association 
The ECtHR recognized that the employer has the right to restrict freedom of association of 
employees under article 11 ECHR, when it is necessary in a democratic society.70  The State 
has a positive obligation to promote freedom of association, which includes the right to become 
or not become a member of a trade union.71  Political parties constitute part of a democratic 
society, which means it is important to safeguard individuals against unfair dismissal based on 
their political opinion or affiliation.72  In this context, the State might be obliged to intervene 
in the relationships between private parties to ensure the individual’s freedom of association.   
In Redfearn v. UK, the applicant was dismissed from Serco, after he was elected as a local 
councillor for the British National Party (BNP), which only accepted white nationals as 
members of the Party.73  The applicant brought a claim for indirect racial discrimination before 
the Employment Tribunal, which held that the employer’s decision for dismissal was 
proportionate and legitimate for reasons related to health and safety (e.g. his position could 
lead to attacks on Serco’s transport vehicles).74  The ECtHR accepted that the employer may 
lawfully restrict the employee’s freedom of association in cases that is deemed as necessary in 
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a democratic society.75   In the present case, the employer had only received complaints against 
the applicant about his political affiliation.76  The employer did not receive any complaint from 
a client or a colleague about the employee’s conduct or performance at workplace.77  It is 
interesting that in the present case, the applicant was not eligible to bring to claim before the 
Employment Tribunal, because the applicant did not fulfil the required admissibility criterion, 
which required him to complete one qualifying year in employment.78  This threshold, as the 
ECtHR explained, was set by the UK Government in the interests of employers’ flexibility.79 
The Redfearn case seems to be a landmark decision in terms of employment and job security.  
From a human rights perspective, it seems that the ECtHR takes into consideration various 
factors to determine whether a dismissal, which restricts individual’s freedom of association, 
could be understood as a necessary measure ‘in a democratic society’.  Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR provides substantive safeguards for workers that were dismissed, who were otherwise 
(due to procedural requirements) not allowed to bring a claim for unfair dismissal before the 
national competent courts.80  The ECtHR’s approach is closer to the ILO’s clear-cut approach 
rather than to the EU approach, as the ECtHR provides substantial safeguards for protection of 
freedom of association, which could promote human dignity and equality.  The ILO’s rights-
based approach is reflected in article 5(a) of ILO Convention N.158, which explicitly prohibits  
dismissals on grounds related to ‘union membership or participation in union activities outside 
working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours’.81  Whereas, the 
EU does not regulate individual dismissals for reasons related to political affiliation or freedom 
of assembly.  The EUCFR provides prohibition against unfair or unlawful dismissal (article 30 
EUCFR), which is arguably manifested in EU Directives protecting employees from 
discriminatory dismissals.  However, trade union membership and collective bargaining are 
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4.2.2 European Social Charter (ESC) and European Social Charter Revised (RSC)  
 
The European Social Charter (ESC), which was revised in 1996 (the European Social Charter 
Revised) (RSC), clearly enshrines the right of workers to protection against unfair or unlawful 
dismissal.  The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) has endorsed a broad 
understanding of the term ‘termination of employment’, which includes inter alia termination 
due to bankruptcy and invalidity.82  The ESC adopted a list of valid reasons in case of 
termination of employment, which are the same with ILO Convention N.158 - i.e. capacity, 
conduct or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or 
service.83  The ESC’s provisions, which were also embedded in the RSC, enshrines invalid 
grounds of dismissal that include: maternity reasons that also entail the right to return to the 
same or similar post (article 8(2) ESC and RSC), the right to join a trade union (article 5 ESC 
and RSC) and the right to strike (article  6(4) ESC and RSC). 
As Colm O’Cinneide articulated, the right to work (in article 1 ESC/RSC) has a more detailed 
normative content from article 6 ICESCR, as it is focused on ‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’.84  
The ECSR shows through its interpretative approach that this right, as a composite right, has 
many components, such as the right to protection against unfair dismissal (job security).  In 
particular, the ECSR has stated that this right entails prohibition against any direct or indirect 
discrimination in employment based on different grounds, which inter alia include sex, race, 
ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation and political opinion.85  Article 1 
ESC/RSC provides positive obligations on States to promote full employment in its national 
framework, which according to O’Cinneide, entail two types of obligations: first, measures to 
enable workers to preserve their employment and second, measures to facilitate jobseekers to 
transition from unemployment to employment.86 
In the second paragraph, the ESC and the RSC enshrine the right of worker to earn his living 
in an occupation freely entered upon (article 1(2) ESC/RSC).  According to the interpretative 
approach of the ECSR, article 1(2) ESC/RSC includes different types of work-related 
protection, among which the prohibition of all forms of discrimination in employment.87  In 
this context, the ECSR has stated that the State shall take specific measures to ensure that the 
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right under article 1(2)ESC/RSC is protected, such as protection against unfair dismissal and 
remedies.88  As the ECSR has further explained, when a dismissal causes detrimental effects 
to the individual, such termination, can also fall in the ambit of article 1(2) ESC/RSC.89  The 
RSC also includes the following grounds in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
which are inherently linked with other provisions under the Charter: family responsibilities 
(article 27 RSC), disability (article 15 RSC), sex (article 20 RSC) and acting in the capacity of 
a workers' representative (article 28 RSC).  Article 28 RSC also guarantees the right of workers' 
representatives to protection in the undertaking and facilities to be accorded to them.    
According to the ECSR, article 28 RSC also entails protection against unlawful or unfair 
dismissal based on the capacity and the activities of workers’ representative.90 
The ECSR has examined a limited number of complaints concerning article 24 RSC, which 
provides the right to protection in cases of termination of employment, through the Collective 
Complaints Procedure (CCP).  In Finnish Society of Social Rights v. Finland, the Committee 
held that national courts shall examine whether the dismissal could be justified due to 
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.91  According to the 
Finnish Employment Contacts Act, termination of employment is justified in cases where ‘the 
work to be offered has diminished substantially and permanently for economic or production-
related reasons or for reasons arising from reorganisation of the employer's operations’.92  The 
Finnish Society of Social Rights, as the complainant organization, noted that ‘economic 
reasons’ that constitute a valid reason for termination of employment, refer ‘to economic 
difficulties, not to maximize profit’.93  The ECSR noted that the term of ‘operational 
requirements’ could cover different situations, such as measures to increase enterprise’s 
competitiveness level even in cases where the enterprise does not face any economic 
difficulty.94  The ECSR concluded that Finish legislation strikes a fair balance between 
employees’ and employers’ rights, which is entailed in article 24 RSC.95  It further set out three 
conditions, which shall be met to justify the dismissal on economic grounds.  There shall be a 
 
88 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVI-Iceland’, p.313. 
89 ECSR Conclusions XVI-1, Austria, p.25. 
90 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2003, France’, pp.208-209. 
91 Finnish Society of Social Rights v. Finland (Complaint N.107/2014), para.49. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 




‘decline in demand’, ‘obsolete products’ and ‘an increased competition or restructuring of the 
business’.96 
In addition, article 4(4) ESC/RSC enshrines ‘the right to a reasonable period of notice for 
termination of employment’, which could act either as safeguard for job security or impediment 
for facilitating transitions of employment.  In Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) 
v. Greece Complaint N.111/2014, the complainant organization alleged that the notice period 
as derived from domestic legislation, which was adopted between 2010 and 2014 as part of 
economic (austerity) measures, was too short.97  According to Sub-section A in article 74(2) of 
Act N. 3863/2010, full-time employees that have not completed the first twelve months of 
employment, can be dismissed without prior notice.98  Whereas Section B of the Act 
N.2863/2010 provided that those who worked for a period of twelve months to two years are 
entitled to one-month’ notice prior to termination of employment.99  The Committee concluded 
that there was a breach of the Charter, because of the ‘legislature’s inaction’ and the ‘strong 
pressure from the creditor institutions’ that led to the breach of Charter’s provisions.100  As the 
term ‘reasonable period of notice’ is not defined, the ECSR looks at the qualified period of 
employment.  For example, granting one week notice prior to dismissal for a worker who was 
employed less than six months has been deemed a reasonable period.101  In an effort to adjust 
a strict procedural requirement, the Committee also suggested that the worker should be 
granted time off to enable the worker to find another job and remain in the labour market.102 
Looking at the case of Cyprus in 2012, the ECSR concluded that the domestic legislation in 
Cyprus is not in conformity with the Charter on two grounds.103  First, the employees that are 
not continuously employed for twenty-six weeks are excluded from the scope of protection.104    
This could increase the levels of job insecurity for workers that have not completed a period of 
continuous employment for twenty-six weeks.  Second, the categories of workers that are 
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It is interesting that issues related to decent work are conceived as part of other ESC rights - 
such as, the right to just conditions of work (article 2 ESC/RSC).106  Whereas, the CESCR 
tightly connected the two ingredients of ‘accessibility and availability’ with decent work 
(which also appears as ‘acceptability of work’).107  The CESCR General Comment N.18 (2005) 
explicitly states that the right to work is ‘essential for realizing other human rights and forms 
an inseparable and inherent part of human dignity’.108  In this context, the CESCR identified 
the three elements (accessibility, availability and acceptability), which characterized as 
‘interdependent and essential elements’ for transnational regulation.109  This shows that the 
ECSR and CESCR converge as to the first two elements and diverge towards the normative 
content of the right to work, which has a ‘complex character’.110 
 
4.3 Social security in the human rights regime 
 
4.3.1 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)  
 
The right to social security as a socio-economic right is not clearly guaranteed in the ECHR. 
However, the ECtHR has regarded social security benefits as ‘possessions’ under article 1 
Protocol 1 to ECHR (A1P1 ECHR) where the individual contributed to a fund created by the 
State for purposes of pensions or other allowances.  As the ECtHR stated in Nagy v. Hungary 
to emphasize the vital need for adequate social security protection: ‘in the modern, democratic 
State, many individuals are, for all or part of their lives, completely dependent for survival on 
social-security and welfare benefits’.111  This aspect of the ECHR is the focus of the first part 
of this section of the chapter.  The second part will explore social security standards in relation 
to non-discrimination law and the right to private and family life (article 8 ECHR) as developed 
in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  The third part examines the right to fair trial (article 6), which 
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I. A1P1 ECHR  
A1P1 ECHR provides that ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions’.112  In Maurice v. France, the ECtHR described ‘possessions’ as ‘existing 
possessions or assets’.113  As the ECtHR explained, social security legislation, which integrates 
the situations where there is ‘a legitimate expectation of obtaining an asset’,114  generates a 
proprietary interest that falls in the scope of the ECHR.115  In Béláné Nagy v. Hungary, the 
ECtHR referred to the term ‘legitimate expectation’, whose interpretation shall be ‘based on a 
legal provision or a legal act’,116 and examined whether there was ‘an assertable right under 
domestic law to a welfare benefit’.117 
The ECtHR developed a two-fold test for A1P1 ECHR in Béláné Nagy.  First, there shall be an 
assertable right and second, the right shall be of a sufficiently established, substantive 
proprietary interest under the national law expectation.118  In Baczúr v. Hungary, the ECtHR 
held that applicant’s claim for disability benefit for six months satisfied the test,119  whereas, 
the applicant in Béláné Nagy had not, according to the new work capability assessment 
methodology that was introduced in Hungary.120  This illustrates the subjective nature of the 
assessment criteria, which determine whether an individual is eligible to receive the disability 
benefit or not. 
Social security benefits fall in the ambit of ‘possessions’ under A1P1 ECHR, however, the 
wide margin of appreciation left to the States could substantially restrict the right to social 
security.  In Aldeguer Tomás v. Spain, the ECtHR clarified that the State has a wide margin of 
appreciation under the ECHR as to ‘general economic or social measures, which are closely 
linked to the State’s financial resources’.121  The ECtHR explained that national authorities are 
aware of the special needs of the internal domestic system.122  In other words, the State is in a 
better position to understand the societal needs than the international standard-setting actors 
(such as the ECtHR) and for this purpose, the domestic authorities have a wide margin of 
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appreciation, which will enable them to introduce the appropriate domestic legislative 
amendments.123  The Member States are eligible to amend social security legislation, which 
will be adapted to the current societal needs (e.g. eligibility criteria).124  As the ECtHR further 
explained, social security legislation is expected to be amended ‘to verify the existence of a 
sufficiently established, substantive proprietary interest under the national law’ and 
subsequently, promote legal certainty and the rule of law.125  It seems that this approach 
endorses the principle of effectiveness, as it permits the Member States to have discretion and 
adopt their own legislation. 
II. Articles 8 and 14 ECHR 
The restriction of a wide margin of appreciation could only be removed if the State’s 
interference falls in the ambit of non-discrimination law (article 14 ECHR).  In Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia, the ECtHR held that article 8 ECHR does not include the positive obligation 
to provide parental leave allowances.126  However, the State shall decide whether to provide 
parental leave and parental allowances, in such a way that will be in conformity with articles 8 
and 14 ECHR. 
As the ECtHR stated: ‘enabling one of the parents to stay at home to look after the children, 
parental leave and related allowances promote family life and necessarily affect the way in 
which it is organised’.127  In the present case, the applicant, who was employed in military 
personnel, requested three years’ parental leave because he was the sole carer for his 
children.128  After his claim was rejected because such allowances were only granted to female 
personnel, the applicant brought a case before the Military Court, which rejected the applicants’ 
claims.129  Then, the applicant was granted a parental leave allowance by another head of the 
military unit.130  As consequence, the Military Court reacted, characterizing this decision as 
unlawful.131  The ECtHR based its judgment on a wide range of international materials, which 
promote gender equality: CEDAW, ILO Convention N.111, EUCFR and EU Parental Leave 
Directive 2010/18.  As the ECtHR stated, national law shall not impose traditions (such as 
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man’s primordial role and patriarchal family) to justify a difference in treatment in grounds of 
sex.132  This is a landmark case because it shows that the ECtHR changed its view from the 
1988 judgment of Petrovic v. Austria which had previously stated that the exclusion of male 
applicants from Parental Leave Law was not a violation of articles 8 and 14 ECHR.133 
III. Article 6 ECHR 
Article 6 ECHR states that ‘in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal’.134  The ECtHR clarified that disputes concerning social benefits could be conceived 
as ‘civil rights and obligations’.135  In Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands, the applicant claimed 
that she was not able to return to work as she was ill.136  In March 1978, the Governing Board 
of the Occupational Association of the Banking and Insurance, Wholesale Trade and Self-
Employment Sector held that she was no longer entitled to sickness benefit as the Associate’s 
consulting doctor decided that she was able to return to work.137  The applicant  lodged an 
appeal, claiming that her right to a fair trial was infringed.138  The Appeals Board declared her 
application as inadmissible because two permanent medical experts examined the applicant 
and allowed her to express her objections orally.139  The ECtHR discussed the features of public 
law (i.e. character of legislation, compulsory nature of the insurance and assumption by the 
State of responsibility for social protection) and private law (i.e. personal and economic nature 
of the asserted right, connection with the contract of employment, affinities with insurance 
under the ordinary law) to examine whether the legislation in dispute could fall in the scope of 
public law.140  In this case, the ECtHR decided that the legislation in dispute, which established 
the legal framework of the health insurance scheme, could fall in the scope of article 6 ECHR.  
As the ECtHR explained, there was a breach of article 6(1) ECHR because the applicant did 
not fulfil the ‘restrictive’ conditions of access to the two Boards, and as a consequence the 
applicant was restricted from bringing a claim before the two Boards and challenge the 
decision, which was taken by the President of the Appeals Board.141 
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The ECtHR further decided that proceedings concerning welfare benefits given on a non-
contributory basis could also fall in the scope of article 6(1) of ECHR.142  This was established 
in Stec v. UK, and re-confirmed in more recent cases (such as in Carson).143  The ECtHR 
particularly stated that claims regarding payment of a welfare benefit or pension (contributory 
or non-contributory), which generates ‘a proprietary interest’, falls under the scope of A1P1 
ECHR.144 
4.3.2 European Social Charter (ESC/RSC) and the European Code of Social Security 
(ECSS)   
 
The right to social security is clearly enshrined in article 12 of ESC/RSC, according to which 
States shall ‘maintain the social security system at a satisfactory level at least equal to that 
necessary for the ratification of ILO Convention N.102 (as set in the ESC) and the European 
Code of Social Security (ECSS) (as set in the RSC)’, which provides minimum standards for 
social security protection as established in ILO Convention N.102.145  The ESC and RSC, 
which endorsed the branches of social security benefit in the ECSS, adopted social security 
standards for inter alia: medical care, unemployment, sickness, employment injury, family 
responsibilities and maternity reasons.    
Family responsibilities 
Part VII of the ECSS, which was not accepted by the Republic of Cyprus, established protection 
for family benefit.  According to article 40 ECSS, the family benefit solely covers ‘the 
maintenance of children’.146  In other words, the family benefit does not cover situations where 
the worker acts as carer of his relatives (e.g. elderly parents).  The family benefit shall be 
provided to individuals that have completed a qualifying period, which consists of one month 
of contribution/employment or six months of residence.147 
Maternity leave 
Maternity benefit covers contingencies of pregnancy, confinement and its consequences, which 
is a standard derived from that adopted in ILO Convention N.183.148  According to article 48(2) 
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of the Code, the maternity benefit shall cover pre-natal, confinement and post-natal care and 
hospitalization.  The Code stipulates that the aim of maternity benefit is to ‘maintain, restore 
or improve the health of the woman protected and her ability to work and to attend to her 
personal needs’, which creates responsibilities for the employer to adjust worker’s needs to the 
enterprise’s interests.149 
Unemployment benefit 
Article 12 RSC increased the scope of protection and sets the conditions according to which an 
individual is entitled to unemployment benefits.  The term ‘suitable work’, which also appears 
in ILO Convention N.102, is not explicitly defined in the Charter.  The ECSR interpreted the 
term ‘suitable job’, which means that it ‘must be adequately paid, must correspond to the 
physical abilities of the person concerned and it must not constitute a hazard to the unemployed 
person’s health or moral principles’.150  Whereas, the ECSS specifies that unemployment 
benefit should be provided in cases where the individual is ‘unable to obtain suitable 
employment in the case of a person protected who is capable of, and available for, work’.151   
In the 2016 ECSR Conclusion (Spain), the ECSR discussed Spanish legislation, which states 
that the individual shall ‘be actively seeking a job and not have rejected the offer of a suitable 
job or refused to take part, without justified reason, in an occupational improvement, training 
or retraining programme’.152  As the ECSR suggested, in cases where the unemployment 
benefit is suspended or withdrawn because an individual rejected the offer of a suitable job, 
then the State shall ensure that the individual will be able to bring a claim before the national 
courts, which will provide him or her judicial redress if the job was not suitable.153  Reflecting 
on the UK legislation, the ECSR agreed that the period to decide on the suitability of a job is 
decided ad hoc.154  This means even if the prescribed period (13 week initial period) has passed, 
it does not mean that the individual lost his or her right to claim that the job is not suitable.155  
In this context, the CoE published a ‘Guide to the concept of suitable employment in the context 
of unemployment benefits’, as a soft-law handbook, to influence transnational regulation, 
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which appears that it was also used by the CESCR.156  At the ILO-level, the CEACR through 
its interpretative approach, discussed different elements (such as travel time and distance), 
which could render a job position as suitable.  However, it appears that there is no clear-cut 
definition of ‘suitable job’ and Member States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation at 
international level (ILO/UN) and in the context of the CoE. 
Educational benefit 
Educational benefit, which could be used to increase employability of individuals that will 
enable them to enter, re-enter or remain in the labour market, is not included in the ECSS and 
the Convention on Social Security (CSS).  The ECHR enshrined the right to education in article 
2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, although the ECtHR has not found that this provision 
encompasses the right to vocational training.  It seems that the right to education as enshrined 
in the ECHR refers to the right to substantive education.  The idea of educational benefits is to 
enable the individual to make the transition from one job to another or from unemployment to 
employment.  For this purpose, it is important to explore the regional standards concerning 
educational benefits. 
Article 1(1) RSC provided that the right to work encompassed the duty of the Member States 
to provide or promote appropriate vocational guidance and training.  In addition to the above, 
article 10 RSC enshrines the right to vocational training.  This provision refers to ‘technical 
and vocational training for all persons’, which means it refers to all individuals (either workers 
or unemployed individuals).157  Article 10 RSC refers to the State’s duty to provide ‘readily 
available services’.158  Also, it seems that it creates a flexible framework where individuals 
would be able to enjoy the right to vocational training.  This flexible framework entails 
financial assistance of the ALMPs and normal working hours that support the realization of 
training.  Article 1(4) RSC provides that the Member States are obliged to provide or promote 
appropriate vocational guidance, training and rehabilitation.159  The ECSR expressed that 
vocational training programmes shall be addressed to both employed and unemployed 
individuals.160 
 
156 Council of Europe, Guide to the concept of suitable employment in the context of unemployment benefits 
(Council of Europe 2010).  
157 RSC, article 10(1).  
158 Ibid, article 10. 
159 Ibid, article 1(4). 
160 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XII-1, Statement of Interpretation on Article 1(4)’, p.67.  
97 
 
It appears that the Code has not set out any rules concerning financial assistance in the context 
of ALMPs and LLL.  For example, it has not specified which actors shall be responsible to 
provide financial assistance for the realization of vocational training.  In addition to this, the 
Charter refers to supervision of vocational programmes, however, it has not specified which 
actors shall act as supervisory mechanisms and to what extent this supervision would enable 
the individuals to remain in the labour market.161  It seems that the ILO has adopted a more 
detailed normative framework as to which actors shall invest and contribute in the realization 
of ALMPs and LLL.  In particular, the States are responsible for in-work training (ILO 
Convention N.142),162 whereas all interested actors (including enterprises, States) shall invest 
to ensure that everyone enjoys the right to education and training (ILO Recommendation 
N.195).163 
The role of social dialogue is relevant because the supervision of these facilities and 
programmes shall be decided in consultation with workers’ and employers’ representatives.164  
Social dialogue, which is recognized as one of the main ingredients in the flexicurity discourse, 
was also set as a core feature in the CoE regime.  The ESC and RSC enshrined the right to 
social dialogue in their scope of protection – i.e. article 5 ESC/RSC, article 6 ESC/RSC, article 
25 RSC and article 28 RSC.   Cyprus, which is used as case study in this thesis, accepted articles 
5 and 6 ESC/RSC.165  Article 5 ESC and RSC enshrines the Member States’ obligation to 
guarantee the freedom of workers and employers to form and join organizations (such as trade 
unions), through which they will be able to protect their socio-economic rights.166  However, 
it does not seem an easy task to strike a proper balance between the socio-economic interests 
of workers and enterprises’ interest to increase their level of competitiveness.  Moreover, article 
6 ESC and RSC safeguards the right to collective bargaining, which may take the form of ‘joint 
consultation’.  The ECSR described ‘joint consultation’ as ‘consultation between employees 
and employers or the organisations that represent them’.167  Such consultations shall be held as 
tripartite bodies, where social actors shall participate in the whole negotiating process.168  The 
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issues raised for discussion shall cover all matters of common interest, such as vocational 
training, productivity and social insurance.169  The representatives shall fulfil particular criteria 
that are prescribed by domestic law, although these criteria shall be ‘objective, reasonable and 
subject to judicial review’.170 
According to article 21 RSC, social dialogue also takes the form of exchanging information.  
It seems that this type of social dialogue aims to facilitate the procedural and normative 
function of enterprises, while enabling communication.  In other words, it enables the worker 
to be aware of the situation in the undertaking/enterprise.  In addition, article 22 RSC, which 
provides ‘the right of workers to take part in the determination and improvement of the working 
conditions and working environment in the undertaking’, introduces the right of workers’ 
representatives to consultation at enterprise-level. 
Article 25 RSC provides that workers have the right to protect their claims in case of insolvency 
which might arise from employment relationship (including their employment contract).  This 
provision seems particularly important in the era of economic crisis, where the situation of 
workers is manifestly affected by the economic downturn.  Similarly, the ESC enshrines the 
right to social dialogue, which includes inter alia information and consultation with workers’ 
representatives, in case of collective redundancy.171  Article 29 RSC explains that the social 
dialogue in these circumstances shall aim to ‘avoid or limit collective redundancies or mitigate 
their consequences’.  In this context, the RSC sets out different social measures that should be 
taken into account as a means to avoid collective redundancies, among which are the ALMPs 
and LLL (‘redeployment or retraining programmes).172  As the ECSR indicated, article 1(3) 
RSC, which provides that the Member States shall ‘establish or maintain free employment 
services for all workers’, entails that trade unions and employers’ organisations shall participate 
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4.4 Conclusion  
 
As an overall conclusion, it seems that the CoE is more concerned about human rights and less 
concerned with dismissals.  It is interesting that the evolving jurisprudence of the ECtHR does 
cover dismissals to the extent that fall under the scope of other substantive rights (art.8-11 
ECHR), but does not seem to attend to the right to access employment (or recruitment), which 
is a core component of employment security from a flexicurity perspective.  The concept of 
employment security, which in this research study takes the meaning of entering, remaining or 
re-entering employment, is complex in its very nature (see more about employment security as 
flexicurity component in section 2.2) and sometimes collides with job security standards, which 
could be challenged under the ECHR spectrum.  As illustrated in section 4.2, the ECtHR strikes 
a balance between other ECHR substantive rights and collective interests (e.g. public health) 
in a case-by-case basis to determine whether the dismissal was legitimate and necessary in a 
democratic society. 
Hugh Collins argued that the right to work is so crucial, however, there is hesitation over its 
recognition as human right due to its ‘imprecise meaning’.174  It is inevitable that the right to 
work is conceived as a fundamental human right at international level, which is also established 
at domestic level under the Constitution of Cyprus (article 6).  However, as Collins explained, 
there is a ‘lack of consensus’ about the normative content of the right to work, which has 
multiple integral substantive components, such as the right to decent work (as promoted at 
UN/ILO level) and the right to access employment.175  The ESC/RSC attempts to distinguish 
the different components of the right to work, which also seems problematic because the 
Member States are eligible to select and adopt discrete provisions.  This practice of selecting 
the integral parts of the right to work could create major challenges as to the normative content 
of the right to work, which as an ‘hybrid’ right entails a mixture of civil and socio-economic 
liberties (the hybrid nature of the right to work is explained in section 4.2.1). 
The right to work, which seeks to ‘attain full employment’ in the ESC/RSC context, reflects 
the positive aspect of the right to work, in which (according to Collins) ‘positive rights [are] 
typically framed as goals’.176  This positive feature of the right to work also appears in the 
international arena: article 6 of ICESCR refers to ‘full and productive employment’ and ILO 
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Declaration of Philadelphia 1944  takes the form of ‘full employment’.177  It is interesting that 
the EUCFR of 2000 does not make any mention of full employment and limits the scope of the 
right to the freedom to choose or accept occupation or conduct one’s own business in the EU 
regime (articles 15 and 16 EUCFR), which is established in article 1(2) ESC/RSC.  This 
provision of ESC/RSC protects the freedom of individual to get access to work without being 
discriminated.  Even if transnational labour systems converge because they mutually promote 
equality and fundamental rights as core values in their system, it seems that neither the UN/ILO 
nor the CoE are seriously interested in regulating the procedures of economic dismissals.  
Whereas, as we see below the EU provides not only for protection from discriminatory 
dismissal and social security provision, but also offers detailed standards for economic 
dismissals to preserve jobs, which inevitably is a component of the multi-dimensional right to 
work (see section 5.3 for economic dismissals at EU-level).  
Nevertheless, the protection of the right to social security under A1P1 ECHR seems to be an 
important development in the context of ECHR, which could facilitate the realization of 
employment security as part of the right to work.  The right to social security, which includes 
non-contributory and contributory benefits, is not distinguished into branches or contingencies 
as in ILO Convention N.102.  The ECSS follows the logic of ILO Convention N.102, but it 
takes it a step further and includes educational benefit in its normative content, which could 
play a key role in the realization of vocational education and training (ALMPs and LLL) at 
national level.  The ECtHR developed its distinctive two-fold test in Nagy (i.e. assertable right 
and substantive proprietary interest),178 to restrict the scope of the right to social security.  It 
seems that the right to social security can be substantially restricted due to the wide margin of 
appreciation given to Member States under the ECHR, which aims to preserve pluralistic 
democracies and State sovereignty, as illustrated in Konstantin Markin.179  It seems that the 
way that social security is comprehended in each systemic environment, illustrates that 
transnational labour regulatory systems develop its own norms to attain distinct aims.  The 
ECHR and the ESC/RSC conceptualize social security and social assistance as a human right.   
The arguments that are deployed in this chapter emphasize that the legal right to work and 
social security, as exists in different systemic environments, differ as to their normative content 
and comprehensible form.  From the ECHR perspective, it seems that there is more to be done 
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to respect, protect and fulfil the legal right to (decent) work, which is fiercely promoted at 
UN/ILO level, and to endorse the UN maxim: ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated’.180 
 
 





Chapter 5: The European Union 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Following the analysis of the systems of UN/ILO and the CoE, this is the last chapter on 
transnational legal systems.  This chapter examines the regulation of the European Union (EU). 
The aim of this chapter is to see how the EU deals with employment security and job security, 
and gain an understanding of the connections between employment security and social security 
regulation.   
The EU consists of a single internal market, which seeks to guarantee free movement of people, 
goods, services and capital.1  Phil Syrpis observed that ‘for the framers of the Treaty [of Rome], 
it was seen as axiomatic that through the establishment of a common market, social and 
economic benefits would result’.2  However, since there are different domestic labour 
traditions, labour mobility could give rise to a potential conflict of national laws.  Nevertheless, 
the Ohlin Report (1956), which was prepared by a group of ILO experts and formed the basis 
for the Treaty of Rome (1958), clarified that creating a common market does not presuppose 
harmonisation of labour standards.3  The sole exception initially contemplated was equal pay,4 
which then spawned the evolution of much more wide-ranging non-discrimination law, that 
has implications for employment security and social security. 
EU non-discrimination law has become more inclusive after the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
as the Race Directive 2000/43 and Framework Directive 2000/78 introduced multiple non-
discriminatory grounds (such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion or belief, age and 
disability).5  It seems that EU non-discrimination law needs to be set in the context of 
substantive equality.  This entails a shift from formal Aristotelian equality to the 
‘multidimensional’6  and complex concept of substantive equality.  The Aristotelian formal 
equality, whose roots are set in Ethicae Nicomachiae, appears as ‘like things alike and unlike 
 
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 (TEU), article 3.  
2 Phil Syrpis, ‘The EU’s role in Labour Law’ in Alan Bogg, Cathryn Costello and A.C.L. Davies (eds), Research 
Handbook on European Labour Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2016), p.23. 
3 International Labour Organisation, Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report by a Group of 
Experts (summary), in: (1956) 74 International Labour Review, pp.99-123. 
4 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (TFEU), article 
157. 
5 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Related Acts [1997] OJ C340/1; TEC, article 13(1); TFEU, article 19(1). 
6 Fredman S., ‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2016) Human Rights Law Review 1, pp.9-11.  
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things differently, according to their difference’.7  As Jule Mulder argued, the concepts of 
‘likeness’ and ‘unlikeness’ are neither defined nor explained in the work of Aristotle.8  
Whereas, substantive equality looks at the ‘outcomes’ and does not only seek to ‘remove [any] 
irrelevant classifications, such as race or sex’, which is the aim of formal equality.9  Instead, as 
Sandra Fredman explained, substantive equality is ‘a multidimensional concept’ because it 
pursues ‘four complementary and interrelated objectives’: first, it aims to ‘redress 
disadvantage’; second, ‘address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence’; third, ‘facilitate 
participation’; and fourth, ‘accommodate difference’.10 
The notion of substantive equality, which is inter-related with the principle of human dignity 
(article 2 TEU),11 could be linked to the so-called ‘social dimension’ of the EU.  The Treaty of 
Lisbon (2009), which revisited the EU aims, proclaimed that sustainable development in the 
EU internal market entails realization of ‘full employment and social progress’.12  Of course, 
the ‘social dimension’ is not a new development per se.  In the Summit of Paris (1970s), the 
Heads of Governments agreed that they ‘attached as much importance to vigorous action in the 
social fields as to the achievement of the Economic and Monetary Union’.13  This led to the 
adoption of the first Social Action Programs in January 1974, which set three core objectives, 
among which was to ‘promote and provide for a full and better employment [in the EU]’ and 
improve the standards of living.14  Under this prism, multiple acquis were adopted often with 
a market-rationale, which set a unified legal framework to regulate inter alia economic 
dismissals (Collective Redundancies Directive 75/129, Insolvency Directive 80/897, Transfer 
of Undertakings Directive 77/187) and social security coordination (Regulations 3 and 4 of 
1956).  During the EC Presidency of Jacques Delors, the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989, which was purely declaratory, introduced core 
principles that set the foundations for the European labour law.15  These principles included 
 
7 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomacea V.3 1131a–b (W Ross trans, 1925). 
8 Jule Mulder, EU Non-Discrimination in the Courts: Approaches to Sex and Sexualities Discrimination in EU 
Law (Hart Publishing 2017), p.21. 
9 Fredman (n.6). 
10 Ibid. 
11 TEU, article 2.  
12 TEU, article 3(3).  
13 Dodo M., ‘Historical Evolution of the Social Dimension of the European Integration: Issues and Future 
Prospects of the European Social Model' L'Europe en formation, <https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-
formation-2014-2-page-51.htm#pa8> accessed 23 May 2019.  
14 Ibid. 
15 The Community Charter was adopted by the heads of state or government of the then 11 Member States meeting 
at Strasbourg on 9 December 1989. The text is reproduced in 1 Social Europe 1990, pp.46–50, 
<www.eesc.europa.eu/ resources/ docs/ community- charter–en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
104 
 
the freedom to choose and engage in an occupation and showed that the social dimension was 
essential for the realization of internal market.  The ‘Social Chapter’, which refers to the Social 
Policy Agreement that was concluded in Maastricht (December, 1991) by eleven Member 
States as the UK opted-out, extended qualified majority voting in employment-related areas 
(e.g. equality between men and women, information and consultation and working 
conditions).16  The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) incorporated the Social Chapter in the main 
Treaty that covers all EU Member States, as it had only operated on a twin-track at that time.17  
In addition to the latter, the ‘Employment Policy Chapter’ was primarily introduced in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and further integrated in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009).18  This 
‘Employment policy chapter’ seeks to encourage the Member States to cooperate and develop 
the European Employment Strategy (EES), which as a reflexive process aims to set higher 
employment standards within the EU regime. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has recognized the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) as a 
binding means of legislation in the EU legal order.  The EUCFR of 2000, a key EU legal 
instrument for promotion of human rights, includes provisions, which are at the heart of labour 
(including different aspects of employment security) and social security law.  Article 6 TEU 
also provides that the EUCFR’s rights shall have the same legal status with the ECHR, if the 
EU accede to the ECHR.  This tendency of labour law to communicate with other systems that 
promote fundamental rights, was described by Silvana Sciarra as ‘transnational 
juridification’.19  However, such accession seems problematic because the ECHR, which will 
be used as a source of inspiration, does not enshrine work-related (such as protection against 
unfair dismissal) and social security rights, if they do not fall in the field of other substantive 
provisions of the Convention (e.g. articles 8-11 ECHR).  Nevertheless, the accession of the EU 
to the ECHR remains ‘a theoretical debate’ after the CJEU in Opinion 2/13, rejected the draft 
plan on the accession of the EU to the ECHR because such agreement would be incompatible 
with article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol (N.8).20  As the CJEU explained inter alia, the fact that 
EU legal sources (including CJEU’s rulings) will be examined by an external judicial body 
(ECtHR) does not fully preserve the autonomy of EU law.21  In addition to this, the draft 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Treaty of Amsterdam, provision 5, article B. 
18 TEC, article 13(1); TFEU, article 19(1). 
19 Sciarra S., ‘Collective Exit Strategies: New Ideas in Transnational Labour Law’ in Guy Davidov and Brian 
Langille (eds.) The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), p.407.  
20 Opinion 2/13 of the Court pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU [2014] OJ C65/2.  
21 Ibid, para.183.  
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agreement did not provide any guarantee to ensure that the harmonization of standards between 
the EUCFR and the ECHR will ensure ‘primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law’.22 
The concept of ‘employment security’ remains a complex and contested topic at EU-level.   
From a theoretical perspective, employment security describes the situation in which the 
individual remains in the labour market - either through securing a job or position in which 
they can stay (job security) or remaining in employment by finding alternative kinds of work 
(employment security in the broader context).  From a flexicurity perspective (flexibility-
security), as described in the EES, the transition of workers in the labour market can be 
achieved through social security protection, while promoting ALMPs and LLL.  In the EUCFR, 
employment security takes the form of job security and access to employment in the broader 
context.  The right to protection against unfair dismissal, which refers to job security (secure a 
job position), is recognized in article 30 EUCFR.  This recognition seems to be an important 
step towards the understanding of job security as a human right.  Whereas, the concept of 
employment security in the broader context appears in article 15 EUCFR (right to choose an 
occupation and right to engage in work) and article 16 EUCFR (right to conduct business).    
Articles 15 and 16 EUCFR reflect the need of the EU to broaden the scope of employment 
security. 
The European economic distress, which also affected Cyprus, has required the EU system to 
react through employment security and social security transnational (re)regulation, and the key 
actors to reflect upon and change norms and practices.23   From the perspective of reflexive 
law, legal instruments are conceived as ‘procedural devices’ for self-regulation,24 which 
include social dialogue as an effective solution for easing complexities.  Workers need 
protection due to the power imbalances that may exist in the workplace.  This protection is 
provided either by setting minimum legal standards or through social dialogue.  In the EU 
regime, social dialogue takes the form of consultations between management and labour at EU-
level, either taking the form of tripartite or bipartite social dialogue, as explained in chapter 
2.3.3.  Nevertheless, as shall become apparent in this chapter, the EU social actors, representing 
management, labour and civil society, seem to struggle to mediate tensions between 
employment security and job security norms. 
 
22 Ibid, para.189. 
23 Rogowski R., The Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013), p.87. 
24 Ibid, p.97.  
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In addition, it appears that the means of EU labour regulation have shifted from hard law to 
soft law.  The regulation of employment security primarily appears in binding means of 
regulation in the context of gender equality in a market-based on equal pay and the protection 
of workers for economic dismissals.  Regarding social security, the EU mechanism, which 
solely coordinates social security norms, aims to ease transitions, reduce complexities and 
facilitate the right to move within the EU (article 21(3) TFEU). 
This chapter is divided in four sections.  Section 5.2 investigates the regulation of individual 
dismissals in the field of non-discrimination, which constitutes a core value of EU law.  Section 
5.3 explores the regulation of job and employment security when workers are dismissed for 
economic reasons, which is a special type of transnational labour regulation.  The EU 
Directives that regulate economic dismissals are: Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59, 
Protection of employees in the event of insolvency Directive 2008/94 and the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive 2001/23.  The existing literature that evaluates the regulation of job 
and employment security in the context of economic dismissals, covers the material scope and 
level of protection in the event of economic dismissals.  However, it seems that there is a gap 
regarding the tensions that may arise between employment security as part of transitional 
employment and job security as identified above.  The analysis in this context is focused on 
the legal standards that govern access to employment, which may take either the form of job 
security or employment security (i.e. remaining in the labour market).  Here, the thesis 
investigates the role of procedural as well as substantive norms, as well as the role played by 
the social partners. 
Section 5.4 examines the role of the EU regulatory mechanism as to social security 
coordination.  The EU regulation is focused on the facilitation of the right to move within the 
EU, taking the form of coordination of norms.  In comparison, the ILO and the CoE, establish 
a set of minimum standards for social security protection. This demonstrates that internal 
processes of each system (UN, ILO, CoE and EU) are determined by internal normative and 
functional limitations, which are established by the regulatory mechanism based on its core 
aims. 
Section 5.5  focuses on two soft-law reflexive strategies, the EES and Social OMC, which as 
alternative means of regulation aim to foster employability and tackle social exclusion.  Section 
5.5.1 explains the procedure of EES, which entails inter alia the Integrated Employment 
Guidelines, the National Reports and the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR).  This 
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section shows that the EES is focused on employability, which reflects the commercial aspect 
of flexicurity, rather than on employment security, which is set as the over-arching aim of 
flexicurity in the 2007 EC Flexicurity Communication.  This section also explores to what 
extent the Social OMC promotes social security protection and the implications of its primary 
focus on the transition of workers in the EU labour market.  Section 5.5 further examines to 
what extent these two reflexive mechanisms that promote the concept of flexicurity could 
enhance the protection of employment security and social security. 
 
5.2 Regulation of employment security in the field of non-discrimination  
 
EU regulatory strategies in non-discrimination, which also impact on labour standards, are 
embedded in the principles of equality and human dignity (article 2 TEU).  It appears that the 
EU regulation of individual dismissals, using hard law means of communication, is restricted 
to the field of non-discrimination.  This demonstrates the different level of power dynamics 
between: on the hand the EU, which only provides protection to individual dismissals in the 
field of non-discrimination; and on the other hand, the ILO, which has adopted an entire 
Convention N.158 to protect individual dismissals offering protection for a broader range of 
reasons arguably influencing the ESC/RSC, which provides a general protection against unfair 
or unlawful dismissal (article 24 ESC/RSC). 
Individual dismissals in the field of EU non-discrimination law are regulated using many 
specialized legal instruments rather than one single legal instrument.  The fact that the 
protection of individual dismissals is dispersed in many EU non-discrimination legal 
instruments could possibly mean that the EU actors, which were involved in the drafting 
process, did not have strong incentives to enforce employment security protection per se.  
Nevertheless, it appears that the European social actors have a key role to play in the adoption 
of these non-discrimination instruments, as the EC shall consult management and labour prior 
to submission of proposals in the social and employment policy field.25  In the initial stage of 
consultations, the EC asks the social partners general questions about the substance of the 
instrument, what EU action shall be taken and whether social actors are willing to initiate a 
 
25 TFEU, article 154. 
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dialogue.26  The EC may also launch a second stage of consultations, through which the EC 
shall ask the EU social actors about the content of the proposal. 27 
This section explores the EU non-discrimination acquis, which govern individual dismissals 
on multiple discriminatory grounds.28  It also entails analysis of the CJEU interpretative 
approach under article 267 TFEU.29  The analysis begins with Recast Directive Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation 2006/54, whose original legal instrument (Directive 
76/207) is the oldest EU legislation that provides protection against unfair dismissals for 
reasons related to gender equality.  Section 5.2.2 is focused on Maternity Leave Directive 
92/85, since the 2010 EP amending Resolution was not adopted.30  The reasons that lie behind 
the failure of the EU institutions to reach a conclusion on this matter could be the conflicting 
interests (maternity protection and other economic interests) and power imbalances between 
the involved actors.  Section 5.2.3 further examines the legal framework of Paternity Leave 
Directive 2010/18, which replaced the original Directive 96/34, and the new Directive on 
Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers. 
The last two sections are focused on two ‘post-Charter’ EU non-discrimination instruments, 
which expanded extensively the scope of protection for individual dismissals in the field of 
non-discrimination.  Article 21 EUCFR explicitly prohibits discrimination on grounds related 
to sexual orientation, disability, age, religion, belief, race or ethnic origin.31  Section 5.2.4 deals 
with Directive 2000/43, which prohibits unfair individual dismissals on grounds related to 
racial or ethnic origin.  Section 5.2.5 is focused on Directive 2000/78, which extends the list of 
prohibited discriminatory grounds – i.e. age, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief.  It 
is interesting that these two legal instruments were adopted twenty-three years later after 
Equality Directive 76/207. 
 
 
26 European Commission, VADEMECUM: Commission support to EU Social Dialogue: A practical Guide for 
European Social Partner Organizations and their National Affiliates (July 2017), p.46.  
27 Ibid.  
28 These grounds consist of sex, maternity leave, parental leave, race, religion, disability, age, and sexual 
orientation. 
29 Rogowski (n.23), p.39. 
30 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of 
pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding COM (2008) 637 final.  
31 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (EUCFR), article 21. 
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5.2.1 Directive 2006/54: Equal treatment between men and women in employment and 
occupation 
 
In the Treaty of Rome (1957), the principle of gender equality was recognized as a core 
principle of the EU.32  Historically, the principle of equal parity between men and women was 
primarily adopted at EU-level for pure economic reasons.  To explain, the Member States 
(especially France) wanted to ‘eliminate distortions in competition between undertakings’ at 
domestic level.33  France, which was the first Member State that had already adopted provisions 
to promote equal pay between men and women, was afraid that female workers could be cheap 
labour in the other Member States and this situation could possibly cause adverse economic 
effects on the economy of France.34  It was only in Defrenne (1976) that the CJEU recognized 
that article 157 TFEU, which enshrines equal parity, embraces a social objective.35  The 
original Equal Treatment Directive 76/207, which was further amended by Directive 2006/54, 
provided protection for individual dismissals either based on direct or indirect discrimination 
on grounds related to sex.36  It is interesting that there are some cases related to gender equality 
and dismissals, whose scope can also fall within the scope of Maternity Leave Directive 92/85 
and Parental Leave Directive 2010/18.  However, the scope of Directive 2006/54 is quite broad.  
This means its scope is not restricted to issues related to maternity and parental leave because 
it also embraces other market-based issues (for example, equal pay, social security protection, 
participation in the vocational and education training schemes). 
The normative prohibition of dismissals on grounds related to sex is enshrined in article 14 
Directive 2006/54, which enables workers to secure their current job.  This job security norm 
also exists in the other transnational systems: the ILO regime (ILO Conventions N.158 and 
N.111) and the CoE (article 1(2) RSC).  The job security concept as embedded in the 
framework of Directive 2006/54 entails two types of job security norms.  The first type of job 
security entails the prohibition of dismissal on grounds related to sex, whereas the second type 
of job security entails a combination of internal flexible working arrangements to avoid job 
insecurity.  The second type of job security entails that a worker is primarily eligible to return 
to an equivalent job position after maternity leave which in some cases is also applied after 
 
32 TFEU, article 157; EEC, article 119; EC, article 141.  
33 European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Gender Equality, Susan Burri and Sacha Prechal, ‘Gender 
Equality Law: Update 2013’ accessed <http://www.ysu.am/files/DS0113847ENN_002.pdf>, 20 April 2018, p.2. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Case C-43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR-455.  
36 Council Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and 




paternal/adoption leave (i.e. boosting employment security).  In the context of States’ 
discretion, the Member States are eligible to extend the scope of protection to paternal and, or 
adoption leave.37  This job security norm also enables the worker to request his or her employer 
to provide him or her with flexible working arrangements (i.e. notions of internal flexibility), 
which would enable the worker to exercise the core form of job security and retain the current 
job.38  Even if the other two international and European actors (UN/ILO/CoE) recognized the 
prohibition of dismissals on grounds related to sex, Directive 2006/54 established a stricter 
threshold.  Article 15 of Directive 2006/54 introduced the concept of ‘flexible working 
arrangements’, through which working conditions will be adjusted to the workers’ needs, so 
that the worker will be able to retain the current job(position).39  Directives 2006/54 and 92/85 
on Maternity Leave, analysed in the next section, are primarily focused on the protection of 
working parents with biological children.40  This means working mothers with adopted children 
have not been included in the scope of protection, although parents of adopted children do now 
fall within the scope of Parental Leave Directive 2010/18.  The role of social dialogue, which 
may take the form of collective bargaining, is crucial as to ensure the promotion of equal 
treatment between men and women.41  For example, the social actors can ensure that paternal 
leave and adoptive leave are included in the scope of domestic legislation.  The Member States 
shall also interact (taking the form of exchanging information) with interested NGOs.42  The 
Member States could seek to engage interested NGOs in other forms of contribution (e.g. 
funding vocational training schemes) so that workers would be able to stay in employment. 
It seems that the CJEU held a strict stance towards protection of pregnant mothers in accessing 
the labour market or retaining their job for reasons related to pregnancy or maternity.  In Hertz, 
the CJEU reaffirmed the Dekker rule and established that the dismissal of female worker due 
to repeated periods of sick leave that are attributed to pregnancy or confinement would also be 
recognized as discriminatory practice.43  The CJEU has also stated that Directive 76/207 (in 
particular articles 2(1), 2(3) and 5(1)) covers the illnesses that resulted from pregnancy or 
 
37 Directive 2006/54, article 16. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, article 15. 
40 Foubert P., ‘Child Care Leave 2.0 – Suggestions for the improvement of the EU Maternity and Parental Leave 
Directives from a rights perspective’ (2017) 24(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 245, 
p.250-251.  
41 Directive 2006/54, article 21. 
42 Ibid, article 22.  
43 Case C-460/06 Nadine Paquay v Société d’architectes Hoet + Minne SPRL [2007] ECR I-851, para.40. 
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confinement, even if the illness arose after maternity leave.44  It has further noted that dismissal 
on grounds related to maternity leave, is prohibited despite the moment when the employee is 
notified of the decision for dismissal.45  The CJEU held that reasons related to fertilisation 
treatment shall not constitute valid reason for dismissal as such practice, which only involves 
female workers, is discriminatory on grounds of sex.46  In cases where the worker has not 
informed her employer about her pregnancy, even if the worker would not be able to perform 
her working tasks properly for a specific period, the dismissal of the pregnant worker cannot 
be justified under article 5(1) of Directive 76/207.47 
With regard to article 3 of Directive 76/207, the CJEU held that the worker, who was dismissed 
during pregnancy, breastfeeding or the period that has recently gave birth to a child, is entitled 
to bring an action for damages.48  Article 14 of Directive 2006/54 prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of sex in various areas that entail employment security components, which consist of 
conditions for access to employment (article 14(a) of Directive 2006/54) termination of 
employment (article 14(c) of Directive 2006/54), access to vocational training programmes and 
(article 14(b) of Directive 2006/54) and membership in workers’ or employers’ organizations 
(article 14(d) of Directive 2006/54). 
In Pedro Manuel Álvarez, the CJEU held that the Spanish legislation (i.e. Basic Law 3/2007), 
which provides that male workers, who are fathers of a child, are entitled to take leave during 
the first nine months of the child’s birth only if the child’s mother is also employed, is 
discriminatory on the grounds of sex, as derived from articles 2(1), 2(3), 2(4) and 5 of Directive 
76/207.49  This case is distinguished from Hofmann, in which the CJEU decided that the legal 
norms shall respect the special relationship between the mother and the child during pregnancy 
and after childbirth.50  The reason that these two cases differ the one from the other is because 
Pedro Manuel Álvarez examined the domestic legislation that provides protection for 
maternity/paternal leave before the expiry of the protective period, whereas Hofmann examined 
the national legislation that provided the granting of additional maternity leave, which was  
 
44 Case C-400/95 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, som representant för Helle Elisabeth 
Larsson mot Dansk Handel & Service, som representant för Føtex Supermarked A/S [1997] ECR I-2757, para.26. 
45 Nadine Paquay(n.43), para.54. 
46 Case C-506/06 Sabine Mayr v Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-1017, paras.50 
and 54. 
47 Case C-109/00 Tele Danmark A/S v Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (HK) [2001] ECR 
I-699, para.34. 
48 Case C-63/08 Virginie Pontin v T-Comalux SA [2009] ECR I-10467, para.76. 
49 Case C-104/09 Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2010] ECR I-8661, para.39. 
50 Case C-184/83 Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR I-3047, para.25. 
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reserved exclusively to the mother, after the expiration of the protective period.51  The Pedro 
Manuel Álvarez case falls better within the scope of the Equal Treatment Directive rather than 
parental leave and maternity leave because it reflects the equal opportunities of men and 
women in the labour market.  This situation would possibly enable the mothers with young 
children to enter/re-enter the labour market as fathers would also devote time to their children. 
5.2.2 Maternity Leave Directive 92/85  
 
Directive 92/85 protects mothers with biological children because article 2 of Directive 92/85 
explicitly refers to ‘pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth, workers who are 
breastfeeding’.52  This means mothers with adopted children are solely protected under Parental 
Leave Directive 2010/18.53  The 2008 EP legislative resolution amending Council Directive 
92/85, which was not adopted, extended the scope of protection and included mothers with 
adopted children.54  Surrogate mothers are however currently excluded from the scope of 
protection.55  In Z. and C.D., the CJEU held that the refusal to provide paid parental leave to 
mothers who are unable to bear a child and had a baby through a surrogacy arrangements, are 
not included in the scope of article 14 of Directive 2006/54.56  It is interesting that women that 
undertake vitro fertilisation treatment (IVF) are protected under Directive 92/85 as the CJEU 
established in Mayr.57  This shows that the scope of maternity leave differs between Directive 
2006/54 and Directive 92/85.  Whereas, ILO Convention N.183, which endorsed a more 
universal and inclusive approach than Directive 92/85, provides protection to ‘all employed 
women’ (i.e. woman in the context of ILO Convention N.183 means ‘any female person 
without discrimination whatsoever’).58 
The maternity leave shall be at least 14 weeks and mothers are entitled to the right to return to 
their job, which reflects a job security norm.59  In comparison to Directive 2010/18, the social 
 
51 Ibid, para.26. 
52 Directive 92/85, article 2. 
53 Ibid, article 1.  
54 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC 
on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers 
and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding {SEC(2008)2595} {SEC(2008)2596} 
COM/2008/0637 final, article 1.  
55 Case C-363/12 Z. v A Government department and The Board of management of a community school [2014] 
OJ C142/7, para.67; Case C-167/12 C. D. v S. T. [2014] OJ C142/6, para.55. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Case C-506/06 Sabine Mayr v Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-1017. 
58 ILO Convention N.183, articles 1 and 2. 
59 Directive 92/85, articles 8 and 10. 
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actors can participate in assessment and information of working conditions.60  Directive 92/85 
sets a lower threshold than ILO Convention N.183 as to the compulsory period before and/or 
after confinement.  Directive 92/85 entails a compulsory maternity leave for the first two weeks 
before and/or after the confinement, whereas ILO Convention N.183 entails the period of the 
first six weeks after the confinement, plus 14 weeks of maternity leave.61 
Pregnant workers are also eligible to request from their employer flexible working 
arrangements and their employers are obliged to ensure that the working conditions do not 
cause any health and safety risk to the mother.62  The employer is responsible to swiftly 
transition the female worker to another job position, which does not cause any risk to her, and 
enable the worker to remain in employment.63  Nevertheless, the pregnant worker cannot 
control these flexible arrangements as they are decided in the interests of the unborn child.  It 
also appears that Directive 92/85 does not entitle female workers with the right to flexible 
arrangements after pregnancy and maternity leave, which is an issue that is solely regulated at 
domestic level. 
Despite flexicurity policies that could assist in mediating flexible arrangements and 
employment security, social actors struggle to mediate tensions between economic rights of 
the employer, social rights of the mother and the broader social interest of future generations.   
It is however sometimes possible to reconcile all three, so as to ensure that there is not longer-
term departure from a job or the labour market.  If transitions for female workers before 
maternity leave are not ‘technically and/ or feasible’, so that the pregnant worker cannot 
perform different tasks to avoid exposure to working conditions dangerous to the foetus, the 
worker shall be entitled to paid maternity leave for the period before the birth, which is required 
to ensure the protection of worker’s health and safety.64  This norm shows a very likely 
simultaneous reaction of employment security and social security systems (reflecting 
flexicurity) because the female worker retains a right to suitable alternative work, or in its 
absence, leave following which she can return to her current job.  She is entitled to maternity 
benefit during her absence, if necessary, before as well as after the birth. 
 
 
60 Ibid, article 4. 
61 Directive 92/85, article 8(2); ILO Convention N.183, article 4(4). 
62 Directive 92/85, article 5(1). 
63 Ibid, article 5(2). 
64 Directive 92/85, article 5(3).  
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5.2.3 Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 
 
The Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 is a product of European social dialogue, which took the 
form of negotiations.65  EU social actors can initiate EU-level negotiations under article 156 
TFEU and conclude an agreement that either will be implemented at domestic level by national 
social actors or be annexed to a legislative proposal under articles 154-155 TFEU.  The new 
The Directive on Work-life balance for Parents and Carers, which was proposed under the new 
European Pillar of Social Rights, seeks to promote equality between men and women, equal 
opportunities in the labour market and equal treatment at workplace (article 3(3) TEU).66  The 
new Directive adopts new rights, which includes the right to paternal leave, the right to carers’ 
leave and the right to flexible working arrangements.67  The right to parental leave cannot be 
defeated by technical changes to posts. There is a legitimate claim for breach of the Parental 
Leave Directive if the employer knew that a post was due to be abolished at the time that a 
returning employee was appointed to it.68 
Before the adoption of the new Directive, which provides explicit protection to carers, there 
was a normative gap for carers’ protection at EU-level.  They were only covered under article 
1 of ILO Convention N.156 and article 5 ILO Convention N.158.  Directive 2010/18, which is 
replaced by the new Directive, covered parents with biological or adopted children and 
excludes parents under surrogate arrangements.  However, parents under surrogate 
arrangements could possibly fall in the category of ‘carers’ in the new Directive on Work-Life 
Balance of Parents’ and Carers.  The Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 established a job 
security norm, which is also established in the new Directive, according to which dismissals 
on grounds related to parental leave shall be prohibited.69  By way of contrast,  the ECHR does 
not provide the right to parental leave per se, but examines the right to non-discrimination in 
the light of article 8 ECHR.70  The parental leave shall be at least four months (of which the 
one month is non-transferable), a minimum standard that is not established in the ILO and CoE 
regimes.71 The Member States/social actors are responsible to decide a notice period prior to 
 
65 Directive 2010/18, Annex, Clause 2(1). 
66 Directive (…/2019) of the European Parliament and of the Council on work-life balance for parents and carers 
and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU [2019] (not published yet).  
67 Ibid.  
68 Case C-7/12 Nadežda Riežniece v Zemkopības ministrija and Lauku atbalsta dienests [2013] OJ C225/23, 
paras.15-20. 
69 Directive 2010/18, Annex, clause 5. 
70 See further details about dismissals and article 8 ECHR in pp.95-96 of this thesis. 
71 Directive 2010/18, Annex, clause 2(2).  
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parental leave. This means it is up to these actors to decide any flexible arrangement of the 
notice period and promote employment security. 
The nexus of internal flexibility and employment security, which is also enshrined in Directive 
2006/54, aims to facilitate the worker to secure its current job or swiftly transition to another 
job position.  The employer is responsible to arrange the internal flexible working conditions 
or terms after taking into consideration employers’ and workers’ needs.72  Even if this norm 
promotes fairness, it would be unrealistic not to accept that it is difficult for employers to strike 
a proper balance between employers’ needs (e.g. economic interests/competitiveness) and 
workers’ needs (work-life balance).  The provision on flexible working arrangements is 
improved by the new Directive, which provides the right of parents and carers to ask for remote 
working arrangements, flexible working schedules, or reduced working hours.  This 
improvement is essential because an improper balance could possibly lead to modern forms of 
forced labour.  Apart from these flexible working arrangements, Directive 2010/18, as amended 
by the new Directive, fails to promote vocational education and training schemes as ways in 
which to facilitate the return to work (either to the current job or to swiftly transition to another 
job position).  This norm, which aims to enhance employability skills of the worker and enable 
him/her to remain in the employment (i.e. employment security norm) appears in ILO 
Convention N.158 (see chapter 3.3 for further analysis on ILO Convention N.158).73 
5.2.4 Race Directive 2000/43  
 
The Race Directive 2000/43 sets out a clear prohibition against dismissals on grounds related 
to racial or ethnic origin.  However, difference of treatment on grounds related to nationality is 
not included in the scope of protection.74  EU Directive 2000/43 established the following two-
fold test to examine whether the practice is discriminatory or could be justified under the 
umbrella ‘difference of treatment’: first, the norm shall fulfil a legitimate objective and second, 
the norm shall be proportionate.75  From the CJEU’s approach, it appears that domestic courts 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in examining whether there was direct or indirect 
discrimination for reasons related to race or ethnicity.  For example, in Galina Meister, the 
CJEU examined whether the applicant, who obtained a degree from a Russian institution in 
systems engineering recognized in Germany, was discriminated against by Speech Design, 
 
72 Ibid, Annex, clause 2(5).  
73 ILO Convention N.158, article 7.  
74 Directive 2000/43, article 3. 
75 Ibid, article 4. 
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which published a new vacancy for ‘experienced software developers’ and rejected the 
applicant’s application for this position without justification.76  The CJEU held that it is up to 
the domestic court to decide whether this justification was necessary taking into account 
various factors in the context of establishing facts from which it is rendered whether there was 
direct or indirect discrimination.77  This case illustrates the procedural hurdles that an 
individual has to face to enter or re-enter the labour market, or even transition from one job to 
another. 
The Centrum case, which was brought by a public authority in Belgium whose mandate is to 
foster the principle of equality, demonstrates that it might be easier for a public body than an 
individual to lodge complaints on non-discrimination on grounds related to race or ethnicity.78   
In this case, the Centrum, which is eligible to bring legal actions in case of discrimination 
because the Belgian legislation implemented Directive 2000/43, brought a claim against the 
company.  As the company did not recruit workers with the status of ‘immigrants’, the Centrum 
brought legal proceedings against the company for its discriminatory recruitment policy.  
Provisions regarding the role of social actors and NGOs in the promotion of equality also 
appear in Directives 2006/54 and 2000/78.79  In particular, Directive 2000/43 enables the inter-
play of different bodies, which will be designated by the Member State to provide assistance 
to the victims of discrimination.80  The scope of this provision could be expanded so that the 
Member State could also establish bodies, which could provide assistance to individuals that 
are not eligible to apply for/get a job, whose requirements are based on characteristics related 
to racial or ethnic origin. 
5.2.5 Framework Directive 2000/78 
 
The normative legal framework of Directive 2000/78 provides protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief as 
discriminatory grounds.81  In comparison with the ILO, the grounds of religion and belief 
appear as the basis for wrongful discrimination in ILO Convention N.158, whereas age is 
embedded in the Recommendation N.166, which facilitates the application of ILO 
 
76 Case C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH [2012] OJ C165/4, paras.3-4. 
77 Ibid, para.48. 
78 Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] ECR 
I-5187. 
79 Directive 2000/78, article 13. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, article 1. 
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Conventions.82  This study examines the norms that promote equality in relation to each 
discriminatory ground in the context of employment security (either as job security or 
employment security in the broader context), as established in Directive 2000/78. 
According to article 1 of Directive 2000/78, the ground of age is recognised as a discriminatory 
ground.83  Although, there is an exception to the non-discrimination principle, according to 
which differences of treatment on grounds of age are allowed in specific circumstances.84  
These circumstances shall fulfil two criteria: the domestic norm shall be ‘objectively and 
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim’ and ‘the means of achieving the aim are appropriate 
and necessary’.85  Even if Directive 2000/78 sets out few examples of what shall be considered 
as ‘difference of treatment’ (article 6(1) Directive 2000/78), the domestic actors, using the 
means of preliminary procedure where necessary, shall examine the peculiar characteristics of 
each case and determine whether the aforementioned criteria are fulfilled.  In comparison to 
ILO regime, even if the ground of age is only enshrined in Recommendation N.166, which is 
a non-binding instrument and facilitates the application of ILO Convention N.158.  In addition, 
it is considered as discriminatory ground under ILO Convention N.111, which provides a 
general protection against discrimination in the field of employment and occupation. 
The protection of individual dismissals in the field of non-discrimination can also be justified 
on other policy grounds, embracing the principle of human dignity, which is a core EU value 
(article 2 TEU) as a means of redesigning the means of regulation.  Article 51 EUCFR sets out 
very clearly that the Charter, which promotes job security and employment security, creates 
obligations to the Member States only ‘when implementing EU law’, which means only in 
areas that are regulated by EU law.86  In this context, the CJEU examined the protection of 
employment security in the spectrum of other public policies (e.g. transportation).  In Werner 
Fries, the CJEU stated that the imposition of age limit in the field of commercial air transport 
as legitimate and proportionate.87  The applicant was dismissed by his employer because he 
had reached the age of 65 and for this reason, he was no longer entitled to work as a pilot in 
commercial air transport under Regulation N.1178/2011.  In this case, the norm seems to clash 
with article 21(1) EUCFR (i.e. prohibition of non-discrimination on the ground of age) and 
 
82 ILO Convention N.158. 
83 Directive 2000/78, article 1. 
84 Ibid, article 6. 
85 Ibid, article 6(1). 
86 EUCFR, article 51.  
87 Case C-190/16 Werner Fries v Lufthansa CityLine GmbH [2017] OJ C283/7. 
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article 15(1) EUCFR (the right to engage to work – in other words, to remain in the labour 
market).  The CJEU held that civil aviation safety is ‘an objective of general interest’ and the 
imposition of age restriction for pilot’s licence to act as a pilot in the commercial air transport 
serves a proportionate aim.88  This requirement aims to avoid aeronautical accidents that caused 
by the pilot, whose physical capabilities were diminished with age.89  The CJEU further 
stressed that this norm (i.e. prohibition of pilots to engage in commercial air transport al they 
reached 65 years) is an appropriate and necessary measure to achieve the over-arching aim of 
preserving civil aviation safety.90 
This norm seems to restrict pilots’ ability to freely choose an occupation and the freedom to 
conduct a business (article 15(1) EUCFR).  According to the CJEU, this right, which is a non-
absolute right, shall be ‘considered [according] to its social function’.91  It seems that the term 
‘social function’ is not clearly defined and might leave questions as to interpretation.  The 
CJEU also held that this restriction does not affect the substance of the right as enshrined in 
article 15(1) of EUCFR and the restriction, which was imposed, was legitimate and 
proportionate to the over-arching objective to preserve civil aviation transport.92 
Age 
The link between employment security and discrimination based on ground of ‘age’ remains 
one of the contested issues at EU-level.  As statistics indicate, the rate of youth unemployment 
(aged 15-24) remains high in some EU Member States. For example, the rate of youth 
unemployment in Greece, which is the largest in the EU, is 18.5%, whereas the rate in Spain is 
14%.93  It seems the EU appears as ‘a pioneer’ since the other two transnational regulatory 
mechanisms (CoE, ILO/UN) do not create binding obligations in this sense.  In Abercombie & 
Fitch Italia Srl , the employer dismissed the applicant because he reached the age of twenty-
five years, in accordance to the Italian Government’s interpretation of article 34 of the Italian 
Legislative Decree N. 276/2003.94  The CJEU examined whether this norm can be justified by 
a legitimate aim and the means for achieving this aim are appropriate and necessary, as 
 
88 Ibid, paras.43-44. 
89 Ibid, para. 45-47. 
90 Ibid, para.73. 
91 Ibid, para.73. 
92 Ibid, paras.74-79. 
93 Eurostat official website, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Unemployment_statistics> accessed 23 May 2019.  
94 Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v Antonino Bordonaro [2017] OJ C300/4, paras.16,26. 
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prescribed by article 6 of Directive 2000/78.95  It is interesting that the Italian Government 
argued that this norm (restriction) serves a legitimate aim, as it aims to make the labour market 
more flexible and increase levels of employment.96 
The Italian Government claims that this norm enables young workers to enter the labour market 
and acquire experience, which predominantly seems to embrace the idea of flexicurity (as it 
seems to facilitate the transition from unemployment to employment).97  This norm seems to 
create a tension between employment security and job security because this norm, which aims 
to increases flexibility of labour market to enable young workers to enter the labour market, 
creates adverse effects to job security for workers over 25 years old, since it could possibly 
lead them to unemployment and social exclusion.  This case illustrates the tendency of some 
employers to replace workers rather than create an inclusive labour market for everyone that 
provides decent jobs for all.  The applicant argued that an individual 25-year-old with some 
years of work experience is in a better position to seek a job rather than a young worker that 
has not entered the labour market yet.  In this context, the CJEU held that this measure served 
a legitimate aim for employment and social security policies and the means for reaching this 
aim were considered necessary and appropriate.98 
Disability  
Directive 2000/78 also enables the disabled worker to request from the employer to adjust 
working conditions (indicating internal flexibility) to his/her needs, although such flexible 
working arrangements shall not cause a ‘disproportionate burden on the employer’.99  This 
threshold, which aims to promote the idea of ‘difference of treatment’ on grounds of age, 
constitutes an exemption to the principle of non-discrimination.  The norm is conceived as 
difference of treatment rather than a discriminatory norm if it satisfies a two-fold test: firstly, 
the norm serves a legitimate aim and secondly, the means to achieve this aim shall be 
‘appropriate and necessary’.100 
The CJEU interpreted the material scope of disability in light with the CRPD to determine the 
scope of equality on grounds of disability (i.e. prohibition of dismissal on grounds of disability 
 
95 Ibid, para.30. 
96 Ibid, para.32. 
97 Ibid, para.32. 
98 Ibid, para.47. 




is applicable to public and private employees).101  This reflects the cognitively openness of the 
EU system.  In Milkova, this feature of the EU to communicate with the ILO, as the 
international standard-setting actor for labour protection, led the CJEU to expand its scope and 
include public employees under Directive 2000/78.102 
Religion and belief 
With regard to religion/belief, the CJEU in Achbita, held the company’s internal policy shall 
be considered as difference of treatment based on religion.  In this case, the applicant was 
dismissed because she insisted on wearing a headscarf at the workplace, even though it was 
contrary to the workplace regulations of the company.103  The company adopted a general 
company policy of political and religious neutrality, according to which ‘employees are 
prohibited, in the workplace, from wearing any visible signs of their political, philosophical or 
religious beliefs and/or from engaging in any observance of such beliefs’.104  The Higher 
Labour Court stated that Ms. Achbita was not dismissed for her religious beliefs, but because 
she insisted on wearing religious signs at workplace.105  It also added that the company’s policy 
of ‘blanket ban of wearing visible signs of religion at workplace’ cannot be considered as 
discriminatory practice.106  The Court of Cassation referred a preliminary ruling to the CJEU 
and asked whether the ban of wearing a headscarf, which falls under the company’s blanket 
ban policy, could be considered as discrimination.107  In this context, the CJEU examined the 
two-fold test, which is established in Directive 2000/78 and assessed whether this policy is 
‘objectively justified by a legitimate aim and secondly, the means are appropriate and 
necessary.108  This internal policy (i.e. blanket ban of wearing religious signs at workplace) 
served a legitimate aim because the employer has the discretion to promote ‘an image of 
neutrality’ to its customers, which enabled the employer to exercise the freedom to conduct 
business as enshrined in article 16 EUCFR.  This case reflects the power imbalances between 
the employer’s interests (right of conduct business such an occupational requirement) and the 
interests of workers (to wear religious symbols in all areas).  Even if such ‘blanket ban’ policies 
 
101 UNCRPD, article 1; Case C-406/15 Petya Milkova v Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i 
sledprivatizatsionen control [2017] OJ C144/7, paras.3-5. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Case C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S 
Secure Solutions NV [2017] OJ C151/3, paras.10-18. 
104 Ibid, para.17. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, paras 10-18. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Directive 2000/78, article 2(2)(b). 
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are legally accepted, the workers with religious beliefs, who conceive wearing a religion 
symbol as part of their identity (such as female Muslim workers), are placed in a disadvantaged 
position. 
Regulation of employment security as exists in the EU regime embraces the over-arching 
principle of non-discrimination, which constitutes a core value of EU law as enshrined in article 
2 TEU.  In this context, the EU as a self-regulatory autopoietic system creates norms that are 
adjusted to different grounds of non-discrimination.  The illegitimate grounds for 
discrimination identified at the EU level has increased through the years, from sex 
discrimination that embraces economic interests to other grounds that promote social objectives 
– such as age and racial discrimination.  However, it seems that there are still problems with 
the power balances and dynamics in regulating and distinguishing discriminatory practices 
from difference of treatment.  The CJEU seems to play a catalytic role in this context, as it 
examines cases through the preliminary reference procedure, which could be characterized as 
unilateral communication.  The term ‘unilateral’ is used to describe the preliminary reference 
procedure because the information as derives from the EU is not exchanged but is solely 
transmitted from the EU to the Member States.  The scope of different treatment, which blurs 
the line between grounds that could or could not be justified, as enshrined in the EU hard-law 
instruments and further interpreted by the CJEU is particularly important in the context of 
flexicurity (transitions of workers in the labour market).  In these cases, the role of social 
security regulation, which could take either the form of unemployment benefit or educational 
benefit, is considered here as a means for easing the transitions of workers from one job to 
another. 
 
5.3 Regulation of employment security: economic dismissals  
 
The Council, acting as the key EU regulatory actor in the creation of EU economic dismissal 
laws under the special legislative procedure (article 153(d) TFEU), adopted binding legal 
instruments to regulate economic dismissals after the burst of the last major European-wide 
financial crisis in the 1970s.  The three EU binding legal instruments for economic dismissals 
consist of: Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59 (amending original Directive 75/129), 
Directive 2001/223 (replacing original Directive 77/187) that regulates the procedures for 
transfer of undertakings and Insolvency Directive 2008/94 (amending original Directive 
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80/987) that aims to guarantee payment of workers in the event of insolvency.  EU hard-law 
instruments on economic dismissals require employers to follow specific procedures, which 
were agreed at EU-level through transnational regulation, to terminate an employment 
relationship for reasons that are not related to workers’ status, performance or capabilities.  
These means of regulation attempt to increase workers’ protection in the functional system of 
internal market.  The question that needs to be posed in this context is to what extent these EU 
Directives, which primarily aim to promote job security and guarantee payments in the event 
of insolvency, shifted their aim towards promotion of employment security.  Has their content 
and operation adjusted to the concept of flexicurity, which aims to facilitate transitions in the 
labour market?  In other words, it is interesting to explore to what extent these procedures 
manage to strike a proper balance between the interests of workers to promote employment 
security and the economic benefits to employers following from flexibilization of economic 
dismissals procedures (for example, to increase the enterprise’s competitiveness level). 
EU regulation of economic dismissals also reflect the normative divergences between the EU 
and the ILO, the UN and the CoE, which conceive employment security standards as part of 
the human rights regime and are primarily interested in the regulation of employment security 
in the field of non-discrimination.109  It seems that the link between the regulation of economic 
dismissals and the respect of human dignity, which normally acts as a normative and moral 
justification for human rights, might not be as profound as in EU regulation of individual 
dismissals in the field of non-discrimination, which is analysed in section 5.2.110  The question 
is ‘to what extent should employers take responsibility’ for violation of human dignity in this 
context and to what extent the EU may impose such responsibility.111  The precondition of 
dignity, namely the ability to get paid a salary adequate for ‘all aspects of life’112 presupposes 
the ability of the worker to have a job, which refers to the ability of the worker to 
remain/enter/re-enter the employment.  The procedures for regulating economic dismissals 
provide safeguards to the worker to either retain a current job (through consultations between 
employers and workers’ representatives to mitigate the risk of dismissal) or facilitating the 
worker’s transition in the labour market.  In this context, the interests of workers could be 
 
109 Rogowski (n.23), pp.98-99. 
110 McCrudden C., ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 655, pp.656-
658.  





represented through the procedures of information and consultation, which are established in 
the EU legal instruments (see further details on the specific procedures in sections 5.3.1-5.3.3). 
Section 5.3.1 explores EU Directive 98/59 on Collective Redundancies, which gives the 
opportunity to employers to propose collective dismissals and understand their legal 
obligations.  Section 5.3.2 examines the Council Directive 2001/23 (amending original 
Directive 77/187) and investigates the safeguards that are provided to employees in the event 
of transfer of undertakings, business or part of undertakings or businesses (these safeguards 
include consultations and notification) to promote job security.  Whereas, section 5.3.3 is 
focused on the Council Directive 2008/94, which was amended multiple times, that regulates 
the procedures for protecting the employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer. 
This section merely discusses the safeguards (in terms of payment) that are provided to workers 
and could facilitate their transition in the labour market. 
5.3.1 Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59 
 
Council Directive 75/129 was the first international and European legal instrument to establish 
the key foundations for transnational regulation of collective redundancies.  It introduced the 
definition of ‘collective redundancies’ and the core procedures that employers must fulfil to 
propose collective redundancies.  These procedures consist of the notification of public 
authorities and workers’ representatives prior to collective redundancies and consultations with 
workers’ representatives prior to dismissal, which could mediate the conflict of employers’ and 
workers’ interests and avoid redundancies.  At international level, ILO Convention N.158 of 
1982, which was adopted seven years after the original Directive 75/129, set minimum 
standards for employment security, but has not distinguished between individual and collective 
dismissals.  To explain, collective redundancies just fall under the scope of ‘operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service’ in article 4 of ILO Convention 
N.158, which sets out the valid reasons for dismissals.  The EU instruments actually offer more 
protection regarding the specific issues surrounding collective economic dismissals. 
EU Council Directive 98/59 replaced the original legal instrument, Directive 75/129, and 
extended its scope of protection.  Examples of the major changes that were introduced by the 
new Directive include specific procedures for collective redundancies that arose from 
termination of the establishment’s activities after a judicial decision (article 3 of Directive 
98/59).  It further increased the thresholds in the procedures for collective redundancies.  For 
example, the consultations of employers with the workers’ representatives shall begin ‘in good 
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time’ (article 2(1) of Directive 98/59).  In addition, the workers’ representatives have the right 
to ‘call on the services of experts’, which could be used to find alternative routes and mitigate 
the risks of redundancies (article 2(2) of Directive 98/59).  These procedures could integrate 
the concept of flexicurity and either, secure the job worker (avoiding collective redundancies) 
or facilitate the transition of worker in the labour market (e.g. by providing educational 
benefits). 
In this context, it is vital to investigate in more depth the criteria and procedures that are set out 
in Directive 98/59 (amending Directive 75/129).  The term ‘collective redundancy’ is defined 
as a ‘dismissal effected by an employer for one or more reasons not related to the individual 
workers concerned’.113  The employer shall meet the following four criteria for proposing 
collective redundancies: i) the technical criterion of dismissal ii) numerical iii) temporal and 
iv) local (which refers to the idea of ‘establishment).114  Firstly, collective redundancies refers 
to dismissal at the initiative of the employer, which means that there shall be ‘a direct 
manifestation of the will of the employer consisting in taking the initiative’.115  With regard to 
ii) and iii) requirements, Member States are eligible to choose either conditions as prescribed 
in article 1(a)(i) or article 1(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59.116  According to article 1(a)(i) of Directive 
98/59, the number of redundancies shall be one of the following within a period of 30 days:   
minimum 10 redundancies in small establishments (i.e. with 20 - 100 workers), minimum 10% 
of the number of workers in larger establishments (i.e. with 100 - 300 workers), or minimum 
30 redundancies in major establishments (i.e. with more than 300 workers).117  According to 
article 1(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59, the number of redundancies within a period of 90 days shall 
be minimum at least 20 regardless the number of workers that are normally employed in the 
establishment.118  Directive 98/59 introduced a new provision according to which if the number 
of redundancies in a small establishment (i.e. with workers 20-100) exceeds the number of five 
and the reasons for the dismissal are not related to the individual worker, then these 
redundancies fall in the scope of the Directive.119  This provision is particularly interesting 
because it shows a more liberal approach to workers that are employed in small undertakings. 
 
113 Directive 98/59, article 1(a). 
114 Ibid. 
115 Case C-323/08 Ovidio Rodríguez Mayor and Others v Herencia yacente de Rafael de las Heras Dávila and 
Others [2009] ECR I-11621, Advocate-General Opinion, para.28. 
116 Directive 98/59, articles 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii).  
117 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16, article 1(a)(i). 
118 Ibid, article 1(a)(ii). 
119 Ibid, article 1(i). 
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The fourth requirement refers to the concept of  ‘establishment’, which consists of ‘a distinct 
entity, having a degree of permanence and stability, which is assigned to perform one or more 
given tasks and that has a workforce, technical means and a certain organizational structure 
allowing for the accomplishment of those tasks’.120  This interpretation seems to raise problems 
because Directive 98/59 could also cover ‘single workers of an establishment, which is distinct 
and separate from other undertakings’ and such an interpretation seems to be contrary to the 
definition of a ‘collective redundancy’.121  In this context, the CJEU clarified that an 
establishment is included in the wider context of an undertaking.122  This means that article 
1(1)(a)(i) and (ii) Directive 98/59 shall be interpreted as the minimum number of redundancies 
shall not be less than the prescribed number of workers ‘from a particular establishment of an 
undertaking’.123  In Athinaïki Chartopoiïa AE, the CJEU held that the production unit at issue 
was not necessary to show a degree of ‘legal, economic, financial, administrative or 
technological autonomy’ to be regarded as ‘establishment’, due to the adverse socio-economic 
impact that constructive redundancies could cause ‘in a local and social environment’.124  This 
ruling illustrates how the labour system, which creates its own internal rules, is cognitively 
open and interacts with the economic system so that its own norms can have practical effect in 
the real life and meet social objectives (e.g. tackle unemployment and social exclusion). 
Directive 98/59 introduced EU legal rules on three areas that are related to collective 
redundancies, where laws of Member States should have been harmonized (‘approximation of 
the laws of the Member States’).125  These areas consist of compulsory consultation with 
workers’ representatives prior to collective redundancies, compulsory notification of 
competent public authorities prior to collective redundancies and additional powers of public 
authorities in the procedure for collective redundancies.126  These powers include the power to 
reduce or extend the length of notice period prior to dismissal.127  It seems that all these norms, 
which Directive 98/59 aims to coordinate, can be used as protective nets against employment 
insecurity/job insecurity.  The power to reduce or extend the length of notice period 
 
120 Case C-80/14 Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), B. Wilson v WW Realisation 1 Ltd, 
in liquidation, Ethel Austin Ltd, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] OJ C213/8, para. 49. 
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demonstrates a level of flexibility that could facilitate the shift from one job to another or from 
employment to unemployment in the absence of ALMPs. 
Regarding consultation and information with workers’ representatives, article 2(1) of Directive 
98/59 provides that such consultations shall begin ‘in good time with a view to reaching an 
agreement’.128  Jan Heinsius points out that social dialogue is used here to ‘mitigate [the risk 
and] avoid the dismissal, or reduce the number of dismissals’.129  This articulation shows the 
protective angle of social dialogue under Directive 98/59, which aims to foster employment 
security, balancing the interests of both parties (workers and employers).  Nevertheless, the 
case-law of the CJEU demonstrates that there are some problematic aspects regarding the 
interpretation of the legal norms as established Directive 98/59.  In Akavan Erityisalojen 
Keskusliitto AEK ry and Others, the CJEU interpreted the term ‘in good time’, which is 
described as at the time when a ‘strategic or commercial decision’ is taken that obliges the 
employer to ‘contemplate or to plan for collective redundancies’.130  It appears that as long as 
this strategic or commercial decision has been taken, the employer shall begin the consultations 
with workers’ representatives, regardless of whether or not the employer is able to provide the 
appropriate information to the workers’ representatives, as prescribed in article 2(3)(b) of 
Directive 98/59.131  In Junk, the CJEU held that a collective redundancy arises at the time that 
an employer explicitly declares his intention to terminate the contract of employment.132 The 
CJEU noted that an employer is eligible to contemplate a collective redundancy after 
consultations with workers’ representatives and notification of the projected collective 
redundancies as prescribed in articles 2 and 3 of Directive 98/59.133 
All the above cases reflect the temporal procedural issues that affect the right of workers to 
retain their current jobs or receive the appropriate severance pay.  It is worth noting that 
Directive 98/59, which regulates the procedures for collective redundancies, does not set out 
any requirements for severance pay.  This also shows the notions of normative divergence 
between the EU and the ILO.  To explain, ILO Convention N.158 sets out two core criteria, 
the length of employment and the level of wages that shall be considered for the calculation of 
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the severance pay.134  The level of severance pay, which is an issue that shall be negotiated 
between employers’ and workers’ representatives based on the national legislation/practices, 
could play an important role in facilitating the transitions in the labour market – i.e. the 
severance pay could possibly be used by the worker to pay for his participation in 
educational/vocational training schemes and improve the worker’s level of employability.  The 
exclusion of severance pay from the EU’s legislative competence illustrates the complexity of 
this issue (reflecting the traditional order of each system).  To explain, the severance pay is not 
legally regulated in all Member States (e.g. Finland and Sweden) or its regulation is a 
combination of company agreements/individual contracts and legal regulation.135  In addition, 
the most common norm among the Member States is that the employer pays directly the 
severance pay to the employee, whereas the Republic of Cyprus has a national redundancy 
fund (contributed by employers’ contributions 1.2% of employees’ earnings funds).136 
In AGET Iraklis, the CJEU examined whether Directive 98/59 entails the public authorities, 
without prior consultations with workers’ representatives, to authorise the projected collective 
redundancies assessing the following conditions: a) the conditions in the labour market, b) the 
situation of the undertaking and c) the interests of the national economy.137  The applicant, 
AGET Iraklis, decided to close the Chalkida plant and dismiss 236 workers as part of their new 
restructuring scheme.138  After the refusal of workers’ representatives to discuss the issue 
(Union of Cement Workers), the AGET Iraklis requested from the public authorities (i.e. the 
Ministry of Labour) to authorize the projected redundancies.139  The Supreme Labour Council, 
which examined the projected collective redundancies, refused to authorize the projected 
collective redundancies based on the three aforementioned reasons.140   The CJEU held that the 
employer can implement collective redundancies even if there is no prior negotiations with 
workers’ representatives, as long as the competent public authorities have authorized such 
redundancies.141 This is very interesting because it reflects the flexibilization of procedural 
thresholds, according to which the employer shall negotiate with workers’ representatives.  
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This flexibilization seems sensible because the workers’ representatives refused to negotiate, 
which shows that the CJEU seems to facilitate the transitions in the labour market.  The CJEU 
has particularly held that the competent domestic courts are authorized to decide whether 
domestic legislation, which sets out the three assessment criteria, could ‘deprive the provisions 
of the directive of practical effect’ and therefore, the employer cannot affect collective 
redundancies.142  The CJEU also held that reasons of high unemployment and economic 
distress cannot affect the interpretation of Directive 98/59 as given above in the first 
preliminary question.143 
The consultations of employers and workers’ representations, which constitute a core part in 
the procedure for collective redundancies that aim to mitigate the risk of dismissals, could give 
the opportunity to workers’ representatives to negotiate the criteria proposed for the selection 
of workers to be dismissed in the context of collective redundancies.144  In this context, it is 
important to note that pregnant workers, which are considered by the CJEU as ‘exceptional 
cases’, can be brought in the scope of Directive 98/59 and dismissed for reasons not related to 
pregnancy.145  This ruling is not per se problematic because it gives to the pregnant worker the 
same rights as the rest of workers in the context of collective redundancies and the employer 
is obliged to explain the ‘exceptional circumstances’ that led to inclusion of the pregnant 
worker in the redundancy plan.  This decision reflects the vital need to provide the appropriate 
safeguards in the procedure of economic dismissals to the workers and emphasizes the 
importance of consultations as a means to mitigate the adverse effects of collective dismissals.  
In the broader context, this ruling also reflects the importance of strengthening the link between 
employment security and social security systems, which could minimize the risk of exposing 
workers into social exclusion and/or unemployment. 
Nevertheless, social dialogue takes the form of information and consultations in the context of 
Directive 98/59, which regulates the procedures for collective redundancies.  Apart from 
informing workers’ representatives in good time, which was discussed above, the workers’ 
representatives shall ‘make constructive proposals’ about multiple issues (such as, reason of 
dismissal, number of people that will be affected by projected redundancies the criteria for 
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selecting workers that will be affected).146  As shown in the next sub-section (section 5.3.2), it 
seems that a similar attitude is endorsed in the context of transfer of undertakings under 
Directive 2001/23, which shows that arising issues are supposed to be resolved between 
employers and workers’ representatives based on a climate of trust, confidence and mutual 
respect. 
Τhe legal framework of Directive 98/59 seems to embrace the idea of ALMPs, as a means to 
promote employment security since the person that performs real work in the context of 
traineeship, internship, or apprenticeship is also brought under the umbrella of the term 
‘worker’ as defined in EU law.147  In Ender Balkaya, the CJEU clarified that reasons related to 
‘low productivity levels’ and ‘less working hours’ cannot have any consequence as to whether 
the person would be regarded as ‘worker’.148  This means Directive 98/59 could give the 
opportunity to workers, who participate in new and atypical forms of work to fall in the scope 
of the Directive and exercise the right to consultations and negotiations prior to collective 
dismissal.  The CJEU has further noted that the person, who serves traineeship or 
apprenticeship, is included in the scope of protection regardless the origin of funding of 
remuneration (e.g. by the public authorities that are responsible for the promotion of 
employment) and the legal framework of the employment relationship in terms of vocational 
training and apprenticeship (e.g. full-time or part-time job).149 
This decision seems to be a stepping-stone regarding the regulation of employment security in 
the context of flexicurity.  The integration of workers who participate in modern forms of 
employment could facilitate the transitions of workers in the labour market.  It could play a 
catalytic role to give incentives to workers (by making them feel more secure) to take part in 
educational/vocational training schemes to improve their employability and meet the 
occupational requirements, which are required to get a job and if necessary, swiftly transition 
in the labour market.  This legal framework, which was introduced in Ender Balkaya, is 
especially important since neither the EU Directive 98/59 nor ILO/UN/CoE regulate the 
funding of ALMPs, which is a gap that could possibly be filled through the EU reflexive policy 
mechanisms (i.e. the Social OMC and EES).150 
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5.3.2 Directive 2001/23: Transfer of undertakings  
 
Directive 2001/23, which amended the original Directive 77/187, provides protection to 
employees in the event of a change of employer and attempts to strike a fair balance between 
the rights of employees and the interests of the transferees.151  The ideas lying behind Directive 
2001/23 are that the transferred worker can work under the same terms and conditions for the 
new employer and be protected from unfair dismissal on grounds related to the transfer of 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business as prescribed in article 4 of 
Directive 2001/23.152  The amended Directive made major developments in this context 
because it set out the specific cases that cannot be excluded from the scope of protection.  For 
example, it has set out that the number of working hours may not play a decisive role in 
excluding specific categories of workers from the scope of protection, which seems to be 
catalytic as to enabling the workers that participate in new forms of employment in securing a 
job (and possibly tackling precariousness).153 
The transferor’s rights and obligations are transferred to the transferee (article 3 Directive 
2001/23), reflecting the raison d’être of Directive 2001/23.  The transferee is entitled to 
‘observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement’, regardless of whether 
the collective agreement expired.154  This case illustrates the importance of the collective 
agreements as procedural mechanisms to safeguard workers’ rights, which could also play a 
role in mitigating the risk of job insecurity. However, collective agreements that were 
concluded after the date of transfer and the transferee has not been involved in the negotiation 
process are not included in the scope of article 3 of Directive 2001/23, even when the contract 
of employment indicates that the agreement falls in the scope of Directive 2001/23. 
In Mark Alemo-Herron and Others, the CJEU examined whether the employees have dynamic 
rather than static contractual rights against the transferor, which is agreed by a third party 
collective bargaining body.155  In the present case, the Lewisham London Borough Council, a 
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public entity, entered into agreement with CCL to contract out of the leisure services in 2002, 
and as a consequence the employees of the Lewisham Council became employees of the 
CCL.156  During the employment in Lewisham, the terms and conditions of employees were 
agreed between the Lewisham Council and NJC (the local collective bargaining body) through 
collective agreements.157  Two years later (May 2004), CCL was sold to Parkwood, which does 
not participate in the NJC because it is a private entity.158  In June 2004, the NJC concluded a 
new agreement on pay increase, however Parkwood informed its employees that the agreement 
is not binding to it.159  In this context, the Supreme Court of the UK referred to the ‘static’ and 
‘dynamic’ protection of employees after the transfer of undertakings – static protection means 
that the collective agreement shall not be applicable, whereas, dynamic protection means that 
the agreement shall be applicable.160  The CJEU held that the interests of the transferee 
(contractual freedom) is seriously limited because the transferee, which is not part of the NJC, 
is not able to negotiate the working conditions of its employees and this could cause a 
detrimental impact on the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business.161 Arguably, this limits 
the role of continuing collective agreements and collective bargaining post transfers. 
In cases where a ‘substantial change in working conditions’ could be detrimental for the 
employee, the employer shall be regarded as responsible for the termination of employment 
contract or relationship (article 4(2) of Directive 2001/23).162  This provision seems to be 
crucial in the period of economic distress, during which the employers tend to make changes 
to boost the enterprise’s productivity levels.  Directive 2001/23 intends to achieve partial 
harmonization and for this reason, it has not set out the legal consequences of employer’s 
responsibility.  In this context, the CJEU examined whether the right to financial compensation 
is included in the scope of article 4(2) of Directive 2001/23.163  As the CJEU held, the Member 
States are not obliged to safeguard the right to financial compensation to workers whose 
employment is terminated for reasons related to transfer of undertakings, although the domestic 
courts shall ensure that the transferee employer takes the legal consequences of such 
termination – e.g. payment of salary and payment of appropriate benefits related to notice 
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period as determined in the context of national law.164  It is worth noting that Directive 2001/23 
and Directive 98/59 do not provide the appropriate safeguards for the payment severance pay, 
which is left at the discretion to the Member State’s actors (such as the national courts). 
Article 1 of Directive 2001/23 sets out the definition of ‘transfer of an undertaking, business, 
or part of an undertaking or business to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or 
merger’.165  The CJEU held that ‘a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy’ shall send a preliminary question on the interpretation of article 1(1) of Directive 
2001/23 to the CJEU.166  This is particularly important because the interpretation of article 1(1) 
of Directive 2001/23, and in particular the phrase ‘a transfer of a business’ has caused 
difficulties in various Member States as to interpretation, the domestic courts are obliged to 
refer a preliminary question in order to avoid the risk of misinterpretation of EU law.167  It 
appears that the CJEU has given ‘a sufficiently flexible interpretation’ of article 1 of Directive 
2001/23 to preserve the aim of the Directive and safeguard the interests of workers in the event 
of transfer of undertakings.168  It also established limits to the interpretation of article 1 of 
Directive 2001/23.  For example, a municipal authority that decided to terminate its 
employment contract with a private company that was responsible for the cleaning of the 
municipality’s premises and hire new workers to undertake the same working tasks (i.e. 
cleaning of its premises) could not fall in the scope of protection as derived from Directive 
2001/23.169 
According to article 1(b) of Directive 2001/23, the transfer shall entail ‘a transfer of an 
economic entity which retains its identity.170  In CLECE, the CJEU set out that the identity of 
an economic entity, which shall be preserved after the transfer of undertaking, could be the 
group of workers that are assigned to a particular task.171  In this context, the CJEU held that 
Directive 2001/23 also covers situations where an undertaking, business, or part of an 
undertaking or business has not managed to preserve its ‘organizational autonomy’ after the 
transfer.172  The concept of ‘organizational autonomy’ could include change of working hours 
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or working tasks, or assigning an employee to a position that is equivalent to its previous 
position, although these changes shall not cause any harm or damage to the worker (‘detriment 
of employee’).173  In cases of causing detriment of employee due to organizational changes of 
the undertaking or business, the employer is to be regarded as responsible for the termination 
of employment relationship or contract.174  This shows that the regulation of economic 
dismissals through Directive 2001/23 is merely focused on fostering job security.  Article 4 of 
Directive 2001/23 reflects a defence, according to which economic, technical or organizational 
(ETO or ETOR) reasons that led to changes in the workplace can constitute a valid reason for 
dismissal.175  This means that Directive 2001/23 restricts the level of job security for reasons 
related to economic, organizational or technical changes in the case of transfer of undertakings, 
while providing a flexibility to employers because it gives them the opportunity to terminate 
an employment relationship in this context.176  At this point, the regulation of social security 
system shall play a key role to ensure that the workers who are dismissed on ETO grounds can 
remain in the labour market (either in the form of unemployment benefit or educational benefit 
which will facilitate such transitions). 
Directive 2001/23 further introduced that the Member States have the discretion to exclude 
workers from the scope of protection of article 4 based on the national legislation or practices.  
This means that workers that participate in new types of employment (such as trainees) could 
be excluded from the scope of Directive and be dismissed on grounds related to the transfer of 
the undertaking or business.  This could leave these workers exposed to the risk of 
unemployment.  The only safeguard that could mitigate the adverse effects on the workers is 
the obligation of the employer to negotiate the issue with the workers’ representatives (article 
7 Directive 2001/23).  This safeguard was introduced in the original Directive 77/187, however 
Directive 2001/23 extended its scope, which includes inter alia the obligation of the employers 
to consult workers’ representatives about the date/proposed date of the transfer.177  According 
to the Federatie Nederlanse Vakvereniging case, the transfer of undertaking shall take place 
following a declaration of insolvency.178  The amended Directive 2001/23 also clarified that 
the employers cannot use the excuse of not being provided with the appropriate information by 
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the undertaking to justify a breach of the information and consultation safeguards of Directive 
2001/23.179 
It seems that even if Directive 2001/23 is primarily focused on fostering job security through 
the procedure of transfer of undertakings, its scope of protection goes beyond the exact activity 
of transfer.  In particular, the transferee when terminating the employment of an employee, is 
obliged to take into account the length of service that the worker acquired with the transferor 
and subsequently, the calculation of the employee’s length of service and the notice period that 
is required.180  This shows that the rights of the employee are not lost after the end of transfer 
procedure, which emphasizes the macro-scale protection of Directive 2001/23 that provides 
the appropriate safeguards to the employees that were transferred.  These safeguards could 
possibly include other rights that would enhance employment security – e.g. consultations and 
notification. 
Apart from the exclusion of workers based on their type of employment, the Member States 
are eligible to exclude specific types of ‘transfers’ from the scope of protection (article 5 of 
Directive 2001/23).  These types refer to the ‘transfers’ that are subject of ‘bankruptcy 
proceedings’ or ‘any analogous insolvency proceedings’ that comply with two criteria: firstly, 
it aims to the liquidation of the transferor’s assets and secondly, the insolvency is supervised 
by a competent public body.  This shows that the job security protection of workers entails a 
combination of technical tests or criteria that need to be satisfied, which could restrict the scope 
of protection under Directive 2001/23.  The most problematic aspect is that all the procedural 
safeguards that are set in Directive 2001/23 cannot be applied in these cases, which means that 
these types of transfers can only be regulated through national regulation or through soft-law 
policy mechanisms. 
Social dialogue, taking the form of information and consultations, could be used as a tool to 
ease power imbalances which arise in the context of the application of Directive 2001/23 and 
mitigate the risk of exposing workers to dismissal.  As article 7 of Directive 2001/23 provides, 
the employer (transferor or transferee) is responsible to inform workers’ representatives ‘in a 
good time’ prior to transfer of undertakings, which is a provision that also exists in Directive 
98/59.181  It is noteworthy that Directive 2001/23 does not provide that workers’ representative 
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shall ‘make constructive proposal’ as in Directive 98/59.182  Instead, the Directive sets a 
baseline of the normative content of consultations, according to which workers’ representative 
shall at least cover issues about ‘any measures envisaged in relation to the employees’.183  
Social dialogue could be used to ensure: on the one hand, there is no additional burden placed 
on companies that could affect their level of competitiveness, but on the other hand, workers 
are protected to the greatest extent from the risk of dismissals.  In this context, consultations 
could also include the issue of employability, as a measure to increase productivity of the 
company and the worker, ensuring that the worker can remain in employment.  However, it 
seems that there is significant absence of access to protection of collective bargaining as a 
stronger form social dialogue, which means that ‘any balance of employers’ and employees’ 
interests is not required’.184 
5.3.3 Insolvency Protection Directive 2008/94  
 
Directive 80/987 provides a legal framework to protect employees in the event of insolvency 
of their employer, which could facilitate the transition of workers to another job or ensure 
severance pay.  It also provides protection to employees in cases where a request for insolvency 
has been made for the opening of proceedings involving the employer’s assets to satisfy 
collectively the claims of creditors and which make it possible to take into consideration.185  
The most recent amendment of the original Directive 80/987, which was replaced multiple 
times, is via Directive 2008/94.  This Directive integrated inter alia: first, the core principles 
of the original Directive (i.e. material scope, the guarantee institutions, social security 
protection); and second, the provisions concerning transnational situations (Chapter IV) of 
Council Directive 2002/74 and 2008/94, which were introduced to facilitate transitions in the 
EU labour market.  Apart from the transnational situations, the key difference between the 
amending instruments is based on the categories of workers that could be excluded from the 
scope of protection.  Nevertheless, the Insolvency Protection Directive 2008/94, which is 
primarily focused on guaranteeing the payment of outstanding claims, aims to provide 
safeguards to workers’ payment, rather than persuading employers that are in the state of 
insolvency to preserve job security. 
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In this legal framework, there are terms whose interpretation is left at the discretion of the 
Member States – i.e. ‘employee’, ‘pay’, ‘employer’, ‘right conferring immediate entitlement’ 
and ‘right conferring prospective entitlement’.186  According to the José Vicente Olaso Valero 
case, the Member State is entitled to decide whether the term ‘pay’ includes compensation for 
unfair dismissal.187  The term ‘pay’ shall be interpreted in such a way as to include 
compensation for unfair dismissals awarded by judicial or administrative decision or under 
conciliation procedures.188  This terminological broadness leaves room for the Member States 
to adjust the term to the current challenges and ensure that the individual would be able to 
secure a benefit after insolvency. 
The Member States are also entitled to impose a time-limit for the exercise of rights as derived 
from Directive 80/987, as long this time-limit fulfils the following criteria: a) it does not make 
‘impossible from a practical point of view or excessively difficult’ the exercise of such rights 
b) respects the principle of proportionality (‘not disproportionate’) and c) respects the principle 
of equality.189  It seems that article 12 of ILO Convention N.173, which also covers severance 
pay of workers in the event of insolvency, sets out more detailed criteria than Directive 
80/987.190  To explain, this provision provides that the normative content of the Convention  
protects inter alia: a) workers’ claims on wages for a ‘prescribed period’, which means not less 
than eight weeks prior to the insolvency or prior to the termination of the employment; b) 
workers’ claims about holiday pay for a period, which was not less than six months prior to the 
insolvency or prior to the termination of employment.191 
Directive 2008/94 (along with the original Directive 80/987) aims to safeguard employees in 
the event of the insolvency of their employer through payment of employees’ outstanding 
claims.192  In this context, Directive 2008/94 provides rules for harmonization to guarantee 
institutions guarantee (article 3 of Directive 2008/94) and payment of employees’ outstanding 
claims (article 4 of Directive 2008/94).  However, article 4 of Directive 2008/94 provides that 
the Member States are able to ‘limit the liability of guarantee institutions’ as prescribed in 
article 3 of Directive 2008/94. 
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In van Ardennen, the CJEU held that Member States are not eligible to adopt a domestic legal 
rule which obliges employees to register as job-seekers as means to fulfil their right to payment 
of outstanding claims.193  Even if article 10 of Directive 2008/94 provides that the Member 
States are able to ‘take necessary measures to avoid abuses’, the CJEU stated that obliging 
employees to register as jobseekers is not brought under article 10 of Directive 80/987.194  This 
ruling seems sensible as it respects the choice of the individual to transition from employment 
to inactivity. 
It seems that the procedural requirements play a core role in the context of severance pay, since 
in some cases the employer is eligible to dismiss workers after insolvency without being 
obliged to pay a severance pay.  In Maira María Robledillo Núñez, the CJEU held that 
severance pay (‘compensation for unfair dismissal’) that is recognized in extra-judicial 
conciliation procedure could be excluded from the scope of article 3 of Directive 2008/94, 
which enshrines the obligation of the guarantee institutions to pay employees’ outstanding 
claims that resulted from termination of employment relationship or employment contract.195  
As the guarantee institution has no right to intervene in the extra-judicial conciliation 
procedure, it appears that the procedure ‘does not offer sufficient guarantees of the avoidance 
of abuse’.196  According to article 10(a) of Directive 2008/94 that has already been 
aforementioned, the Member States are able to take the appropriate means to avoid abuse.197   
On this basis, the CJEU held that the Member States could exclude compensation for an unfair 
dismissal, which is recognized in extra-judicial conciliation procedure.198  Such exclusion is 
understood by the CJEU as a necessary step to avoid abuse.199  The rules as derived from 
Directive 2008/94 apply in the same manner (respecting the principle of equality) in cases 
where compensation for unfair dismissal is recognized from judicial or administrative body, or 
under conciliation procedures.200 
According to article 4(3) of Directive 2008/94, the Member States are able to ‘set a ceiling to 
the liability of employees’ outstanding claims’ to safeguard the social aim of the Directive.  
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Although the CJEU explicitly stated that such limitation shall not be set in cases where the 
payment of sums would be insufficient to cover the basic needs of employees.201  The concept 
of basic needs seems rather obscure as it is a matter of doubt what it means.  It could possibly 
refer to short-term basic needs (such as food, water, shelter) rather than long-term socio-
economic needs (e.g. participation in the ALMPs) that would enable the worker to find a job.   
The criteria to set this ceiling in the EU seems to be more technical than in the ILO regime.  To 
explain, article 4(3) of Directive 2008/94 states that the Member State is eligible to set this 
ceiling after giving the appropriate information to the EC, setting out the methods.  Whereas, 
article 7 of ILO Convention N.173 sets out that this ceiling is set only after consultations with 
workers’ and employers’ representatives.202  In other words, EU regulation does not integrate 
the contextual framework of the ILO Convention, which attempts to mitigate the risks of 
dismissals through consultations, but it leaves the onus on the Member States to alleviate the 
costs of dismissals. 
The provisions concerning transnational situations, which were primarily introduced in 
Directive 2002/74 and further endorsed in Directive 2008/94, regulate the inter-play of 
domestic actors in the payment of the outstanding employees’ payment.  According to article 
8(1) of Directive 2002/74, if the undertaking performs activities in two or more Member States, 
then the guarantee institution shall be that in the Member State, where the employees either 
‘work or habitually work’.203  The purpose of the transnational provisions is to facilitate the 
administrative procedures between the Member States, through exchanging the appropriate 
documents.204  The CJEU decided various cases about these transitional provisions, in which 
it has applied strictly the criteria that are established in Council Directive 2008/94 (i.e. the place 
of ‘work or habitually work’).  In the Opinion of Advocate General (AG), Mengozzi attempted 
to ease the complexity of transnational regulation regarding the issue of which Member State 
is competent.205  The AG introduced an additional criterion to determine which Member State 
shall be responsible to alleviate the costs in the context of transnational situations.  This 
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criterion refers to ‘the social and language environment with which they are familiar’, which 
seems to reflect the social objective of the Directive.206 
As a concluding remark, the regulation of economic dismissals, which is tightly linked to the 
operation of internal market, entails a combination of job security protections in the context of 
collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings and employment security protections in 
the context of insolvency.  The job security protection under Directives 98/59 and 2001/23 are 
not sufficient on their own to facilitate the transition of workers in the labour market.  In this 
context, it is important to strengthen the connection between employment security and social 
security (taking the form of educational benefits and unemployment benefits) to reduce the risk 
of exposing workers in unemployment. 
 
5.4 Regulation of social security  
 
EU regulation of the social security system created procedural norms to achieve two over-
arching goals that are related to its functions as described in the Treaty of Rome, which were 
further integrated in the subsequent Treaties.  Firstly, the EU aims to coordinate social security 
to promote the freedom of movement of workers (article 45 TFEU) and enable Member States’ 
social security systems (as complex systems) to work more effectively together.  Secondly, this 
regulatory regime creates norms that are adjusted to the core principle of non-discrimination 
(on grounds of nationality within the EU), which is embedded in the coordination of social 
security.  This second normative objective is also integrated with other dispersed EU legal 
instruments on non-discrimination to ensure that EU citizens enjoy the right to social security 
regardless their personal status and characteristics (e.g. race, ethnicity, religious belief). 
The coordination of social security systems was firstly introduced in Regulations 3 and 4 of 
1956, which shows that these coordinating procedures were set as a priority in the EU regime.   
The concept of ‘social security coordination’ integrates the theory of legal pluralism, according 
to which there are multiple social security systems that reflect the diverse legal traditions of 
Member States.  The core aim of coordinating social security systems is to secure social 
security benefits of workers and their siblings, who exercise their freedom of movement, so 
that individuals will be able to transition easily in the EU labour market.  From a reflexive law 
perspective, the term ‘coordination of social security’ entails communication of social security 
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systems through EU internal procedures.  These EU coordination procedures, which do not aim 
to harmonize social security standards, are only used in cases where the workers move/reside 
in another Member State from the Member State of residence/employment. 
The concept of ‘social security’ exists in each system, which being normatively closed system 
adjusts that conception to its aims and functional operation.  Apart from the coordination of 
social security systems, the EU also ensures the promotion of non-discrimination in the area of 
social security protection, which constitutes a core value of the EU.  Nevertheless, the absence 
of minimum baseline for social security standards at the EU-level emphasizes the normative 
divergence between the EU and the other international/regional standard-setting actors 
(UN/ILO and CoE), which set social security norms to respect and promote the right of social 
security.  The EU mainly regulates the technical ‘practicalities’ of social security benefits when 
two Member States are involved in the process to facilitate the operation of internal market.   
For example, the EU regulates which body is responsible to grant the social security benefit.  
Whereas, ILO Convention N.102 enshrines that medical benefit shall be provided to workers 
to ‘maintain, restore or improve the health of the person protected and his ability to work and 
to attend to his personal needs’.207  Nevertheless, the Social OMC, which is analysed further in 
section 5.5.2, as a reflexive process attempts to encourage the creation of social security 
standards at domestic level. 
Section 5.4.1 focuses on the EU coordination of social systems, with particular focus on 
Regulation 883/2004 and examines the existing normative complexities that could create 
barriers in the transition of workers in the EU labour market, such as the absence of an 
unemployment benefit.  Section 5.4.2 examines the social security regulation in the field of 
non-discrimination as exists in the hard-law instruments and attempts to investigate to what 
extent the social security system could possibly communicate with that of employment 
security.  
5.4.1 Coordination of social security systems  
 
The concept of ‘coordination of social security systems’ was primarily introduced in 
Regulation 3 of 1958 and later embedded in Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community and 
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Regulation 574/72.208  The scope of social security coordination was further extended in 
Regulation 883/2004, replacing Regulation 1408/71.209  The modernization of EU rules on the 
coordination of Member States’ social security systems is introduced through Regulation 
988/2009 and the supplementary Regulation 987/2009, which specifies the measures and 
procedures for implementing Regulation 883/2004.210 
The EU coordination of social security norms stems from article 48 of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
according to which the EP and the Council are entitled to adopt social security norms to 
facilitate freedom of movement of people (and their siblings) within the EU.211  This provision 
covers aggregation, calculation and payment of social benefits.212  The coordination of social 
security systems reflects the effort of the EU to ease the internal differentiation of domestic 
social security systems and facilitate the transition from one job to another within the EU.  This 
section attempts to explore the principles of social security coordination and which are 
challenges, such as the lack of definition of ‘family benefits’. 
There are four core principles that are established in the coordination package, which were 
introduced in Regulation 1408/71 and further reaffirmed in Regulation 883/2004.  These 
principles consist of equality of treatment (articles 4 and 5 of Regulations 1408/71 and 
883/2004), aggregation (articles 6 of Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004), the principle of a 
single applicable law (article 11(1) of Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004) and exportability 
(article 7 of Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004).213  Frans Pennings articulated the view that 
Regulation 883/2004 modernized coordination of social security norms, by introducing the 
principle of ‘equal treatment of benefits, income and facts’ (article 5 of Regulation 
883/2004).214  However, social security standards are restricted by the principle of 
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aggregation,215  which means that EU legislation determine which Member State is responsible 
to calculate and pay social benefits.216 
The EU social security protection covers: the individuals who are nationals of Member States 
(including employed or self-employed individuals), refugees or their survivors’ (Regulations 
1408/71, 574/72, 883/2004, 987/2009, Directive 2004/38) and third-country nationals, who 
work and reside in a Member State (Directive 2011/98).  After adoption of Regulation 
883/2004, the coordination of social security norms are not solely addressed to economically 
active people.217  The new provision seems to reflect the universal nature of article 6(1) ECHR 
and article 1 of Protocol 1 annexed to ECHR, which encompass the right to social security.218  
Article 6(1) ECHR refers to ‘everyone’, whereas article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR covers ‘every 
natural or legal person’.219  The arising question is if there are any complications that arose 
from the general scope of Regulation 883/2004.  This means other individuals without the 
status of worker could be included in the scope of protection of Regulation 883/2004, such as 
students and voluntary emergency helpers.220  It seems that the general nature of Regulation 
883/2004 does not facilitate the transition from one job to another as the status of worker and 
residency plays a crucial role for social benefits.  For example, an unemployed individual 
would not be able to receive social benefits from another Member State as he would not have 
obtained the legal status to stay in the other Member State. 
The conditions of nationality and residence play a crucial role for EU social security protection 
and act as prerequisites for granting social security benefits.  The term ‘residence’ as  described 
in article 1(j) of Regulation 883/2004 refers to ‘the place where a person habitually resides’.221  
In addition, article 11 of Regulation 883/2004 sets outs a list of elements that shall be concerned 
in determining residence – these criteria include the period that the individual was present in a 
Member State.222  In B., the CJEU held that an individual, who is registered in a territory 
although he does not work or habitually reside in that Member State, is excluded from 
Regulation 883/2004.223  For example, a person (Mrs. B.), who was permanent resident in a 
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neither Mrs. B. nor her family members worked in that Member State.224  In other words, the 
norms for social security coordination are based on two principles: the principle lex loci laboris 
(i.e. the applicable law of the Member State in which the individual is employed)  and lex loci 
domicilii (i.e. the applicable law of the Member State in which the individual resides).225  These 
principles create concerns as to what extent these principles are applicable to specific cases 
(such as ‘family benefits of cost-compensating schemes).226 
In the case of frontier workers, Regulation 883/2004 sets out a more flexible provision, 
according to which family members of frontier workers, who reside in the competent Member 
State, are entitled to social security benefits, even if the worker stays outside the competent 
Member State.227  Regulation 883/2004 is depended on lex loci domicilii rather than the 
principle lex loci labori to ensure that the siblings of posted workers are protected under 
Regulation 883/2004.  The concept of frontier workers is determined by the sending Member 
State, which in some cases this created complexities.228  In Calle Grenzshop, the CJEU stated 
that the worker, who resided in one Member State and the undertaking of his work was in 
another Member State, was not a posted worker, even if the worker was regularly undertaking 
activities in the Member State of his residence.229 
Article 3 of Regulation 883/2004 sets out the branches of social security that the Member States 
shall ensure that nationals of a Member State, stateless persons, refugees and their survivors 
enjoy the same benefits under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof.230   
These branches include sickness, maternity, paternity, employment injury (‘accidents at work 
and occupational diseases’), unemployment and family benefits.231  Member States have the 
discretion to exclude contributory or non-contributory social security schemes, which are set 
out in the Annex of Regulation 883/2004.232  The Republic of Cyprus, which is the case study 
in this research, has not introduced any exclusions to Regulation 883/2004.233  With regard to 
the rights of third-country nationals, Directive 2011/98 relies on Regulation 883/2004 as to 
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setting out the rules of social security system.234  Although the branches of social security are 
clearly set out in the Regulation 883/2004, there are cases where the benefit that introduced at 
domestic level does not clearly belong to a particular branch of social security corresponds.  In 
this context, the CJEU held that to distinguish the different branches of social security, it is 
vital to consider ‘the risk covered’ by each social security benefit.235 
Before examining the various social security rules as developed in the EU regime, it is 
necessary to explore the general principles as derived from Regulation 883/2004.  According 
to Regulation 1408/71 (title II: ‘Determination of the legislation applicable), the applicant of 
the prescribed social security protection falls in one of the categories as prescribed in articles 
13-14 of Regulation 1408/71.236  The individual, either employed or self-employed in a 
Member State, shall be entitled for social security benefits from that Member State.237  As 
regards public servants, they are entitled to social security benefits from the same Member 
State whose administration is also employing them.238  In case of posted workers, they are 
entitled to receive social security benefits from the sending Member State, as long as their stay 
in the receiving Member State does not exceed the period of twenty-four months.239  According 
to the revised Directive on posted workers, when the posting exceeds the 12 month-period, 
workers that are posted to their territory shall enjoy the terms and conditions of employment 
of the Member State, where they carry out the work.240  However, this provision does not cover   
‘supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes’ and terms/procedures for 
termination of employment.241  Article 12(2) of Directive 883/2004 sets out that self-employed 
workers, who normally work in one Member State and they pursue a similar professional 
activity to another Member State for a period less than twenty-four months, are entitled to 
social security benefits from the Member State that they normally work.242 
Regulation 883/2004 sets out special rules for each branch of social security, which are based 
on the four main principles as prescribed in title II of the Regulation.243  Regarding sickness, 
maternity and paternity benefits (chapter 1: title III of Regulation 883/2004), the individual and 
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the members of his or her family, who do not habitually reside in the competent Member State, 
they shall receive the same benefits from the Member State of residence.244  This rule is not 
applicable to posted workers, which are entitled for social security benefits from the competent 
Member State.245  In case where an individual shall stay (i.e. ‘temporary residence’) in another 
Member State from the competent Member State for medical reasons, then the Member State 
may be entitled for social security benefits from the second Member State.246 
A crucial complexity of medical benefits is the difference in the levels of cover in force in the 
Member State of affiliation and in the Member State of stay, respectively.  In European 
Commission v. French Republic, the CJEU held that the Member State is eligible to impose 
‘objective and non-discriminatory’ requirements for medical benefit, which covers care in and 
outside hospital.247  In the present case, the CJEU held that the prior authorisation is a measure 
to control costs and resources (e.g. financial or technical), but it might ‘deter or prevent’ 
individuals from obtaining the appropriate treatment.248  An example of high cost of medical 
equipment is the positron emission tomography, which is used by the UK and France for 
treatment of cancer.249  This case shows that lack of medical benefits seems to be a major 
restriction on the facilitation of workers’ transitions in the labour market because workers who 
are not able to receive proper medical treatment, might also not be able to keep/return to their 
job, which could possibly increase the risk of employment insecurity.  This situation illustrates 
the ‘deficit’ of EU social security regulation, which does not regulate the normative substantive 
aspect of social security standards.  In other words, it does not set minimum standards for 
medical benefits and cost sharing.  In contrast, ILO Convention N.130 specifies that medical 
benefit shall ensure that the worker ‘shall be [able] to maintaining, restoring or improving the 
health of the person protected and his ability to work and to attend to his personal needs’.250 
Occupational disease or accident at work  
The workers that suffered from occupational disease or injury while they stay or reside in 
another Member State from the competent Member State, are entitled to receive employment 
injury benefits from the Member State of stay or residence.251  In case of aggravation of an 
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occupation disease, then the competent Member State shall bear the cost of the benefits and 
take into account the aggravation, only if the person that suffered from the occupational disease 
has not pursued an activity in another Member State.252  Whereas, if the person has pursued an 
activity in another Member State, then the competent Member State shall not take into account 
the aggravation of an occupational disease.253  The EU norm seems to be stricter than ILO 
Conventions N.102 and N.130, which stipulate that the States (who are ILO Members) are 
eligible to request from the beneficiaries to share in the cost of benefits.254  Whereas, the 
European Code for Social Security (ECSS) does not regulate who bears the cost for medical 
benefits.  
The lack of funds for medical benefit could create impediments for workers to retain their work 
(job security) or transition to another job position (preconditions for flexicurity).  Maximilian 
Fuchs raised the issue of the absence of adequate ‘accident insurance institutions’, which means 
that other institutions shall participate in the payment of costs for occupational diseases.255   
This might create complexities in cases where the Member State shall take into consideration 
different elements to determine whether the qualified period is completed, which occurred in 
other Member States.256  For example, article 61(5) of Regulation 1408/71 stipulates that the 
competent institutions shall take into account previous accidents at work or occupational 
diseases that occurred in other Member State to determine the degree of capacity of worker.257   
It is also important to mention at this stage the principle of exclusivity, according to which the 
individual shall seek to get compensation from the Member State that was the last country of 
employment and if this is not possible, the applicant is eligible to obtain compensation from 
the Member State of previous employment (article 57 (1) of Regulation 1408/71).258  This 
principle extends the scope of protection as derives from Regulation 1408/71, since it provides 
to the individual an alternative route to seek compensation (i.e. social benefits for occupational 
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The unemployed individual is entitled to unemployment benefits from the competent Member 
State, after completing a period of insurance, employment, or self-employment.259  The 
coordination of unemployment benefits seems to foster the concept of flexicurity at national 
level, as unemployed individuals, who are not entitled to receive unemployment benefits from 
a Member State because they have not completed the appropriate period of qualification, have 
to return home and seek for job.  This period of insurance or employment is determined, taking 
into consideration periods of employment or insurance that completed in any other Member 
States.260 Regulation 883/2004 also provides that the period of employment, under the 
legislation of another Member State, shall be taken into consideration only if such period is 
considered as period of insurance.261 
As a general principle, the individual is entitled to unemployment benefits, under the legislation 
of the Member State of residence – this reaffirms the aforementioned statement about 
flexicurity.262  For unemployed individuals that seek work in another Member State from the 
competent Member State, the person is entitled to unemployment benefits, if the individual is 
registered as unemployed and remains available to the employment services of the competent 
Member State before his departure to the other Member State.263  The unemployed individual 
shall also register as unemployed in the employment services of the Member State that he left. 
According to article 64(1)(c) of Regulation 883/2004, the unemployed individual, who has not 
been available to the employment services of the Member State that he left for a period that 
exceeds three months, shall not be entitled to unemployment benefits.264 
In cases where the individual is ‘partially or intermittently unemployed’ and during his last 
activity as employed or self-employed, resided in other Member State than the competent 
Member State, then he is entitled to receive unemployment benefits from the competent 
Member State.265  Although, ‘a wholly unemployed individual’, who his last activity as 
employed or self-employed was in another Member State and he still resides or returns to that 
Member State, shall be entitled to receive unemployment benefits from the Member State of 
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residence.266  In Monique Chateignier, the CJEU reaffirmed that the eligibility of 
unemployment benefit is subject to the completion of a period of employment in the competent 
Member State.267  This shows that coordination of unemployment benefits does not facilitate 
transition from unemployment to employment, if the individual has not completed the required 
period of employment or insurance. 
Regulation 883/2004 does not define ‘unemployment benefits’, which means the CJEU (along 
with domestic actors) shall determine in which cases an individual is eligible to receive 
unemployment benefits.  The CJEU’s case-law demonstrated that the lack of definition of 
‘unemployment benefits’ caused problems, however, the social security systems reflect the 
domestic traditions and it would be difficult to harmonize the definition of ‘unemployment 
benefits’.  In Knoch and Campana, the CJEU held that educational benefits for vocational 
schemes (under ALMPs), which either aim to facilitate the transition from unemployment to 
employment or the worker to keep its current job, are also brought under the category of 
unemployment benefits.268  These rulings are crucial as the CJEU widened the scope of 
unemployment benefits and included educational benefits that would enable the individuals to 
secure their job or enter/re-enter/remain in the labour market. 
Family benefits  
The coordination of family benefits could facilitate the transition of workers with family 
responsibilities in the EU labour market as the worker would be able to move in another 
Member State for work and ensure that his/her family (primarily spouse and children) will be 
granted the appropriate benefits.  In the absence of granting appropriate family benefits, 
workers could be more reluctant in making the transition in the EU labour market.  The case-
law of the CJEU shows that there are problems regarding family benefits as to the 
terminological interpretation and the scope of family benefits as determined in Regulation 
883/2004.  According to article 1(z) of Regulation 883/2004, family benefit is described as ‘all 
benefits in kind or in cash that aim to meet family expenses’.269  It is clear that the scope of 
family benefit does not include ‘maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption 
allowances’, which are set in the annex of Regulation 883/2004.270  In this context, it is 
important to note that the Republic of Cyprus did not adopt any exclusions to article 1(z) of 
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Regulation 883/2004.271  In the cases below, it is evident that the CJEU has an important role 
to play in determining family benefits, which as a consequence will enable the workers to retain 
their job, while securing the appropriate benefits during their absence from work for reasons 
related to family responsibilities. 
In Kerly Del Rosario Martinez Silva, the CJEU examined whether ANF, which is a cash benefit 
that aims to meet family expenses, is included in the scope of ‘family benefit’ as prescribed in 
article 1(z) of Regulation 883/2004.272  According to the domestic legislation (i.e. article 65 of 
Legge n.448) the ANF is paid to individuals that have at least three children and their income 
is no less than a certain barrier.273  The CJEU stated that the family benefits, whose eligibility 
criteria are objective and are related to ‘their size, income and capital resources’, are included 
in Regulation 883/2004.274  The CJEU further held that the ANF falls in the scope of ‘family 
benefit’ as prescribed in Regulation 883/2004.275  This ruling, which integrates parental leave 
within the context of family responsibilities, ensures that parental leave norms as established 
in Parental Leave Directive are coordinated within the spectrum of the EU. 
5.4.2 Non-discrimination and social security  
 
The right to social security and social assistance, which is promoted under article 34 EUCFR, 
is entitled to everyone residing and moving legally within the EU.276   However, as Jennifer 
Tooze stated, ‘the implications of article 34 EUCFR for Member States and for EU law and 
policy more generally remains unclear’.277  Social security and social insurance exist in the 
field of EU non-discrimination, which is described as ‘just and adequate social security’.278  
Looking at the material scope of EU Equality Directives, it appears that Framework Directive 
2000/78 does not prohibit direct or indirect discrimination in the field of social security or 
social assistance for reasons related to sexual orientation, disability, age, religion or belief. 
Race Directive 2000/43 and Recast Directive 2006/54 explicitly prohibit direct and indirect 
discrimination in relation to social protection: the first on the grounds of race and ethnicity 
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(article 3(e) of Directive 2000/43) and the latter on the grounds of sex (article 5 of Directive 
2006/54).279  As Erica Howard articulated, EU non-discriminatory law is problematic because 
‘it creates an hierarchy of discriminatory grounds’.280  This view remains a controversial issue 
because it shows that there is a divergence between transnational labour systems. On the one 
hand, the ICESCR and the ESC/RSC endorsed the universal approach of social rights, which 
are indivisible, inter-related and interdepended.  Whereas, Directive 2000/78 does not seem to 
integrate substantive equality, because it seems that people that fall outside the scope of 
Directive 2000/78, cannot enjoy the right to social security in the prism of non-discrimination. 
Directive 2000/43 provides an exception to non-discrimination rule in cases where the 
objective of the norm is legitimate, and the requirement is proportionate.  Article 5 of Directive 
2006/54 stipulates that discrimination on grounds of sex in occupational security schemes is 
prohibited.281  This provision, which does not cover occupational security schemes on 
voluntary basis, is crucial as to the concept of flexicurity because it facilitates the workers to 
remain in the labour market.  In other words, in cases where the worker needs leave for reasons 
related to maternity leave, paternity leave or adoption leave, the worker is able to retain the job 
and receive the appropriate social security benefit. 
In particular, article 15 of Directive 2006/54 provides that a female worker, who is on maternity 
leave, shall be entitled to maternity benefit during her absence from work.282 It is interesting 
that maternity leave Directive 92/85 stipulates that the Member States are responsible to 
provide the appropriate maternity benefit in accordance with domestic law or practice.283 
Directive 2006/54 also introduced a clause, according to which the Member State shall 
recognize paternity and/or adoption leave, through which the individual shall be entitled to 
appropriate social security benefits.284  The fact that Directive 2006/54 gives the option to 
Member States to decide how they would like to implement paternity or adoption benefits, 
shows that the EU leaves a leeway to the Member States to develop their own social security 
systems in more sensitive areas.  
In the Parental Leave Directive 2010/18, which is replaced by the new Directive on Work-Life 
Balance for Parents and Carers, the Member States or social actors are responsible to ensure 
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that the worker is entitled to receive social security benefits during the leave.285  Workers that 
are protected under Directive 92/85 (i.e. mothers with biological children, pregnant women and 
women who are breastfeeding) are entitled to receive the adequate social benefit during their 
leave.286  The term ‘adequate’ means that the benefit shall be at least equivalent to the income 
that the worker would have receive for medical reasons.287  The Member States have the 
discretion to define the term ‘adequate’ and set conditions are prerequisite for maternity 
benefit.288  The new Directive on Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers, integrated the 
provision of Directive 2010/18 according to which social security protection in relation to 
parental leave shall be determined by the domestic legal systems.289  Although, Directive 
2010/18 explicitly sets out that the Member States shall consider ‘the continuity’ of social 
security schemes,290 constituting a core aspect of the Directive. 
The scope of Directive 2000/78, which promotes non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, religion, belief, disability and age, does not explicitly extend the protection in the 
area of social security schemes.291  The limited scope of Directive 2000/78 could theoretically 
create problems in the facilitation of flexicurity (procedural) norms, because individuals could 
be excluded based on the aforementioned grounds.  Nevertheless, the right to access vocational 
training (embracing the ALMPs), which could give the means to workers to retain their 
job/swiftly transition in the EU labour market, is clearly covered by Directive 2000/78.292  In 
J.J. de Lange, the CJEU held that the right to full deductions of the vocational training costs 
on the basis of age shall be conceived as difference in treatment (reflecting article 3(1)(b) 
Directive 2000/78).293  The taxation scheme for vocational training costs, which differs on 
grounds related to age, falls in the scope of Directive 2000/78 because it embraces the right to 
vocational training of young people.294  The CJEU characteristically referred to the impact of 
income tax on accessing vocational training schemes as this would restrict individuals from 
participating in these schemes and as a consequence, they would not be able to remain in the 
labour market.295  In other words, this case indirectly illustrates an inter-connection between 
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employment security and educational benefits, which could be brought under the umbrella of 
social security system as part of ALMPs (i.e. a core flexicurity component). 
The EU procedures for coordination of social security systems could be characterized as an 
extremely technical and complex type of regulation, through which different domestic social 
security systems use procedures of communication to ensure that workers can enjoy the 
freedom of movement.  The EU regulates the inter-play of domestic actors regards to which 
body is competent to pay the benefit and which period shall be aggregated.  However, it does 
not set out a baseline of norms because this, which could be contrary to the principle of 
conferral and subsidiarity, could be conceived as a threat to national sovereignty since social 
security systems reflect the different realities of domestic labour markets.  It appears that the 
two other international standard-setting actors that are analysed in the research study (UN/ILO 
and CoE) do not embrace the concept of coordination, since they adopt norms to foster labour 
standards.  Despite this normative divergence between the EU on the one hand and the UN, 
ILO and CoE on the other, the principle of non-discrimination is integrated in the foundations 
and roots of all the three systems, in which the systems are based to create procedural 
mechanisms that are adjusted to their internal aims.  Even if the aims of the systems are 
different (for example, the EU aims to operate an internal market, whereas the ILO aims to 
promote decent jobs for all), the principle of non-discrimination is embraced in different 
contexts.  
 
5.5 Reflexive Policy Mechanisms  
 
This research study aims to conceptualize and gain an understanding of the relationship 
between regulation of employment security and social security systems, using a combination 
of hard-law and soft-law instruments.  Since the previous sections explore the EU hard-law 
means of regulation, this section focuses on the EU reflexive mechanisms, which entail the 
production of norms in the two areas of employment and social policy that fall in supporting 
competences of the EU (article 5 TFEU).  Section 5.5.1 explores the normative context of the 
European Employment Strategy (EES), which is used as indirect means for promotion of labour 
standards that integrate the concept of flexicurity.  Furthermore, section 5.5.2 is focused on the 
Social OMC, which is also a voluntary procedure that entails participation of different domestic 
actors and attempts to influence the adoption of social security standards at domestic level. 
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5.5.1 European Employment Strategy (EES)  
 
The EES, which is embedded in the Europe 2020 Agenda, constitutes a reflexive mechanism 
for deregulation and re-regulation of national employment policies.296  The EES, using the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as its policy-tool, facilitates the interaction of interested 
actors through indirect means of regulation.  In the spectrum of EES, the set of goals for labour 
protection are developed at EU-level and the national actors, such as public authorities and 
social actors, choose the methods for implementation of EES at national level to converge the 
existing normative divergences.  This section aims to analyse the normative contextual 
framework of the EES and explore to what extent the EES as a reflexive mechanism promotes 
employment security as embedded in the discourse of flexicurity.  The normative analysis is 
focused on the four EES processes: The Integrated Employment Guidelines, the Joint 
Employment Report (JER), the National Reform Programmes (NRP) and the Country Specific 
Recommendations (CSR). 
The Integrated Employment Guidelines of 2015, which set out the strategic aims for labour 
protection that shall be fulfilled at domestic level, seem to primarily focus on employability 
and social security protection.297  The EC drafts the proposal of Integrated Employment 
Guidelines and the Council further adopts the Commission’s proposal after consultations with 
the European Parliament.298  The social actors may also participate in the drafting and 
implementing process of the Integrated Employment Guidelines.299 
The concept of employment security, which means security in employment that is adjusted to 
employability and derives from the EU-oriented policy of flexicurity, appears in the contextual 
framework of the 2015 Integrated Employment Guidelines.  The origins of flexicurity, which 
introduced this concept of employment security, stem from the Netherlands and Denmark, as 
explained in chapter 2 of this research project.  The Common Flexicurity Principles, which are 
embedded in 2015 Integrated Employment Guideline 7, endorse the idea of employment 
security through an integrated strategy that balances flexibility and security.  The idea of 
flexicurity, which entails internal flexicurity within the enterprise and external flexicurity, 
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promotes security of employment through swift transitions from one job (position) to another, 
while providing adequate social security protection through these transitions (‘modern social 
security systems’).300  A swift transition to a new job (position) shall be achieved by promoting 
ALMPs and LLL, which would enable the individual to transition from one job to another 
job.301  Even if employability (ALMPs and LLL) and social security protection (‘modern social 
security systems’) are promoted through the Integrated Guidelines, it does not necessarily mean 
that the integration of these flexicurity components in the 2015 Integrated Employment 
Guidelines can promote employment security (see sections 2.2.2 for further analysis on 
flexicurity components).302 
The focus of the Integrated Employment Guidelines is on flexicurity components (i.e. ALMPs, 
LLL, generous unemployment benefits and flexible working arrangements) that were 
introduced in the 2007 Communication of Commission (‘Towards Common Principles of 
Flexicurity’) instead the over-arching aim of flexicurity to secure employment, while 
facilitating transitions in the labour market.  In other words, the social actors adopt 
policies/laws to reach the sub-goals that are in line with the flexicurity components, however, 
the main goal of fostering employment security is lost.  This is because the Integrated 
Employment Guidelines guide the Member States to adopt norms to attain the sub-targets of 
flexicurity components (such as to tackle unemployment and structural unemployment as part 
of 2015 Integrated Employment Guidelines 5-7 and combat social exclusion as part of 2015 
Integrated Employment Guideline 8), without considering the over-arching aim of employment 
security (i.e. ensuring that the worker can remain in the labour market).303  For example, if the 
Member State provides generous unemployment benefits as a measure to foster social security 
protection (2015 Integrated Guideline 8), this social security norm could increase inactivity 
levels (instead of facilitating the transition from one job to another and securing employment).   
This is because generous unemployment benefits could motivate the workers to reject job offers 
since they have secured an income and they do not feel the pressure to seek for a job.304  
 
300 Council conclusions on the common principles of flexicurity (November 2007) SOC 476 ECOFIN 483 < 




303 Structural unemployment means ‘a situation where there are people without work because they live in areas 
where jobs do not exist, or because they do not have the necessary skills for jobs that exist’ - Cambridge dictionary 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/structural-unemployment> accessed 12 August 2019. 
304 Funk L., ‘European Flexicurity Policies: A Critical Assessment’ (2008) 24(3) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 349, pp.349-350. 
155 
 
The question that arises is to what extent the promotion of employment security as enshrined 
in the discourse of flexicurity of the Integrated Guidelines include job security norms.  From 
the perspective of the EC, flexicurity policies shall ‘shift from job security to employment 
security’.305  The idea of flexicurity derives from the Kok Report of 2004, which sets out the 
need to focus on flexibility and security, although the Report does not use the terms 
‘employment security’ and ‘job security’.306  These two terms, which are distinguishable as 
they describe two different concepts whose meaning is further analysed in section 2.3.1, are 
intimately interconnected.  In some cases, the simultaneous reaction of employment security 
and job security norms can create tensions.  For example, strict job security norms could have 
an adverse impact on employment security because employers might appear reluctant to recruit 
new workers as in case of termination of the employment at the initiative of the employer, 
employers could possibly have to pay a higher amount of severance pay and inform the worker 
about the dismissal in an extensively long period prior to the actual dismissal.307  The Integrated 
Employment Guidelines of 2015 do not give any suggestions as to how job security norms 
could be embedded in the broader context of employment security.308 
Frank Hendrickx articulated the view that ‘employment security pushes away job security’.309  
The reflexivity of the EES, which includes flexicurity policies, could give the opportunity to 
the interested actors, such as the Government and trade unions, to balance their dynamics and 
mediate any occurring tensions between job security and employment security through 
deregulatory policies.  The idea of flexicurity, which is embedded in the EES, implies ‘a shift 
from employment law to employment policy’, although the EES aims to foster labour 
protection through deregulation and re-regulation of national labour systems.310  The OMC, 
which is the policy mechanism of the EES for mutual learning and peer pressure, can influence 
the creation of hard-law and soft-law norms.311  It is an open question to what extent the 
Member State can learn from each other as each labour market has its own peculiarities and 
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complexities that reflect the internal differentiation of law and to what extent the OMC 
effectively promotes the aims of  the EES as it appears as ‘not capable to generate the necessary 
commitment’.312  The EES aims to facilitate the interaction of the interested actors and ease 
their conflicting dynamics or power imbalances through a reflexive process rather than 
allocating the specific tasks that each actor shall carry out.  This process has the advantage of 
enabling the vested interests of the actors to be reflected in the regulation of employment, which 
could possibly be used as a method of regulation to create decent jobs rather than just tackle 
unemployment if it does not create binding obligations upon the Member States. 
The EES using the OMC, cannot create obligations binding per se upon the Member States.   
For example, the Integrated Employment Guidelines tend to focus on the flexibility aspect of 
flexicurity because ‘security is hampered by structural long-term unemployment and budget 
constraints’.313  In doing so, they just prompt the Member States to ‘make full use of the 
European Social Fund’ (2015 of Integrated Employment Guideline 6), which is 
institutionalized in Regulation 1303/2013.314  In addition to this, Decision 573/2014 of the EP 
and of the Council on enhanced cooperation between Public Employment Services (PES) 
establishes the network of PES, through which the EU ensures that PES still remain key actors 
in the regulation of employment norms.  This Decision, which creates a platform for mutual 
learning among PES, does to describe which specific tasks shall be carried out by the PES.315  
In other words, the involvement of PES is institutionalized and confirmed through hard-law 
instruments.  Nevertheless, the selection of other key actors (such as trade unions, experts) and 
the type of participation (e.g. exchange of information, consultation) could be determined 
though soft law means of regulation. 
The focus of the EES on flexicurity components rather than on employment security (as an 
over-arching aim) is also illustrated in the following EES processes, which are used as means 
to govern the implementation of the EES: National Reform Programmes (NRP) and Country-
Specific Recommendations (CSR).  The NRP is a national report that describes the situation at 
domestic level.  It is prepared by each Member State and submitted to the EC, which is 
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responsible for coordination and evaluation of policies under the European Semester (Europe 
2020 Agenda).316  As a reflexive response to the NRP, the EC prepares CSR and gives 
suggestions to the Member States to ensure the level of implementation of Europe 2020 
strategy.  During the period that Cyprus was under the surveillance of Economic Adjustment 
Programme (2013-2016), which was agreed between the European Commission (EC), the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Government of 
Cyprus, Cyprus could not participate in the implementation procedures under Europe 2020 
Strategy.317  
For example, the 2017 NRP of Cyprus that is used as case study to this research project 
describes the schemes of the Human Resource Development Authority (HRDA) and their 
impact on employability, by giving an emphasis on blue skills and blue occupations.318  The 
NRP fails to discuss the quality of jobs and to what extent job security norms facilitate the 
transition from one job (position) to another job (position), as it seems to solely focus on 
tackling unemployment.  This means the focus remains on the quantity of offered jobs rather 
on their quality.  This report is particularly interesting because the policies that aim to tackle 
unemployment may increase the levels of precariousness.  This shows an imperfect 
communication between the systems, as the Republic of Cyprus tightly adjusted the national 
employment policies to the governmental agenda (i.e. to tackle unemployment) rather than 
embracing the concept of employment security, as conceived in the prism of flexicurity.  In 
response to the 2017 NRP, the Council developed a set of Country-Specific Recommendations 
(CSR).  This is particularly interesting because the CSR, which is used as means to regulate 
austerity management, focuses on enhancing economic development (i.e. economic stability 
and competitiveness) rather than fostering employment security and social security protection.  
The Recommendation 5 of 2017 CSR for Cyprus, which discusses the effectiveness of the 
ALMPs and the role of the Public Employment Services (PES), reflects the mind-set of the 
Integrated Employment Guidelines, which promote employability rather than employment 
security (in other words, fails to promote secure transitions to decent jobs).  Regarding social 
security, the EC urges the Cypriot Government to adopt the appropriate legal framework and 
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provide ‘universal healthcare coverage’ (Recommendation 5).  As a general conclusion, Europe 
2020 Strategy, which should have endorsed the normative framework of the UN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, does not seem to promote the UN SDG 8 and promote decent 
jobs.319 
Regarding flexicurity pathways, the EC suggested that the interested actors shall create their 
own national flexicurity pathway.320  In this context, the EC Communication of 2007, after the 
EC undertook background research, sets out four flexicurity pathways that each Member State 
could use as examples or source of inspiration, and create their own flexicurity pathways.321     
The four main flexicurity pathways, from which the Member States could draw inspiration, are 
the following: a) tackle contractual segmentation, which entails flexibilization of job security 
norms; b) develop flexicurity within the enterprise and offer transition in the labour market 
embracing (as form of internal flexicurity and job security); c) tackle skill and opportunity gaps 
among the workforce by fostering employment security in the broader context; and d) improve 
opportunities for benefit recipients and informally employed workers by fostering income 
security and facilitating transitions in the labour market.322 
In the Joint Employment Report (JER), which is used as a mutual learning tool, the Council 
and the EC describe the best and worst practices of implementation of the Integrated 
Employment Guidelines at domestic level.323  In the 2017 JER, the Council and the EC 
identified the Member States which successfully integrated job security norms in the context 
of employment security through flexible contractual arrangements, social security protection 
and ALMPs and managed to overcome the adverse effects of economic distress.324  In doing 
so, the JER of 2017 referred to the link between effective health systems, which facilitate the 
return to the labour market for workers with family responsibilities.325  The 2017 JER referred 
to medicines cost, however, it failed to flag up the issue of cost-sharing of social security 
benefits that would enable the worker to secure a benefit during medical leave.326  The 2017 
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JER also discussed about the achievements in the Cypriot labour market, such as the continuing 
decline in the rate of unemployment and youth-unemployment.327  The 2017 JER arrived at a 
general conclusion, according to which Cyprus faces major employment and social challenges. 
For example, the rate of people, who are at-risk of poverty, has been increased tremendously.328   
As a policy response to Guideline 5, Cyprus adopted policies to foster participation in the 
labour market, which made workers more adaptable to the needs of the labour market.  For 
example, the Government of Cyprus launched vocational and training schemes for categories 
of workers that are currently facing a higher risk of unemployment.329  These categories include 
unemployed individuals under 25 years old and people with disabilities.330 
EES and social dialogue  
In Lisbon Presidency Conclusions (2005), the social partners were called to play a dynamic 
role in the implementation of the Employment Guidelines.331  The 2015 Integrated 
Employment Guidelines called social actors to play a major role in the creation of national 
employment policies, taking the form of collective bargaining or other social dialogue forms.     
It is a matter of question why the European social actors have not prepared a similar report as 
to 2004 Report on social partner actions in Member States to implement Employment 
Guidelines, which could be used as mutual learning tool and an alternative means of 
communication (reporting).  The participation of social actors in the EES is crucial as social 
actors can have impact on the formalization of norms, either as soft-law norms or hard-law 
norms after close cooperation with national parliaments.  The involvement of public authorities 
in the regulation of employment norms depends on their political willingness and commitment 
to take part in the social dialogue and contribute to the realization of norms. 
The role of social dialogue reflects the link between producing framework agreements, and the 
EES.  The EU social actors can initiate EU-level negotiations under article 156 TFEU.  These 
negotiations could lead to conclusion of an agreement that either will be implemented at 
domestic level by national social actors or annexed to a legislative proposal under articles 154-
155 TFEU.  The former procedure was followed for the adoption of Parental leave Directive 
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is further analysed in section 5.3.2.  An example of autonomous negotiations is the 2010 
Framework Agreement on Inclusive Labour Markets.  The follow-up to this Agreement, the 
European social actors (UEAPME, CEEP, BusinessEurope and Syndicat Europeaen Trade 
Union) prepare a yearly joint table and describe the actions of social actors at domestic level.332  
According to the 2013 report, the Cypriot Social Partners did not manage to adopt the 
appropriate legal framework, which would complement the Framework Agreement on 
Inclusive Labour Markets.333 
The European social actors participated in the debate of ‘flexicurity’ and defined the concept 
of ‘flexicurity’ as ‘flexibility combined with employment security’.334  In the 2007 Joint 
Declaration of Eurociett and Uni-Europe, the social actors set out good and bad examples of 
national flexicurity pathways.335  An example of a good practice that was indicated, was the 
vocational training and education funding for temporary workers from national authorities and 
social actors, whereas a bad practice constitute the access to limited social benefits for 
temporary workers.336  The European social actors can also play a role in facilitating the 
communication between the EU and other transnational labour systems.  The Joint Declaration 
of Eurociett and Uni-Europe is an example of how European social actors referred to ILO 
norms (such as ILO Convention N.181) to assess whether national flexicurity policies 
constitute a good/bad practice.337 
The preparation of the NRP and JER could be characterized as ‘bureaucratic’ procedures, 
because the reports are entirely prepared by the governmental authorities since the other social 
actors are not aware of how this process works.338  The question that arises is why the 
governmental authorities have not used this procedure more to engage social actors in a 
constructive dialogue, as a platform to share their opinions and express their concerns.  The 
reasons behind the transition of this procedure from a reflexive process to a ‘dead process’ 
could be various.  For example, the governmental authorities might not believe in the positive 
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outcomes of this procedure or the governmental authorities might want to hide or obscure some 
negative aspects of their internal labour market that could be problematic. 
Social dialogue in the context of the EES could take different forms, such as negotiations and 
consultations, that could be used as a mutual learning tool or lead to contractual relations.  The 
broad range of the forms that social dialogue may take as part of the EES differs from the 
information and consultation procedures provided for economic dismissals (as analysed in 
section 5.3).  Philippe de Bucke and Maxime Cerutti observed that European social dialogue 
in the EES ‘seem[s] to function well’ at European-level, however social dialogue at domestic-
level seems problematic.339  As they explained, domestic social actors are not always engaged 
in the preparation of national reports as part of the EES.340  Whereas, the procedures for 
negotiation and consultation on economic dismissals are regulated at company-level.  It is 
important to note these forms of social dialogue do not encompass the stronger form of 
collective bargaining, including a right to strike.  This means that the bargaining (and 
persuasive) power of social partners is accordingly very limited in this context, as it is arguably 
in the case of economic dismissals, which takes the form of information and consultations. 
5.5.2 Social OMC  
 
The Social OMC, which evolved from the Lisbon Agenda, aims to enhance social security 
protection in the EU regime.  This section explains how the Social OMC could have an impact 
on the creation of social security standards, entailing cooperation of the key actors, which could 
fill the normative gap that exist in the EU hard law  that are solely focused on the coordination 
of social security systems and non-discrimination.  Since this research project deals with the 
relationship of employment security and social security in the spectrum of flexicurity, this 
section examines to what extent the Social OMC manages to influence the creation of minimum 
social security standards, while facilitating the transition of workers in the labour market.  
The Social OMC focuses on the four pillars of poverty and social exclusion, health care, long-
term care and pensions.341  In the ‘Social Protection Performance Monitor (SPPM) – 
methodological report’, the Indicators Sub-group of the Social Protection Committee set out a 
wide range of indicators to assess to what extent countries managed to improve social security 
 
339 Buck d. P. and Cerutti M., ‘Social Dialogue: Why it matters?’ in Vandenbroucke F., Barnard C., De Baere G. 
(eds), A European Social Union after the Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2017), p.225. 
340 Ibid. 




protection at domestic level.342  Although the Committee was willing to strengthen its 
relationship with the Member States and exchange data though preparation of National Country 
Profiles, it appears that Cyprus was not involved in this process, which was launched in 2012. 
The overarching aim of the Social OMC appears to be the ‘mutual interaction between the 
Lisbon objectives’,343 which shows that distinct areas of EU policies could be interconnected.  
In the Social OMC, the EC emphasized how important is the participation of all stakeholders 
in the development, implementation and monitoring of the policies.344  In addition to this, the 
2017 consultation document on the European Pillar of Social Rights, the European social actors 
discussed the deficiencies in accessing social protection, which could make more difficult the 
transition from one job to another.345  This report, which explains the reasons that caused this 
problem (such as globalization and regulatory deficiencies), describes the branches of social 
security along with the legal requirements to have access to these social security benefits.346 
In the spectrum of the Social OMC, the EU manages to facilitate the communication of 
different actors and influence the creation of standards at the domestic level.  One of the most 
recent achievements of the Social OMC is the establishment of the European Labour Authority 
(ELA), which will be launched in 2019, to provide information to citizens and business about 
employment opportunities and vocational training schemes and their rights if they exercise 
their right to move and work in another Member State.347  It will also facilitate the exchange 
of information between the national actors, which will ease the transitions of EU citizens and 
ensure access of social security protection.348 
Regarding the health care, the Social Protection Committee’s Opinion (2016) sets out 
principles and suggestions that should be taken into account to tackle health inequalities, which 
 
342 EU official website (SPC National Report), < 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?pager.offset=40&&langId=en&mode=advancedSubmit&policyAre
a=750&subCategory=758&year=0&country=0&type=0&advSearchKey=SPCNationalSocialReport> accessed 
27 December 2018. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘A renewed 
commitment to social Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion’ (2008) COM (2008) 418 final, annex. 
345 European Commission, Consultation document on the European Pillar of Social Rights (2017) <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1457706909489&uri=COM:2016:127:FIN> accessed 13 August 
2019, p.26. 
346 Ibid, annex 1. 
347 EU Official website, < 





remains a key issue for social inclusion – for example, ensure coordination at national level.349  
This opinion shows the broad scope of the Social OMC, which just flags up the problematic 
dimensions and gives general suggestions to the Member States that need to be adjusted 
appropriately by the domestic actors.  In other words, it appears that it would be unrealistic to 
argue that the Social OMC could fill the EU’s deficit, according to which hard law means of 
regulation do not set a baseline of social security standards. 
In the case of Cyprus, the preparation of national reports (Cyprus National Social Report) is 
again a governmental procedure since the report is prepared by ‘all the pertinent Ministries and 
Authorities’ as it is set out in the Report itself.350  The Report (NSR), which complements the 
NRP solely focuses on the description of the current legislation rather than on the current 
challenges of the domestic social security system.  This seems to be a common practice that is 
also followed by the Cypriot governmental authorities in the preparation of the NRP in the 
context of EES.  This shows that reflexivity does not only entail procedures but also the 
willingness of the different actors to participate in these procedures. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks  
 
The EU constitutes a procedural reflexive device that promotes the operation of the internal 
market, while integrating the core aims of equality and non-discrimination in its transnational 
regulation.  The EU, which is conceived as an autopoietic system from a reflexive law 
perspective, remains constrained by its functionally closed nature to preserve its market-based 
interests.  However, it has showed an increasing appreciation of the need to achieve wider 
social objectives throughout the years, such as fostering employment security and social 
security protection, and facilitating the exchange of information with its external environment, 
reflecting its cognitively open nature.  This has led to major procedural and substantive 
(normative) changes within the system of the EU.  One of these core changes entails the shift 
 
349 European Social Committee, SPC Opinion ‘Solidarity in Health: Reducing health inequalities in the EU’ (2010) 
SPC/2010/5/4 final. 
350 Cyprus National Social Report (April 2014) <ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11769&langId=en> 





from regulation using EU hard-law means of regulation (such as Directives and Regulations) 
to regulation/re-regulation using a combination of hard-law and soft-law means of regulation. 
The EU hard law means of regulation seems to be more powerful compared to that of the ILO 
and the CoE.  The ILO, known as the key standard-setting actor for the promotion of decent 
jobs, barely manages to transmit the international standards adopted due to low rates of 
ratification of Conventions and very weak supervision mechanisms (such as the CEACR).  
Regarding the CoE, the ECtHR manages to detect the infringement of rights (article 6 ECHR) 
and awards compensation to the applicants, however it seldom manages to prompt the Member 
States to change their normative legal framework.  Similarly, the ECSR is based on a 
deliberative process (reporting and follow-up conclusion) and the lodging of collective 
complaints requires the fulfilment of many technical criteria (e.g. specific groups can lodge a 
complaint).  As a result, the ECSR does not often exercise enough pressure on Member States 
to change the problematic national legal provisions. 
The regulation of employment security norms, as developed in the EU regime, fulfils two 
different systemic aims: firstly, the principle of non-discrimination (dignity-related) and 
secondly, the facilitation of procedures in the event of economic dismissals.  The employment 
security regulation that is related to human dignity and non-discrimination, which are two 
principles that exist in all the four systems of this research study (UN/ILO, CoE, EU, 
Constitution of Cyprus), promotes the prohibition of dismissals for reasons related to 
discriminatory grounds.  Even if the ILO and the CoE promote employment security in the 
field of non-discrimination from a holistic human rights approach (i.e. prohibition against an 
improper discriminatory ground), the EU regulation, which is achieved through various 
dispersed hard-law instruments, marked a normative shift. 
The regulation of employment security in the event of economic dismissals could be 
characterized as ‘procedural law’ because the EU hard-law instruments established procedures 
to facilitate transitions of workers in the EU labour market.  The CJEU has also played a key 
role in interpreting the four substantive elements of ‘collective dismissals’, which appears as a 
normative gap as to the detailed contextual framework.  However, the actual severance pay is 
not regulated at EU-level, which means its determination is entirely left at the discretion of the 
Member State. 
EU norms are tightly linked to the functionally closed nature of the system, while respecting 
the principles of conferral and subsidiarity.  Regarding social security regulation, the EU 
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showed its willingness to facilitate procedures, which are primarily focused on the inter-play 
of actors in the payment of social security benefits.  In other words, EU regulation does not set 
a normative baseline of social security benefits.  In comparison, the ILO and CoE provide 
detailed norms for social security protection.  The question that arises is to how Cyprus has 
drawn on these different transnational social security regulations at domestic level – in other 
words, whether Cyprus has managed to integrate these technical procedures in the holistic 
approach of human rights as promoted by the ILO and CoE. 
The principle of equality and non-discrimination, which is one of the core EU principles, is 
also embedded in the social security regulation that aims to ensure that EU citizens/workers 
can have access to social security benefits and are not excluded from social security protection. 
However, the EU system is once again constrained by its internal functional closed nature.   
Firstly, EU social security regulation is tightly linked to the concept of ‘residence and 
nationality’ and unemployed individuals can remain in another Member State only for 
maximum three to six months.  In addition, the EU legal norms do not regulate the level of 
medical benefit and cost-sharing, whereas ILO Convention N.130 states that the Member State 
shall ensure that workers will be able to maintain, restore and improve their health so that they 
will be able to retain their job.351  This reflects the normative divergence between the two 
systems. In this context, it is also interesting the Cypriot MoU of 2012 prompted the Member 
State to adopt National Health Services (NHS), as it is explained in the next chapter. 
The Social OMC and the European Pillar of Social Rights attempt to offer a normative 
framework for social security protection.  The shift from hard-law to a combination of hard-
law and soft-law regulation has two advantages for the operation of EU: firstly, it gives a 
response to the criticisms that the EU focuses too much on market-oriented interests and 
secondly, it facilitates the communication between different actors to increase protection in the 
social security regulation (in particular, in areas of law that do not fall within EU absolute or 
shared competences). 
The EES has the potential to become a reflexive procedure that enables many social actors to 
participate in the creation of norms.  However, this has not yet been achieved.  Instead, there 
is a ‘dry’ bureaucratic process, which not only does not harmonize labour and social security 
policies, but also barely manages to ameliorate the normative divergences between the systems. 
It seems the role of EU social actors in this context is very limited.  They have adopted just one 
 
351 ILO Convention N.130, article 9.  
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autonomous framework agreement since 2010 for Inclusive Labour Markets to increase the 
level of protection.352  The EU-policy oriented concept of flexicurity that was clearly embedded 
in the EES, was also integrated in the ILO regime that was adjusted to the normative framework 
of decent work (i.e. promotion of employment security as international standard).  It appears 
that the EES procedures are tailored and focused on the four components of flexicurity 
(ALMPs, LLL, social security protection, and flexible contractual arrangements), but the over-
arching goal of flexicurity to increase employment security is lost.  This has led to a shift of 
the EES from employment security to employability.  Finally, it is worth noting that Cyprus 
was excluded from the reporting procedure under the EES353 during the economic adjustment 
programme. This regulation of employment security in the era of European financial crisis, 
which might give the impression that economic interests could have been prioritized over 
employment and other social interests, will be analysed in more depth in chapter 6.  
 
352 BusinessEurope, ETUC/CES, UEAPME, CEEP ‘Framework Agreement for Inclusive Markets’ (25 March 
2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/2010againstpoverty/export/sites/default/downloads/Events/event_123_
Framework_agreement_ILM_25.03.10.pdf> accessed 23 May 2019.  
353 Regulation No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening 
of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L140/1, article 12. 
167 
 




Chapter 6 is focused on the case study of the Republic of Cyprus (‘Cyprus’).  This chapter 
identifies the strong capacity of the Cypriot legal system to self-regulate its own norms, while 
being cognitively open to learning from other transnational legal systems.  Cyprus, which 
proclaimed its independence on 16 August 1960 after the Zurich-London Agreements, became 
a Member State of the transnational legal systems that were discussed in the previous chapters:  
the UN (1960),1 the ILO (1960),2 the CoE (1961)3 and the EU (2004).4  The legal system of 
Cyprus, which is a common-law monistic system,5 is described as a ‘mixed legal system’.6  
This means that public law endorses civil law traditions, whereas private law is regulated 
through common law, reflecting the impact of the British colonial rule that lasted in Cyprus 
since 1960.7 
The reasons for choosing Cyprus as case study for this research project (which were previously 
set out in Chapter 1, p.2) are the following.  First, I have a strong personal bond with Cyprus 
as I originally come from Cyprus and I studied the Cypriot legal system during my 
undergraduate studies at University of Cyprus.  Second, I have a personal interest to gain an 
understanding of the contemporary implications on the Cypriot system – i.e. the 
conceptualization of employment security, the interaction of employment security with social 
security system, while evaluating to what extent the aim of the Cypriot legal system is shifted 
from employability to employment security.  In the process of collecting and analysing material 
 
1 London-Zurich Agreements of 1959 between the Governments of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom of  Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (adopted 19 February 1959); UN official website <http://www.un.org/en/member-
states/> accessed 27 July 2018. 
2 ILO official website, membership 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103070> accessed 
27 July 2018. 
3 Ratification Law 39/1962, access <http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/arith/1962_1_039.pdf> (available in Greek); 
Council of Europe official website, <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-
/conventions/chartSignature/3> accessed 13 July 2019.  
4 Fifth Amendment of 2006 (127(I)/2006) amended articles 1A, 11(2), 140, 169(3) and 179 of the Constitution, 
to facilitate the endorsement of EU legal framework at domestic level.   
5 Constitution of Cyprus of 6 April 1960, article 52; Even if the legal system of Cyprus is monistic, it requires 
ratification and publication of the ratification law in the Gazette (i.e. the official newspaper of the Government of 
Cyprus). 
6 Hatzimihail N., ‘Cyprus as a mixed legal system’ (2013) 6(1) Journal of Civil Law Studies 37, p.1. 
7 Ibid, p.2.  
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for this chapter, I faced a key challenge.  Cypriot primary legal instruments (including judicial 
decisions and laws) had to be translated from Greek (the language that were produced) to 
English language for the purpose of this study.  It seems that translating a legal document from 
one language to another is not an easy task because each legal system develops its unique legal 
language, which has a very distinctive quality. I have identified my translations and where there 
is no exact parallel in English. 
The economic crisis in Cyprus ‘was mainly a banking crisis’ as characterized by Gikas 
Hardouvelis and Ioannis Gkionis,8  however, it caused adverse and spill-over effects in the 
areas of employment and social security protection.  As Cyprus gradually and robustly exits its 
financial crisis,  the rate of unemployment fell sharply from 16.9% in October 2013 to 7.1% in 
February 2019.9  Whereas, the at-risk of poverty rate in Cyprus, which was slightly reduced 
from 28.9% in 2015,  remains steady at high levels, as the rate reached 25,1% in 2017.10  In 
this new post-crisis era, the Cypriot labour market is currently facing multiple challenges, 
which includes: unemployment and poverty (as discussed above); demographic changes due to 
very low fertility rates11 and sharp increase in the ageing population;12 the unresolved Cyprus 
dispute (also known as Cyprus conflict);13 and the migrant and refugee crisis.14  In Chapter 1 
(p.1), I posed the following question: how the transformation of Cypriot legal system can 
provide a sustainable recovery, ensuring that workers can swiftly make transitions in the labour 
market (that is, enter, remain or re-enter the labour market) without being exposed to the risk 
of unemployment and a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms and conditions of employment.  In this 
chapter, I will seek to understand to the preservation by Cypriot courts of job security and to 
what extent Cypriot government made a shift to employment security.  
 
8 Hardouvelis G. K. and Gkionis I., ‘A Decade Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus versus Greece’ (2016) 10(2) Cyprus 
Economic Policy Review 3, <https://www.ucy.ac.cy/erc/documents/Hardouvelis_Gkonis_3-40.pdf> accessed 9 
July 2019, p.11.  
9 Eurostat statistics, 
<https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z8o7pt6rd5uqa6_&met_y=unemployment_rate&idim=countr
y:cy:mt:el&fdim_y=seasonality:sa&hl=en&dl=en> accessed 9 July 2019. 
10 Eurostat official website, < <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/t2020_50/default/table?lang=en> 
accessed 9 July 2019.  
11 Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, ‘Woman in Cyprus in Figures’ (published 7 March 2017), < 
http://www.cystat.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/73F947E6E0470DD2C22580D80037BA90/$file/Woman
_in_CY-EN-070317.doc?OpenElement> accessed 13 July 2019.  
12 Eurostat official website, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_in_the_EU_-
_statistics_on_an_ageing_society> accessed 12 July 2019; Koutsampelas C., ‘Aspects of Elderly Poverty in 
Cyprus’ (2012) 6(1) Cyprus Economic Policy Review 69. 
13 See more details about Cyprus dispute at <http://www.uncyprustalks.org/> accessed 13 July 2019.  
14 See more details about the effects of migrant crisis in Cyprus at <https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-
content/uploads/sites/41/2019/05/Cyprus-Fact-Sheet_updated_MAY2019.pdf> accessed 13 July 2019. 
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This Chapter examines the legal regulatory framework that is applied in the areas that are 
effectively controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.  This means it does not cover the British 
Sovereign Areas (SBAs), which are governed by the UK,15 and the Turkish-occupied area, 
where the application of national laws (including EU acquis) is suspended.16  This suspension, 
which will be lifted after a solution of the so-called Cyprus dispute,  does not affect the rights 
of Turkish-Cypriots and enclaved Greek-Cypriots17 that reside in the Turkish-occupied area.   
Turkish-Cypriots and enclaved Greek-Cypriots are considered as national and EU citizens and 
they are eligible to enjoy the same rights with Greek-Cypriots or Turkish-Cypriots that reside 
in the non-occupied area. 
This chapter is composed of four core sections.  Section 6.2 sets the contextual framework for 
the Cypriot legal system, with focus on labour and social security regulation.  Section 6.2.1 
provides an outline of the sources of law, whereas section 6.2.2 provides a terminological 
analysis of the term ‘employee’ and ‘salaried worker’ as developed in the Cypriot context.   
Section 6.2.3 sets out an overview of the Economic Adjustment Programme and the Post-
Surveillance Programme, which were concluded between Cyprus and the so-called ‘Troika’ 
(IMF/EC/ECB).  Section 6.3 is focused on the forms of social dialogue at Cypriot level and the 
Industrial Relations Code.  Section 6.4 examines the regulation of employment security, which 
shows the strong Cypriot Courts’ approach over job security.  Section 6.5 provides insights on 
the Cypriot regulation of social security, which is composed of social insurance and social 
assistance.   
 
6.2 Cypriot legal system   
 
This section sets the contextual framework of the Cypriot legal system for the analysis that will 
be followed in the rest of Chapter 6.  Section 6.2.1 provides insights over the relevant 
 
15 Guarantee Treaty, United Kingdom Treaty Series No 4 (1961) Cmnd. 1252; Protocol 3 to the 2003 Act of 
Accession on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Treaty 
of Establishment and Guarantee (1960), which was signed between the UK, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to 
proclaim the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, established the British Sovereign Areas (SBAs) in Dhekelia 
and Akrotiri. 
16 Protocol 10 of the Treaty for the Accession, Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic 
of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and 
the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded [2003] OJ L236/955, article 1. 
17 See more details about enclaved Greek-Cypriots at 
<http://www.kypros.org/CyprusPanel/cyprus/enclaved.html> accessed 9 July 2019.  
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international, regional (European) and national sources of law, which regulate legal standards 
for employment security and social security at domestic level.  The second sub-section explores 
the concepts of ‘employee’, ‘worker’ and ‘independent contractor’ in the Cypriot context.  The 
reason of providing this terminological analysis is to gain a better understanding of the scope 
of workers, who are covered by the Cypriot labour law protection, which sometimes differs 
from the scope of individuals that are covered under social security protection.  As Achilles 
Emilianides and Christina Ioannou observed: ‘the relationship [of labour, welfare and social 
insurance] should not be overestimated; whereas … the structure of labour legislation is 
altogether different from welfare and social insurance legislation’.18  For example, the 
employment standards for public and semi-public employees are regulated by administrative 
law,  which is based on civil law traditions.  Whereas, labour protections for ‘employees’, a 
term that is defined on a case-by-case basis by the Cypriot Courts (as explained in section 
6.2.2), is governed by private law, which mainly endorses common-law principles.  Before the 
next section, I also outline the background framework of the financial crisis in Cyprus, with 
focus on the Economic Adjustment Programme (2013-2016) and the Post-Surveillance 
Programme (2016-onwards). 
6.2.1 Sources of law: employment security and social security  
 
This sub-section provides an overview of the sources of law, which regulate employment 
security and social security standards in the Cypriot regime.  The Cypriot labour legal standards 
are heavily based on English common law and equity principles, which are in conformity with 
the Constitution of Cyprus.19  These principles are used by the Cypriot Courts as a core source 
of law in judicial reasoning.20  Nevertheless, the strong desire of the Republic of Cyprus to 
become a Member State of the other transnational regulatory systems, whose binding legal 
treaties or agreements take precedence over the national laws,21 does not necessarily mean that 
Cyprus has ratified all ILO and CoE instruments that are related to this study (or implemented 
these).  For this purpose, this sub-section provides a brief overview of the adopted instruments.  
It is important to note that this sub-section does not refer to the EU hard-law instruments, which 
are extensively analysed in chapter 5 and sections 6.4 and 6.5.  The reason for this is because 
 
18 Emilianides A. and Ioannou C., Labour Law in Cyprus (Wolters Kluwer International: the Netherlands 2018), 
p.31.  
19 Constitution of Cyprus, article 29(1)(γ).  
20 For example, the Supreme Court of Cyprus (SCC) in Elbee Co. v. Efstathiou, adopted common law principles, 
that were developed by the UK Appeal Court in the Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd. v. Sharp case, to define the 
concept of ‘constructive dismissal’. 
21 Constitution of Cyprus, article 169. 
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when the Republic of Cyprus ratified the Treaty of Accession to the EU (2004), it has accepted 
to be bound by all EU binding legal acts (article 288 TFEU).22  
 
Constitution of Cyprus 
The Constitution of Cyprus of 1960 is the supreme law of Cyprus.23  Part II of the Constitution 
sets out an extensive list of fundamental rights and liberties, which contains foundational 
provisions (i.e. provisions that cannot be amended),24 that are related to this research study.  
Article 25 of the Constitution safeguards the right to practice any profession or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business.25  It is remarkable that the Constitution of Cyprus does not refer 
to ‘the right to work’, as safeguarded in the ICESCR and the ESC/RSC.  Instead, article 25 of 
the Constitution refers to the free choice of employment, which is a constituent part of the 
normative content of the right to work.  As Collins articulated, the right to work has an 
imprecise meaning and consists of many dimensions.26  It seems that article 25 of the 
Constitution includes the positive/negative duties of the State to ensure that the individual has 
‘the right to pursue an occupation of his or her choice without unjustified restrictions or 
discrimination’, which is also guaranteed in the EUCFR.27  However, it does not encompass 
other aspects of the right to work, such as the right to decent work, or the right to just conditions 
of employment.28  It is interesting that article 9 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right 
to social security, makes an explicit link of ‘decent existence’ (a concept strongly promoted by 
the ILO) and social security.29  In particular, article 9 safeguards the right to a decent existence 
and social security, which includes workers’ protection, assistance to the poor and social 
insurance system.30 
Article 28 of the Constitution further provides the right to equal treatment and protection before 
the law, which integrates the principle of equality as one of the core values that could converge 
transnational and national systems.  Article 28 includes the prohibition of direct or indirect 
discrimination on ‘grounds of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political or other 
 
22 TFEU, article 288; Treaty of Accession to the EU. 
23 Constitution of Cyprus, article 179. 
24 Ibid, article 182 and appendix.  
25 Constitution of Cyprus, article 25.  
26 Mantouvalou V. (ed), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017), pp.18-
19. 
27 Ibid, p.21 
28 Ibid, p.19. 
29 Constitution of Cyprus, article 9.  
30 Constitution of Cyprus, article 9.  
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convictions, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class, or on any ground’.31  
The open clause of ‘any ground’ leaves room for Cyprus to extend the prescribed list.  For 
example, discrimination in the grounds of age, sexual orientation and disability is prohibited 
by Law 205(I)/2002 (implementing Directive 2000/78).  Furthermore, since the Constitution 
based its foundations on the existence of two communities (Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
community),32 it safeguards the right to non-discrimination against any of ‘the two 
Communities, any person as person or by virtue for being member of one of the two 
Communities’(article 6 of the Constitution).33 
Last but not least, the Constitution safeguards rights that fall in the substantive provisions of 
the ECHR (articles 8-11), which could have implications on job security or social security 
standards as explained in chapter 4 (pp.81-86 and 92-94). 
 
Cyprus and UN/ILO instruments 
The Republic of Cyprus ratified the key UN human rights instruments that guarantee labour 
and social security rights (as discussed in chapter 3): ICESCR,34 CEDAW,35 CRPD,36 Optional 
Protocol of CRPD,37 and CERD.38  However, it has only ratified a limited number of the ILO 
Conventions and Protocols (i.e. fifty-seven ILO Conventions and four Protocols), of which 
only fifty-one Conventions are still in force.39  The ILO Conventions, which were ratified by 
the Republic of Cyprus, include: the eight fundamental ILO Conventions (e.g. ILO 
Discrimination Convention N.111,40 ILO Conventions N.8741 and N.9842 on the right to 
organize and freedom of association), the Termination of Employment Convention N.158,43 
 
31 Ibid, article 28.  
32 Ibid, article 2.  
33 Constitution of Cyprus, article 6.  
34 Law 14/1969 (ratified by Cyprus 2 April 1969). 
35 Law 78/1985 (accessed by Cyprus 23 July 1985).  
36 Law 8(III)/2011 (ratified by Cyprus 27 June 2011).  
37 Law 8(III)/2011 (ratified by Cyprus 3 May 2008).  
38 Laws 12/1967 and 28(III)/1999 (ratified by Cyprus 21 April 1967).  
39 ILO official website, 
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103070> 
accessed 13 July 2019.  
40 Law 3/1968 (ratified by Cyprus 2 February 1968). 
41 Law 17/1966 (ratified by Cyprus 24 May 1966). 
42 Law 18/1966 (ratified by Cyprus 24 May 1966) 
43 Law 45/1985 (ratified by Cyprus 5 July 1985). 
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ILO Convention N.102 and other specialized social security Conventions (ILO Conventions 
N.121 and N.128).44 
In other words, Cyprus showed its cognitively open nature by implementing the UN rights-
based framework to respect, protect and fulfil the right to work and the right to social security.  
Whereas, the Cypriot State appeared reluctant to adopt the normative content of these human 
rights as set in the ILO Conventions, reflecting its functionally closed nature.  This complex 
nature of the Cypriot system is especially illustrated in the social security context because: a) 
the Republic of Cyprus failed to ratify the whole text of ILO Convention N.102 in its entirety;45 
and b) the Republic of Cyprus only ratified Part IV of ILO Convention N.128, which means it 
did not ratify and increase the set of standards for old-age and invalidity benefits.46  
Nevertheless, this reluctance does not seem to have caused any impact on the relationship 
between the ILO and Cyprus.  As the current President of Cyprus, Mr. Nicos Anastasiades, 
stated in the ILO Centenary Conference (Geneva, June 2019): ‘the already excellent 
cooperation between Cyprus and the Organization significantly strengthened following the 
economic crisis in 2013 with the ILO offering invaluable technical assistance, particularly 
through the actuary valuation of our social insurance scheme and on the issue of national 
minimum wage’.47 
Cyprus and the CoE instruments   
The Republic of Cyprus ratified the ECHR (and its first Protocol),48 which mainly promotes 
civil and political rights, and the ESC49 and its revised version (RSC),50 which contain an 
extensive list of socio-economic rights.51  As Cyprus accepted discrete provisions of the 
ESC/RSC, this should create concerns as to: a) the indivisibility of rights and b) the cognitively 
closed nature of the Cypriot legal system to implement the ESC/RSC in its entirety (social and 
economic rights).  The provisions that the Republic of Cyprus failed to implement include: the 
 
44 Law 158/1991 (ratified by Cyprus 3 September 1991); Law 38/1966 (ratified by Cyprus 28 July 1966); Law 
125/1968 (ratified by Cyprus 7 January 1969). 
45 ILO Conventions (n.39).  
46 Ibid.  
47 ILO official website, <https://ilo.cetc.stream/2019/06/11/address-by-h-e-mr-nicos-anastasiades-president-of-
the-republic-of-cyprus/> accessed 13 July 2019, 10:10 – 10:42.  
48 Ratification Law 39/1962; Council of Europe official website, <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-
on-treaties/-/conventions/chartSignature/3> accessed 23 October 2018. The Treaty concerning the establishment 
of the Republic of Cyprus (16 August 1960), which was signed between the Governments of the UK, Greece, 
Turkey and Cyprus, set as an obligation for Cyprus to ratify the ECHR (1950) and the first Protocol (1952). Treaty 
concerning establishment of Cyprus, article 5. 
49 Laws 64/1967, 5/1975 and 203/1991 (ratified by Cyprus 7 March 1968). 
50 Law 27(III)/2000 and Law 17(III)/2011 (ratified by Cyprus 27 September 2000).  
51 Law 64/1967; Law 27(III)/2000. 
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right to dignity at work (article 21 RSC) and the right of workers with family responsibilities 
to enter, re-enter or remain in employment (article 27(1) RSC).52   
Nevertheless, the Republic of Cyprus accepted the Collective Complaints Procedure (CCP).53  
However, Cyprus did not deposit a declaration to the Secretary General of the CoE to entitle 
national NGOs to lodge a complaint under the ESC/RSC against the Republic of Cyprus.54  The 
non-deposition of a declaration could be one of the reasons that the ECSR had the chance to 
examine only two collective complaints against Cyprus, which dealt with the rights to work, 
equal pay and protection against the physical moral hazards (articles 1, 4 and 7 RSC 
respectively).55  
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), which is a key 
instrument for the promotion of minority rights, was also ratified by the Republic of Cyprus.56  
This Convention is related to this research project because it prohibits any discriminatory 
practice against members of national minorities (article 4) and enshrines the right of individuals 
that belong in a national minority, to participate in ‘economic life’ (article 15).57  Nevertheless, 
the Constitution of Cyprus does not use the term ‘national minority’.  Instead, it introduced two 
communities (Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot) and three religious groups (Armenians, 
Latins and Maronites), whose members belong to one of the two communities.58  However, 
this terminological gap could possibly cause problems for the members of the three religious 
groups, even if they ‘quite regularly [are] considered as minorities’.59   
 
6.2.2 Concepts of ‘employee’ and ‘salaried worker’  
 
This sub-section explores the meaning of ‘employee’ and ‘salaried worker’ in the Cypriot legal 
system.  Cypriot labour law is based on the relationship between employer and employee.  The 
 
52 CoE, ‘Cyprus and the European Social Charter’ (March 2019) <https://rm.coe.int/pdf/1680492884> accessed 
12 July 2019. 
53 Law 9(III)/96, which ratified the Additional Protocol to the ESC of 1997. 
54 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter providing for a System of Collective Complaints (9 
November 1995) ETS 158, article 2. 
55 University Women of Europe v. Cyprus (Complaint N.127/2016).  
56 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1 February 1995) ETS 157. 
57 Ibid, articles 4 and 5. 
58 Constitution of Cyprus, article 2. 
59 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Fourth Opinion 
on Cyprus adopted on 18 March 2015, 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680483
b48> accessed 11 July 2019, p.7. 
175 
 
term ‘employee’ (in Greek: ‘εργοδοτούμενος’) is defined in Law 24/67 as ‘the person that 
works for another physical or legal person (of public or private nature), either under a contract 
of employment or apprenticeship,60 or under such conditions from which an employment 
relationship may be inferred’.61  Law 104(I)/2000 (transposing Transfer of Undertakings EU 
Directive 2001/23) and Law 25(I)/2001 (transposing Insolvency EU Directive 2008/94) 
adopted the same definition of ‘employee’ as in Law 24/67.62  However, Law 25(I)/2001 does 
not include individuals that work for the Government of Cyprus.63   
Law 205(I)/2002 (on grounds of disability) and Law 58(I)/2004 (for grounds of religion or 
belief, age, sexual orientation, racial or ethnic origin), which transposed EU Equality Directives 
(2000/78 and 2000/43), adopted a broader definition of ‘employee’ – i.e. ‘any person who 
works or is trained in full-time or part-time occupation, fixed-term or permanent employment, 
continuous or otherwise, irrespective of the place of employment, including home employees 
but excluding self-employment’.64  It is interesting that the term ‘employee’ as defined in Law 
133(I)/2002 (transposing 2006/54) for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation takes 
the meaning of ‘salaried worker’ (in Greek: μισθωτός), which is defined in Social Insurance 
Law 59(I)/2010.65  ‘Salaried worker’ is broadly defined as ‘the person that is employed in an 
insurable employment’ and the concept of ‘employee’ appears as a constituent category of 
‘salaried worker’.66  The different types of ‘insurable employment’ are set out in the Annex I 
of Law 59(I)/2010.67  As Nicos Trimikliniotis and Corina Demetriou observed, the term 
‘salaried worker’ ‘follows the modern approach taken in Greece, i.e. someone who is paid a 
wage/salary (μισθός)  rather than the translation of the English εργοδοτούμενος, who is 
someone who is literally given work by the employer’.68   
 
60 The basic contract principles, as set in Contract Law C149, which include  
61 Law 24/1967, article 2; This definition also covers employee shareholders in a company (as defined in Company 
Law (Cap.113), who do not work under an employment contract but under such conditions from which an 
employment relationship may be inferred. 
62 Law 104(I)/2000, article 2; Law 25(I)/2001, article 2. 
63 Law 25(I)/2001, article 2. 
64 Law 127(I)/2000, article 2; translation from Trimiklionitis N. and Demetriou C. ‘The Concept of ‘Employee’: 
The Position in Cyprus’ in Waas B. and van Voss G.H. (eds) Restatement of Labour Law in Europe (Hart 
Publishing 2017), p.92. 
65 Law N.59(I)/2010, article 2.  
66 Law N.59(I)/2010, article 2. 
67 These types of insurable employment are set out in, which include: employees, clerks, employment of an 
imprisoned person, employment of a shareholder in a company, diplomats, vocational education and training 
schemes, a captain or crew member. 
68 Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (n.64), p.91. 
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The term ‘employee’ under Law 24/67 also covers individuals that work for public law bodies 
with legal personality or for public law organizations without legal entity.69  However, Law 
1/90,70 whose matters fall in the sphere of public law, provides a special regulation for 
recruitment, promotion, dismissals and posting of public employees.71  This means there is a 
key distinction between public (or semi-public permanent)72 employees and private 
employees.73  The labour protection for public employees falls in the scope of administrative 
law, which means: a) their employment rights are governed by administrative acts, using 
principles from civil law traditions; and b) the arising disputes are resolved by the 
Administrative Court of Cyprus (before 2015, the disputes at first instance were decided by the 
Constitutional Administrative Court (CAC)).74  Whereas, private employees’ protection falls 
in the scope of private labour law, which means that: a) their employment rights are governed 
by private law and common-law principles; and b) the arising disputes are resolved by the 
Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) and the Supreme Court of Cyprus (SCC).75  Nevertheless, 
there are specific matters (such as protection of the right to strike that is guaranteed in article 
27 of the Constitution of Cyprus), which even if they involve public or private employees, are 
always governed by public law because they entail State responsibility.76 
The domestic courts developed some tests to determine on a case-by-case basis the nature of 
employment relationship, which is not defined in domestic law (e.g. Law 24/67).  By applying 
these tests, the domestic courts seek to distinguish an employee that is working under a contract 
of employment, from an individual that works under a contract for service (as independent 
contractors).  These tests include two mandatory criteria, which shall always be met for the 
existence of employment relationship,77 and other auxiliary conditions (such as payment of 
salary by the employer to the employee).78  The two mandatory criteria consist of: a) the control 
test;79 and b) determining whether the employee agrees to perform a  service for employer’s 
 
69 Law 24/1967, article 2. 
70 Law 1/90 covers permanent, non-permanent and fixed-term employment (article 2 of Law 1/90).   
71 The regulation of 1/90 does not cover individuals that work ‘in the army or the security forces of the Republic’ 
(article 122 of Constitution of Cyprus). See article 122 of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus about the specific 
bodies that are included in or excluded from the term ‘public service’. 
72 Avraam v. The Republic [2008] 3 CLR.  
73 The distinction between public and private sphere is not always clear-cut. See Stelios Aristotelous v. Dimou 
Kato Polemidion, Yiorgos Araouzos v. Dimou Kato Polemidion (2008) 3 C.L.R. 124. 
74 Law 73(I)/2018. 
75 For Appeals. 
76 Emilianides and Ioannou (n.18), p.31.  
77 Tsapaco Catering Ltd v. Republic of Cyprus (1998) 3 C.L.R. 796. 
78 Theodoulou v. Aspis Pronoia Asfal. Et. Zois (1997) 1 C.L.R. 1551. 
79 See more about the control test in Emilianides and Ioannou (n.18), pp.32-34.  
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company (in Greek: ‘να παρέχει τις υπηρεσίες του’).80  It appears that the domestic courts 
followed the criteria/tests that were developed in the landmark English case of Market 
Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of Social Security, to distinguish a ‘contract of services’ from a 
‘contract for services’.81   
Nevertheless, independent contractors (who work under contract for service) could fall in 
Social Insurance Law 59(I)/2010 as part of the category of ‘self-employed workers’ (in Greek: 
‘αυτοτελώς εργαζόμενος’), which is a distinct category from ‘salaried workers’.82  As 
prescribed in Law 59(I)/2010, the term ‘self-employed worker’ is defined as ‘the person that 
works to make profit, who is also excluded from the categories of insurable employment in the 
Annex I of Law 59(I)/2010’.83  It is interesting that self-employed workers (as independent 
contractors), who are set in the foundations of Social Insurance Law 59(I)/2010, are not 
covered by all equality Cypriot laws that promote equal treatment in employment and 
occupation.  For example, they are covered under Equal Treatment between Men and Women 
Law 133(I)/2002, but, they are explicitly excluded from the rest of equality laws (Laws 
205(I)/2002, Law 58(I)/2004), which cover other discriminatory grounds (e.g. disability, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion and age).   
6.2.3 Cypriot Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) and Post-Programme 
Surveillance (PPS) 
 
This section sets the framework of the so-called ‘Cypriot economic crisis’, which was mainly 
treated from scholars as a financial, or banking crisis.84  This section deploys the argument that 
the Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) and Post-Programme Surveillance(PPS), which 
were agreed  between the Republic of Cyprus and the ECB/EC/IMF (‘Troika’ or 
‘Institutions’),85  are focused on competitiveness rather than on employment security and social 
security protection.  As the rates of unemployment and poverty reached record numbers during 
 
80 Theodoulou v. Aspis Pronia Life Insurance Company (1997) 1 C.L.R. 1551.  
81 Market Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of Social Security [1968] 3 All E.R. 
82 Law 59(I)/2010, article 2. 
83 Ibid, Table II, Part II. 
84 Zenios S., ‘The Cyprus Debt: Perfect Crisis and A Way Forward’ (2013) 7(1) Cyprus Economic Policy Review 
3 <https://www.ucy.ac.cy/erc/documents/Zenios_3-45.pdf> accessed 7 July 2019; Hardouvelis G. and Gkionis I., 
‘A Decade Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus versus Greece’ (2016) 10(2) Cyprus Economic Policy Review 3, p.16; 
Clerides S., ‘The Collapse of the Cypriot Banking System: A Bird’s Eye View’ (2014) (8)2 Cyprus Economic 
Policy Review 3, pp.3-35. 
85 European Commission, ‘The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus’ (Occasional Papers 149, March 
2013) <http://ec. europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp149_en.pdf> accessed 
13 July 2019 (EAP Cyprus). 
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the period of Cypriot crisis,86 it seems that the crisis had spill-over effects on labour and social 
security systems.  The analysis in this section is divided into two sub-sections: the Economic 
Adjustment Programme (2013-2016) and the Post-Programme Surveillance(2016-onwards).   
6.2.3.1 Cypriot Economic Adjustment Programme (2013-2016)  
 
In April 2013, the ‘Troika’ agreed an Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP)87 with the 
Government of Cyprus that was based on three pillars: firstly, to restructure the banking sector, 
secondly, to build a comprehensive fiscal consolidation plan, and thirdly, ‘to support 
competitiveness and sustainable balance’.88  The Cypriot crisis resulted from a series of events, 
such as: the blockage of Cyprus from access to international capital markets for two years 
(September 2011-September 2013);89 and the destruction of the island’s largest electricity 
producing plant (‘Vasilikos’) by a lethal explosion on 11 July 2011, whose restoration was 
estimated to cost between approximately 2.4 and 3 billion euros.90   
Since the Republic of Cyprus joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) and replaced 
its national currency (‘Cypriot Pounds’) with Euro currency, the Republic of Cyprus was 
eligible to request financial assistance under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).91  In 
June 2012, the Government of Cyprus submitted an official request to the President of 
Eurogroup asking for financial assistance from the ESM/European Stability Facility (ESF).92  
On 16 March 2013, the Eurogroup reached a political agreement, according to which the 
Government of Cyprus was committed to ‘introduce an upfront one-off stability levy applicable 
to resident and non-resident depositors, both insured and uninsured’ (also known as the 
‘haircut’).93   
The EAP is composed of four main documents, endorsing the IMF model: the Letter of Intent, 
the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, the 
 
86 See statistics about unemployment and poverty in Cyprus in nos.9 and 10.  
87 EAP Cyprus (n.85). 
88 Ibid, p.134. 
89 EAP Cyprus (n.85), p.39.  
90 EAP, 2013 (n.85); Kruse T., ‘Cyprus: The Troika’s new approach to resolving a financial crisis in a Eurozone 
member state’ in Magone J.M., Laffan B. and Schweiger C. (eds) Core-Periphery Relations in the European 
Union (Routledge 2016), p.194. 
91 ERM, ‘Communique’ between ERM II and the Government of Cyprus (Brussels, 29 April 2005) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication6159_en.pdf> accessed 27 July 2019; European 
Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro (Decision 2011/199), article 
1. 
92 ESM official website, < https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/cyprus> accessed 23 October 2018.   
93 EAP Cyprus (n.85), p.7.  
179 
 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and the Technical Memorandum 
of Understanding (TMU).  The Letter of Intent, which takes the form of unilateral expression 
of interest, was signed by the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Cyprus and the Governor 
of the Central Bank of Cyprus.94  
The Cypriot EAP, as a form of ESM financial assistance, was made subject to ‘strict 
conditionality’.95  As part of the 2013 EAP, Cyprus authorities committed to implement a series 
of policies and increase the efficiency of Cypriot economy.  The term ‘strict conditionality’ 
entails strict supervision of economic measures by the ‘Troika’, which means that the 
Government should set as its priority the economic policies (as part of the MoU) over other 
policies.  Even if the EAP was launched after an agreement between Cyprus and the Troika, 
Cyprus appeared weak towards negotiating labour standards as part of the package.  Singh 
noted that the stage of negotiations between ‘Troika’ and the Cypriot Governmental authorities 
could leave room for reaching an agreement that represents the interests of both sides.96  It 
seems that policies to tackle unemployment were used as methods to increase competitiveness 
of labour market, which could enable Cyprus to make a come-back to the international markets 
and enhance credibility of creditors.  In Pringle (C-370/12), the CJEU also emphasized the 
important role of strict conditionality in monitoring lending mechanisms.97  Even if the 
Commission Proposal 2013(233), which was further endorsed by the Council Decision 
2013/236, did mention that the Government of Cyprus shall take measures to minimize the 
impact of ‘underperformance of revenues or higher social spending needs’ on disadvantaged 
people, this provision cannot be translated as labour and social security protection.98  
The MoU also introduced a privatization plan for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), such as the 
Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC).99  This plan, which has not yet been enforced, would 
have an impact on the labour protection of employees because they would change from semi-
public, which fall in the category of public servants, to private employees.  This means they 
would be protected under labour law protections, rather than administrative law (for the 
distinction between labour law and administrative law, see section 6.2.2).100  The trade unions 
 
94 Ibid.  
95 TFEU, article 163(3). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General [2012] OJ C26/15, 
paras.136-137 and 142. 
98 Council Decision 2013/236/EU of 25 April 2013 addressed to Cyprus on specific measures to restore financial 
stability and sustainable growth [2013] OJ L 141/32 (not in force). 




(FPUEAE, SIDIDEK, SEPAIK) opposed this plan, which according to Troika aims to increase 
competitiveness.101  The trade unions asked Members of the Parliament of Cyprus to discuss 
the issue in the Economic Commission) (ΕΠΟΙΚ) as such a plan could lead employees exposed 
to job insecurity.102  The reasons that are laid behind the opposition of trade unions includes 
the fear that the employees will be exposed to the risk of risk of unemployment during the 
transitional period of privatization.  
The key question that arises is to what extent labour and social security standards were included 
in the scope of the EAP.  The Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality (‘MoU’), which was prepared by Troika, set out a series of fiscal-structural 
measures (also known as ‘austerity measures’) that had to be implemented at the domestic level 
by the Government of Cyprus.103  The disbursement of loan money was made in tranches and 
each tranche was conditional upon progress which was made by the Government of Cyprus in 
regard to the application of the MoU.  These austerity measures included, among others, cuts 
to social benefits and measures to activate employment.104  The MoU of 2013 noted that the 
Republic of Cyprus has ‘implemented permanent wage cuts applying to the broad public sector’ 
and ‘abolished and/or reduced a number overlapping benefits’ in order to achieve fiscal 
consolidation.105  The Governmental Authorities of Cyprus were also bound to take measures 
to increase the competitiveness level of the tourism industry, which is one of largest industries 
in Cyprus.106  
In the IMF/EC Monitoring Reports, the discussion shifted from labour protection to 
productivity and competitiveness.  According to article 2(10) of the EU Council Decision 
2013/236, the Republic of Cyprus shall improve labour productivity and give incentives ‘to 
take up work’.107  During the period 2013-2016, the Republic of Cyprus was also excluded 
from Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) to avoid duplication of standards.108  This 
could be translated as setting competitiveness as a priority over other aims.  
 
101 EAC official website, <https://www.eac.com.cy/EL/EAC/DocLib/110.pdf> accessed 13 July 2019, pp.15-18. 
102 Ibid. 
103 EAP Cyprus (n.85). 
104 IMF, ‘Cyprus: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum 
of Understanding’ (29 April 2013) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2013/cyp/042913.pdf> accessed 27 July 
2018, p.12, para.27. 
105 Ibid, p.11, para.22. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Council Decision 2013/236, article 2(10).  
108 CSR official website, ‘The country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the social field: An overview and 
(initial) comparison of the CSRs 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014: Stefan Clauwaert Background note, 
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6.2.3.2 Post-Programme Surveillance (2016-onwards)  
 
In March 2016, the Republic of Cyprus cancelled the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
arrangement and successfully exited the EU/IMF bail-out programme on the basis of reduction 
of the public deficit.109  However, since Cyprus has not managed to repay a minimum of 75% 
of the financial assistance received (ESM/IMF loans), it remains under Post-Programme 
Surveillance undertaken by the EC and the ECB (Post-Programme Surveillance, PPS), the IMF 
(Post-Programme Monitoring, PPM) and the ESM (Early Warning System, EWS).110  The  
mandate of the Post-Programme Surveillance (PPS/PPM/ESM) is to ensure that Cyprus will 
be capable to repay its outstanding loans to the lenders (ESM/IMF).  Under the PPS, the EC 
and the ECB assess the Cyprus’ economic, fiscal and financial situation on a regular basis.111  
The EC also prepares semi-annual reports and determines whether corrective measures are 
required to be adopted.112  Under the PPM (IMF’s Post-Programme Monitoring), the IMF 
undertakes consultations, basically on macroeconomic and structural policies, at least twice per 
year.113  The EC Reports flag up the main developments and current challenges that Cyprus is 
facing each semester.  For example, the 2018 EC Report stated that the Cypriot Parliament 
introduced the National Health Service (NHS) in the previous semester, which will be launched 
by 2020.114  In addition, the EC sets out the rates, which are important for describing the level 
of competitiveness in Cyprus.  For example, the 2018 Report stated that the rate of youth 
unemployment remains high as it reaches the rate of 40%.115  It further noted that the problem 
of youth unemployment will be solved through ALMPs and the creation of the casino, which 
will create a lot of job positions.116  The creation of casino as a method to tackle youth 
 
September 2013, < https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/document/file/2018-
06/Comparison_CSRs_in_the_social_field_2.pdf> accessed 23 October 2018, p.12. 
109 European Commission, ‘Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus’ Statements and Remarks 105/16 (7 March 2016) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/2013/03/pdf/Eurogroup-Statement-on-Cyprus(1)/> 
accessed 25 July 2018. 
110 Regulation No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening 
of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L140/1, article 14; EU Briefing: Cyprus' financial 
assistance programme (March 2016) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/574401/IPOL_BRI(2016)574401_EN.pdf> 
accessed 27 July 2018. 
111 EU Regulation 472/2013, article 14(3). 
112 Ibid. 
113 IMF Factsheet ‘Post-Program Monitoring’ (March 2016) <https://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/Sheets/ 
2016/08/02/21/48/Post-Program-Monitoring?pdf=1> accessed 27 July 2018. 
114 European Commission, Post-surveillance Adjustment Programme in Cyprus (January 2018), < 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip083_en.pdf> accessed 14 September 2018, p.31. 
115 Ibid, p.7. 
116 Ibid, pp.7-8. 
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unemployment does not seem a very convincing argument since it will create specific types of 
jobs, for which the young people might not have the acquired skills to get these job positions 
or the transferable skills afterwards to get others.  The 2018 Report also refers to the evaluation 
process of the ALMPs, which has just begun, which is important in terms of assessment as to 
whether there has been facilitation of workers back to employment.117  These EC Reports, 
which are brief and descriptive are not really a means of facilitating communication between 
Cyprus and EU.  They aim to narrowly describe the current economic situation, using graphs 
and tables, rather than reflecting the concerns felt by those living in Cyprus and in the Cypriot 
labour market.  
 
6.3 Social dialogue  
 
The Constitution of Cyprus enshrines the freedom of association (article 21) as a non-absolute 
right.  Article 21 of the Constitution integrates the restrictions from article 11 ECHR, however, 
it provides two additional restrictions.  Firstly, the freedom of association shall be in conformity 
with the constitutional order.118  Secondly, the national legislation can set restrictions for 
individuals who are employed in the Special Forces, police or coast guard.119   The Republic 
of Cyprus ratified ILO Convention N.98 of 1949, which enshrines the right to organise and the 
right to collective bargaining.120  The forms and content of social dialogue differs at national, 
sectoral and company level.  Industrial relations in Cyprus, which endorsed the concept of 
tripartism, shows that social actors (government, employers’ and trade unions) are determined 
to resolve their disputes in an amicable manner.  
The largest trade unions in Cyprus, which were registered through the procedures of Trade 
Union Law 71/1965, are the following: PEO, SEK, DEOK, POAS and POVEK (the largest 
trade union for self-employed workers).121  There is a long tradition of close relationships 
between trade unions and political parties, which might explain why the Parliament of Cyprus 
shows considerable willingness to inform and consult trade unions at national level.122  Since 
 
117 Ibid. 
118 Constitution of Cyprus, article 21(4). 
119 Ibid, article 21(5).  
120 Law 18/1966. 
121 Trade Unions Law 71/1965. 
122 Katsourides, Y. ‘Political parties and Trade unions in Cyprus’ (Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and 




Cyprus implemented Directive 2009/38, trade unions are also eligible to participate in 
European and domestic Works Councils.123  These regional and domestic social dialogue 
procedures can play a key role in facilitating the communication between systems at different 
levels.  An example is the 2016 Second-stage consultation of the social partners at European 
level under article 154 TFEU, in which the social actors from Cyprus informed the European 
social partners that Cyprus did not provide protection of paternal leave.  A year after taking 
advice through the EU consultations, Cyprus introduced the legal framework on paternal leave 
(Law 116(I)/2017).124  In other words, social actors could be described as ‘transmitters of 
information’ between systems.  In the era of economic crisis, social actors did not participate 
in the process of drafting and concluding MoUs, however, their role was recognized at the 
implementation process.125  For example, ‘Troika’ (IMF/EC/ECB) agreed to consult with 
social partners before adopting reforms on wage indexation and social welfare.126  Employers’ 
associations consist of the Cyprus Employers’ and Industrialists Federation (OEB) and the 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI).127  In March 2017, the OEB participated 
in the European Social Dialogue Committee, in which they discussed the reform of Social 
Security Regulation 883/2004.128  
The Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance has permanent tripartite social dialogue bodies, 
which deal with specific subjects.129  Examples of these bodies are: i) the Committee of 
Equality between men and women in occupation and vocational training, which acts as an 
advisory body in compliance with Directive 2006/54; and ii) the Committee of the Fund for 
the Protection of Employees' Rights in the Event of Insolvency of the Employer.  Before the 
Committees, the individuals can lodge complaints that are further examined by the Inspectors 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance Officers.  The reports that are prepared by the 
Inspectors seem to play a key role in the judicial procedure.130   
The Labour Advisory Board (LAB) is eligible to appoint a tripartite technical committee, which 
consists of representatives from government, trade unions and employers’ organizations, 
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before the adoption of a legislative proposal.131  It seems that the role of social partners in the 
LAB is not to be underestimated since LAB members are invited to participate in the 
discussions during preparation of legislative proposals.132  
The Industrial Relations Code (IRC) of 1977, which replaced the ‘Basic Agreement’ of 1962, 
regulates social dialogue at sectoral and company-level.133  The IRC constitutes a soft-law 
instrument (Gentlemen’s Agreement) and sets out the procedures for the settlement of disputes 
about interests, which consist of direct negotiations, mediation, arbitration and personal 
complaints.134  Despite the important role of IRC in regulating social dialogue procedures at 
enterprise and sectoral level, there are still two normative gaps in the IRC.  Firstly, it fails to 
describe how to distinguish social dialogue into three categories based on their content: 
‘bargainable’, ‘consultative’ and ‘prerogatives of management’.135  This terminological gap 
could cause normative problems because the employer is eligible to act unilaterally without 
consulting trade unions or employees for issues that fall in the category of ‘prerogatives of 
management’.136  Whereas, the employer is responsible to negotiate with employees’ 
representatives for ‘bargainable’ or ‘consultative’ matters.137  Even for ‘consultative’ matters, 
such as lay-offs and inter-changeability, the employer has the final say.138  Secondly, a violation 
of the IRC does not involve any legal sanctions.139  However, the obligation of employers to 
accept and recognize trade unions is enshrined in Law 55(I)/2012, which shows that despite 
the legal nature of IRC as soft-law, the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining 
are conceived as basic principles of the Cypriot labour system.140 
Article 26(2) of the Constitution of Cyprus provides that a law may provide for collective 
labour contracts of obligatory fulfilment by employers and workers with adequate protection 
of the rights of any person, whether or not represented at the conclusion of such contract.141  It 
seems that there is still a legislative gap because the Republic of Cyprus has not yet adopted 
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the appropriate legal framework as prescribed by article 26(2) of the Constitution to recognize 
the legal effect of collective agreements.  Emilianides and Ioannou articulated the view that, 
instead, the success of collective agreements rests on the strong willingness of social partners 
and the good faith of employers and trade unions.142  However, it does not seem very 
convincing to describe the reliance on collective agreements as successful.  Since the legal 
nature of collective agreements was not endorsed in an appropriate legal framework, as 
prescribed in article 26(2) of the Constitution, there is a notable deficit.  A collective agreement, 
which was not endorsed in domestic legislation, does not directly create legal rights and 
obligations for public employees, if it not implemented by the administrative bodies.143  In 
Stylson Engineering, the SCC discussing the hierarchy of collective agreements and other 
instruments, stated as obiter dictum that the norms of the employment contract are prioritized 
over those of collective agreements.144 
However, even if collective agreements give flexibility to interested actors to regulate matters 
and represent their interests, it appears that the texts of agreements are brief and general, 
without setting out the detailed norms.  For example, the 2012 Collective Agreement between 
PEO and SEPS just states that dismissal procedures for workers shall be in line with 
Termination of Employment Law 24/1967.145  The 2012 Collective Agreement reflects the 
provisions of IRC to regulate the procedures for termination of employment.  The IRC states 
that collective agreements shall also introduce provisions to regulate dismissals.146  In this 
context, the IRC introduces a provision on dismissal law, according to which employers shall 
inform social partners about the dismissal two months prior to termination of employment.147  
Christophorou et al. have observed that tripartite collective agreements have decreased 
flexibility of the Cypriot labour market.148  However, it cannot be underestimated that 
collective agreements are a useful means for resolving disputes and introducing labour and 
social security standards, which could reflect the interests of all parties.  For example, a 
tripartite collective agreement was concluded in 2017 to reactivate the cost of living allowance 
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(COLA), which was suspended during the EAP.149  The COLA is ‘a wage indexing system’ 
for public and private sector, which is regulated by collective agreements rather than a legal 
instrument, was primarily introduced by the British Colonial Government in 1940s.150  The 
COLA for public employees was suspended by Law 192(I)/2011 to reduce the costs, whereas 
the COLA for private employees was suspended in 2013.151  In 2017, social actors concluded 
a COLA agreement for public employees and another one for private employees to set the main 
standards for the period between 2018 and 2020 (i.e. setting out how COLA is calculated).  
This period was characterized between the social partners as a transitional period, since they 
aim to introduce a permanent wage index by the end of 2020.152    The reactivation of COLA 
in 2018 was embraced by all parties, since the employees receive an additional amount on their 
normal pay, because of the high cost of living.153  
 
6.4 Regulation of employment security 
 
This section examines the regulation of employment security.  The first sub-section discusses 
the Termination of Employment Law 24/67, which regulates individual dismissals, and 
provides three examples to show how the Cypriot Courts fiercely promote job security.     
Whereas, collective dismissals are regulated by Collective Redundancies Law 28(Ι)/2001, 
which implemented EU Directive 98/59.  The second sub-section examines the domestic 
(Cypriot) laws, which transposed EU Directives 92/85, 2000/43, 2000/78, 2006/54 and 
2010/18.  In this context, it seeks to examine to what extent the Cypriot legal system adopted 
a more inclusive approach over employment security, making a comparison with the other 
transnational labour regulatory systems.  
6.4.1 Termination of employment law 24/67 
 
The Termination of employment Law 24/67 is the first Cypriot hard-law instrument, which 
provides protection to workers against unfair or unlawful dismissals.  Law 24/67 endorsed the 
normative legal framework of ILO Convention N.158, which was ratified by the Republic of 
 
149 Eurofound, <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2017/cyprus-social-partners-agree-to-
reactivate-cost-of-living-allowance> accessed 13 July 2019.  
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance <http://www.oeb.org.cy/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018.pdf> 
accessed 13 July 2019. 
187 
 
Cyprus.154  For example, articles 5 and 6 of Law 24/67 set the same valid and non-valid grounds 
of dismissals as established ILO Convention N.158.155  The legitimate reasons for redundancy, 
which refers to individual dismissals under Law 24/67, could constitute valid reason of 
dismissal.  Law 25(I)/2001 (transposing EU Directive in the event of insolvency 2008/94)156 
and Law 104(Ι)/2000 on Transfer of Undertakings (implementing EU Directive 2001/23)157 
provide employment security protections in this spectrum, as illustrated in the analysis of 
section 5.3 on the EU Directives.158  
The primary aim of Law 24/67, as interpreted by the SCC Judge Pikis, ‘is the protection of 
employees from unilateral termination of employment as a social security measure’.159  This 
statement implies that job security protection is conceived as part of the broader social security 
context.  In addition, Judge Liatsos characterized Law 24/67 as a law of social content (in 
Greek: ‘νόμος κοινωνικού περιεχομένου’) that guarantees labour rights.160  This section, which 
is focused on Law 24/67, sets three examples to argue that the national courts have shown great 
sympathy to the interests of employees to remain in a specific job.  In this context, employment 
security as opposed to job security is almost non-existent. 
Example I: Conduct of employee  
The loss of trust and confidence in an employment relationship could constitute a just cause 
for termination of employment, according to article 6 of Law 24/67 .161  The Industrial Dispute 
Tribunal (IDT) and the Supreme Court of Cyprus (SCC), which integrated the reasonableness 
test,  adopted a strict stance over protection against dismissals for reasons related to an 
employee’s conduct.  The SCC has repeatedly and clearly stated that a decision for dismissal 
or instant dismissal (in Greek: ‘άμεση απόλυση’) shall be a measure of last recourse.162  The 
IDT, which stated that the employee’s conduct shall not cause any negative impact on the 
legitimate interests of the employer,163 followed the SCC’s logic in its judgments.  For example, 
in Stephanou Pitsillidi, the IDT held that, even if it has been proven that the cash shortage was 
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caused by the employee’s misconduct, the employer should have taken alternative measures 
(i.e. charge the employee and deduct the amount from employee’s pay), before taking the final 
decision to dismiss the applicant.164  
The Decree for recruitment in case of ‘manifestly illegal or unfair dismissal’ (in Greek: ‘έκδηλα 
παράνομη ή άδικη απόλυση’), could also be conceived as a job security measure, because it 
helps the applicant to return to the same job.165  Nevertheless, the ambiguous nature of the term, 
showed that the Courts very rarely order such Decrees.166  The notice of dismissal in this 
context, which shall be given within one month from the incident, 167  could act as a safety net 
for employees against unfair or unlawful dismissal.  The IDT held that a formal warning from 
the employer to the employee that his/her dismissal is a likely outcome, could create incentives 
for the employee to improve his conduct/performance.  Such warning could then, help the 
employee to take his/her actions and convince the employer not to take the decision for his/her 
dismissal.168  As illustrated in Pitsa Tseriotou, collective agreements can set higher standards 
for notice period.169  For example, the 2012 collective agreement, which was concluded 
between the Cyprus Hotel Association (CHA) and the trade unions of SEK and PEO, provides 
that the employer must double the period of notice between specific periods (1 July and 30 
September or 1 October and end of February).170  This is an example of strict job security 
protection, which could act as an impediment for swift transitions in the labour market.  
Example II: Redundancy    
The organizational changes of the company cannot always act as a valid reason for redundancy 
(article 5 Law 24/67), according to the Cypriot Courts that fiercely promote job security.171  
There are specific circumstances under which the employer is eligible to make an employee 
redundant, which means that the employee will be entitled to receive compensation from the 
Redundancy Fund.172  For example, in the case of Chrystallas Christodoulou, the applicant, 
who was employed as a hotel chambermaid, was dismissed due to operational changes in the 
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company.173  However, after the applicant’s dismissal, the employer recruited a seasonal 
worker to perform the working tasks that were previously undertaken by the applicant.174  The 
IDT held that the recruitment of the seasonal worker to replace the applicant’s position shows 
that the workload of the company was not reduced, which means that the dismissal of the 
applicant was not caused by the organizational changes of the company.175  The IDT, which 
applied the reasonableness test,176 based its reasoning on the SCC’s ruling according to which 
‘the modernization, or reorganization or any other change of the enterprise’ constitutes a valid 
reason for redundancy only if it leads to the reduction in the number of required employees as 
described in article 18(c) of Law 24/67.177   
Example III: return from sick leave 
Law 24/67, which endorsed the norms from ILO Convention N.158 (article 6), provides that 
dismissals are not lawful for reasons related to sick leave.  According to the IDT, when the 
employer fails to warn the employee, that his or her absence from work in sick leave, could 
cause his or her dismissal, the dismissal is unlawful because the employer did not give the 
opportunity to the employee to defend herself and explain the reasons of his or her absence.178  
This shows that Cypriot Courts conceive dismissal as a measure of last recourse and ask for 
employers to take other actions before taking the decision for dismissing an employee.  For 
example, in the case of Antonis Staphylides, the applicant was dismissed after his return from 
sick leave.179  His employer alleged that reason for dismissal was because the employee was 
absent from work for multiple periods.180  The IDT held that the employer shall get more 
information about the medical situation of his employee, but also to discuss the issue with him 
or his doctor before taking his final decision to dismiss him.181  
6.4.2 Non-discrimination, job security and employment security  
 
This section examines the domestic laws that promote equality in the context of employment 
security.  This analysis illustrates (as in the context of Law 24/67) the Cypriot Courts’ positive 
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approach over job security protections.  The analysis is focused on: a) Maternity law 
100(I)/1997 (transposing EU Directive 92/85), Equal Treatment between Men and Women 
Law 133(I)/2002 (transposing 2006/54) and Paternal Leave Law 116(I)/2017; and b) Parental 
Leave Law 47(I)/2012 (transposing Directive 2010/18).  There are also other Equality Laws 
58(I)/2004 (on grounds of religion or belief, age, sexual orientation, racial or ethnic origin) and 
205(I)/2002 (on disability grounds), which implemented Directives 2000/78 and 2000/43, that 
deal with equality, job security and employment security (see further on the analysis of Equality 
Directives in section 5.2).  Before looking at hard-law, it is important to note that matters 
regarding employment security and equality could also be examined through soft-law 
procedures by the Commissioner for Administration and Protection of Human Rights 
(Ombudsman), which could take various forms such as, positions, interventions, reports and 
consultation papers.182  
6.4.2.1 Maternity Law 100(I)/1997, Equal Treatment between Men and Women Law 
133(I)/2002 and Paternity Protection Law 117(I)/2017  
 
Law 100(I)/1997, which implemented EU Council Directive 92/85, prohibits dismissals of 
biological mothers, mothers of adopted children and surrogate mothers (article 4(1)(a) of Law 
100(I)/1997).183  The period of prohibition for dismissal of biological mother lasts from 
pregnancy up to five months from the date that maternity leave ends, whereas the period for 
mothers with an adopted child lasts from the date of adoption up to three months after the date 
that maternity leave ends.184  In the situation of mother, who has a child through surrogate 
arrangements, the period starts two weeks before the surrogate mother gives birth and ends 
fourteen weeks after the birth.185  
The prohibition for dismissal of surrogate mothers, which was recently introduced by Law 
116(I)/2017, sets a broader scope of protection from EU Directive 92/85, which solely focuses 
on mothers of biological and adopted children.  The female workers, who are covered by the 
Law 100(I)/1997, are also eligible to request flexible working arrangements for a nine-month 
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period after the date of birth or the date of adoption.186  These flexible working time 
arrangements consist of an hour daily break or the eligibility to arrive an hour later or leave 
from work an hour earlier.187  Among the flexible arrangements, female workers, who are 
protected under Law 100(I)/1997, are eligible to ask for medical leave for pre-natal testing.188 
The prohibition for dismissal also covers male workers, who would like to exercise their right 
to paternal leave as set out in Law 117(I)/2017.  In this context, it is important to note that the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus (SCC) declared Paternity Law (Amending) of 2018 (Law 
117(I)/2017), which was extending the scope of protection for paternity leave and allowance 
to unmarried fathers, as unconstitutional.189  In the President of Republic v. House of 
Parliament case (2019), the SCC explained that: a) the EU law does not create binding 
obligations according to which the Member States shall include unmarried fathers in the scope 
of protection and b) it is profound that the Law increases the budgetary cost of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  For this reason, it excluded unmarried fathers from the scope of protection.  
Nevertheless, the period for paternal leave lasts only for two weeks and can be exercised within 
a specific period, which begins from the date of confinement and ends up to 16 weeks after the 
date of confinement or adoption.190   It is notable that a male worker, who is covered by Law 
116(I)/2017, is not entitled to similar flexible working time arrangements as a female worker, 
who is covered by Law 100(I)/1997.   
The approach of the IDT towards job security protection for pregnant workers and mothers in 
the times of economic crisis reflects the promotion of social justice as established in the 
regional and international human rights related instruments.  In Eleni Diamantidou, the IDT 
examined whether the termination of employment was fair.  In the present case, the plaintiff 
claimed that she was dismissed after she notified her employer that she was pregnant.191  The 
defendant, who claimed that the reason of dismissal was not related to pregnancy and maternity 
reasons, took the decision to dismiss Mrs. Diamantidou because she was regularly 10-15 
minutes late for work.192  However, the IDT decided that the dismissal was unfair due to the 
following reasons: a) even if the employee was regularly late for work, she also stayed to 
complete the required working hours, b) the employer did not dismiss another employee, who 
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was also regularly late for work and c) the new employee, who was recruited to replace Mrs. 
Diamantidou, was recruited to replace a pregnant worker.193  The IDT finally held that the 
regular delay of the employee for work was used by the employer as an excuse to dismiss the 
plaintiff because she got pregnant.194  The employer, on whom the burden of proof lay, failed 
to prove that the dismissal was not due to maternity and pregnancy reasons.195  The IDT further 
held that the termination of employment for reasons related to sex (equality between men and 
women), which is prohibited by EU Directive 2006/54.196  
According to article 4(1)(a) of Law 100(I)/1997, the female worker is protected under Law 
100(I)/1997 only if the worker informs her employer in writing of her pregnancy.197  The 
employer may also ask for a medical certificate, which confirms the predicted date of birth.198   
In the case where the employee is pregnant at the time of dismissal or notice for dismissal, the 
employer is obliged to cease its decision for dismissal if the employee gives to her employer a 
medical certificate to confirm her pregnancy within five days from the date of dismissal or 
notice for dismissal.199  Nevertheless, the IDT as shown in the following cases adopted a more 
flexible approach over the technical criteria to ensure job security of workers, who are protected 
under Law 100(I)/1997.  In Margharita Mavrommati, the plaintiff dismissed the applicant 
without notice four days after she orally informed her employer that she was pregnant.200  The 
plaintiff alleged that the reason for dismissal was because the applicant was recruited for a 
probation period and ‘failed to meet the plaintiff’s expectations’ (in Greek: ‘δεν είχε 
ανταποκριθεί στις προσδοκίες τους’).201  Τhe IDT did not accept the plaintiff’s allegations and 
stated that any dismissal for reasons related to maternity or pregnancy are not in line with the 
social aim of EU and domestic labour law.202  
The plaintiff’s allegations do however illustrate the weak protection of Law 24/67 for newer 
workers.203  To explain, Law 24/67 provides the right to compensation for employees, who 
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employers can dismiss an employee who has not completed the required period of 26 weeks 
and recruit another employee replacing the dismissed employee, leaving unprotected those 
individuals who seek to transition from unemployment to employment.  However, employees, 
who are covered by Law 100(I)/97, are entitled to the right of compensation as described in 
Law 24/67 and Law 133(I)/2002 even if they have not completed 26 weeks of employment.205  
Apart from protecting female employees against dismissal, Law 100(I)/1997 also stipulates 
that employees, who are protected under the Law, are also entitled to return to the same job 
position or another job position, which shall be equivalent (i.e. same level of income and 
similar nature of job), after maternity leave.206  This provision, which promotes employment 
security as it facilitates the transition from one job position to another, is also enshrined in 
Paternity Leave Law 117(Ι)/2017.207  In Nina Magdalide, the plaintiff (employer) called the 
applicant (employee) a few days before the end of her maternity leave to tell her that she was 
dismissed.208  After the applicant lodged a complaint before the Labour Office, the plaintiff 
asked her to return, however, the applicant refused to do so and lodged a case before the IDT.209   
The IDT held that the dismissal was unfair, and the employee was entitled to refuse to go back 
to work after she has been dismissed.210  
6.4.2.2 Parental Leave Law 47(I)/2012  
 
Parental Leave Law 47(I)/2012, which implemented EU Council Directive 2010/18, replaced 
Law 69(I)/2002.211  According to article 9(a) of Law 47(I)/2012, the aim of parental leave is 
for care and nurture of children.  This provision illustrates that the influence of EU, which 
promotes parental responsibilities, is stronger than the impact of ILO Convention N.156 that 
introduces the wider scope of ‘family responsibilities’.  However, after the new Directive on 
Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers, which has not been implemented yet at domestic 
level, it seems that both Cyprus and the EU have learned from the ILO.  The protection under 
Law 47(I)/2012 covers workers for a period of eighteen weeks, who are parents with children 
up to eight years old.  In case of a widowed parent, the period of parental leave may last up to 
twenty-three months.212  If the child is disabled, then the parent is entitled to take parental leave 
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up to the age of 18, whereas if the child is adopted then the parent is entitled to take up to the 
point his/her child reaches the age of 12.213  
The employer is also not allowed to dismiss an employee during this period of parental leave, 
which shows the social aspect of EU law as transposed in the domestic context.214  The worker 
is also eligible to request working time and organizational flexible arrangements after the end 
of parental leave for a specific period of time.215  Law 47(I)/2012 states that the worker is 
entitled to return to the same or equivalent job position after the end of parental leave, however, 
Law 47(I)/2012 fails to define the term ‘equivalent’.216   
 
6.5 Regulation of social security system  
 
Social security is recognized as a fundamental right in the Constitution of Cyprus, which 
includes social insurance, labour protection and assistance to the poor.217  The term ‘social 
security’ (in Greek: ‘κοινωνική ασφάλεια’) was initially introduced in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (article 22).  Many legal scholars attempted to define the concept 
of social security that historically emerged after the introduction of social insurance schemes.  
For example, Sinfield defined social security as ‘a state of complete protection against the loss 
of resources’.218  Another definition of the term was developed by Berghman, who described 
social security as ‘a situation of complete protection against human loss’.219   Angelos Stergiou 
characterized social security as ‘a wider and evolutionary superior scheme to social 
insurance’.220  
The recognition of social security is a response to ‘human vulnerability’, which is at the heart 
of human rights, and promote the principle of human dignity.221  The close link of social 
security and human dignity is reflected in article 9 of the Constitution of Cyprus, which 
enshrines both, the right to human dignity and social security.222  The main purpose of social 
security system is to provide income security to workers and their families when there are 
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interruptions of income, whether short-term (e.g. sickness or disability) or longer-term periods 
of interruption (such as unemployment or employment injury).  These interruptions occur 
because of socio-economic changes in the post-industrial society, which create new social 
risks.  The term ‘social risk’ is defined by Patrina Paparrigopoulou-Pechlivanides, a Greek 
labour law scholar, as ‘a future and uncertain event, occurring despite the human being’s 
willingness, which causes loss and creates needs’.223  The concept of social security embraces 
the principle of comprehensiveness, which means that social security system shall provide 
comprehensive protection against all social risks (also known as ‘contingencies’ at ILO level), 
which may threaten income security and dignity.224  
There are two main systems of social security that set the foundations for the development of 
national social security systems across the globe: the Bismarck and Beveridge models, the latter 
being discussed in the context of ILO Convention No. 102 above.  Danny Pieters observed that 
it is common for States to converge the features of these two models, creating an amalgam of 
social security system.225  Before examining the Cypriot social insurance model, it is important 
to understand the core characteristics of the two core systems.   The Bismarck model was 
developed by Otto van Bismarck, who was the Prime Minister of Proussia, and created a 
centralized and unified system to protect all economically weak groups.226  The main 
characteristics of the Bismarck system are the following: the insured persons are employees or 
gainfully employed, the contributions are based on salaries and the financing is via 
contributions.227  
The Beveridge Plan (Report ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services) was drafted by Lord 
William Beveridge in 1942, who was recruited by the British Government to restructure the 
UK welfare system.228  The Beveridge Plan is also known as the system of 3U: Unity, 
Uniformity and Universality.229  The plan included the establishment of the National Health 
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System (NHS), which provides medical treatment for all.230  The main characteristics of the 
Beveridge Plan are the following: the scheme includes the entire population, the State budget 
constitutes the main source of funding and the individuals are called for uniform and lump-sum 
contributions.231  It could be concluded that Beveridge embraced the principle of human dignity 
as its plan provided a minimum standard of decent living.  
Social security protection in Cyprus uses two ‘techniques’: social insurance (in Greek: 
‘ασφάλιση) and social assistance (in Greek: ‘κοινωνική παροχή’).232  The difference between 
these two techniques is clear.  When there is a social risk, the individual is entitled to social 
insurance benefit, without applying a means test – in other words, without checking whether 
the individual actual needed the entitlement.233  Whereas, the entitlement to social assistance 
benefit is depended on a means test.234  Social assistance is defined by Vladimir Rys as ‘any 
action of public authorities designed to help the destitute citizen’.235  Historically, social 
assistance emerged from ancient ages (800-500 B.C.), when rulers of City-States in Ancient 
Greece distributed money and food to gain votes as a form of social assistance.236  
Cypriot governmental authorities could be characterized as the key actor for social security 
protection, because social security is tightly depended on public resources (funds).237  Even if 
social insurance also entails contribution from other actors (i.e. employers/employees), social 
welfare systems are entirely dependent on the public budget.  Due to social risks, the social 
security system should aim to provide income security to ensure that individuals would be able 
to enter, remain or re-enter labour market.  
In the post-crisis era, the allocation of public funds for social security becomes an issue since 
there is an increased pressure on public resources.  For this reason, the influence of the 2013 
MoU has a direct effect to social security system because Troika introduced measures to curtail 
the public expenditure – for example, to minimize the public health expenses.  Cyprus was 
characterized as the State that devotes a low share of resources to the health sector and relies 
heavily on private out-of-pocket expenditure to finance health care services, compared to the 
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rest of EU Member States.238  The introduction of the NHS will avoid this pressure that is put 
on the public budget, by enabling the Government to coordinate the public and private systems.   
The 2013 MoU set as a condition for the first tranche of loan that the Government of Cyprus 
shall reduce the health expenditure and introduce the NHS in stages.239  The Cypriot health 
system was shifted from Social Security Health System (SSH) to National Health System (NHS 
or GESY), which was launched on 1st of July 2019.240  In practical terms, this means that all 
workers will have to contribute to the health system. 
6.5.1 Social Insurance Law 59(I)/2010 
 
The Cypriot social insurance system is currently regulated by Insurance Law 59(I)/2010.  
However, the primary Cypriot instrument for social insurance regulation was Chapter 354 of 
1959 that responded to the following social risks: marriage, sickness, maternity, 
unemployment, invalidity and old-age.241  Social insurance legislation was amended multiple 
times after Chapter 354 and addressed new social risks, including single-parenthood benefit, 
child benefit, paternal benefit and surrogate mother as part of maternity benefit.  In particular, 
Social Insurance Law covers the following social risks that are related to this research project: 
unemployment benefit; maternity allowance; maternity grant; sickness benefit, employment 
injury benefit (which includes injury benefit and disability benefit).242   
The social insurance scheme is developed to correct inter alia the gap of private insurance.  
The distinction between social insurance and private insurance is that the rules of social 
insurance are introduced by law, whereas the rules of private insurance are agreed in 
contractual agreements.243  According to Angelos Stergiou, private insurance is not addressed 
to low-income workers, which means private insurance widens income inequality and increases 
the gap between rich and poor.244 
The old-regime of social insurance (i.e. before 1980) was solely based on a flat-rate of 
compulsory contribution.245 However, the current Social Insurance Scheme, which was 
introduced in 1980, is based on two parts: the flat-rate scheme (which also constituted the old-
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regime of social insurance prior to 1980) and the supplementary earnings-related 
contributions.246  The Social Insurance Act 59(I)/2010 set a gradual increase of compulsory 
contributions – e.g. 20.2% in 2014 to 26.7% in 2039.247  A key distinction remains as to the 
percentage of compulsory contribution between the categories of workers.  In 2017, the 
‘salaried worker’ and his employer shall contribute 7.8% of the salary and the State shall 
contribute 4.6% of the salary.248  Whereas, the self-employed worker shall contribute 14,6% 
and the State shall contribute 4.6% of his income.249  
The Social Insurance Scheme of Law 59(I)/2010 covers all workers, embracing the principle 
of universality, which constitutes one of the core features of the Beveridge system. The 
Administrative Authority (in Greek: ‘Διοίκηση’) has the discretion to classify the applicant for 
social insurance into three categories: ‘salaried worker’, ‘self-employed worker’ or ‘optionally 
insurance person’.250  The category of ‘salaried workers’ might refer to the broad concept of 
‘employees’, however, Law 59(I)/2010 explicitly explains which types of ‘employees’ fall into 
this category, including: public, semi-public and private employees, workers falling under EU 
Regulation 883/2004 and participants in ALMPs of Law 125(I)/1999.251  The main principle 
of social insurance scheme, which seems as a measure to minimize the public expenditures, is 
the right to no more than one benefit.  This means that if the beneficiary is eligible for two or 
more benefits (e.g. employment injury and maternity), then he will only receive the benefit 
with the higher rate. 
There is a distinction of rights and responsibilities based on the category of the individual as 
set in Law 59(I)/2010.  The ‘salaried workers’ and ‘optionally insured people’ are entitled to 
access all social insurance benefits, which are provided in Law 59(I)/2010.252  Whereas ‘self-
employed workers’ are not entitled to receive unemployment and employment injury 
benefits.253  The ‘optionally insured person’ (in Greek: προαιρετικά ασφαλισμένος του 
εσωτερικού) means the person that opted to stop working before the beginning of his 
pensionable year and he is willing to continue to pay contributions to secure his pension 
rights.254  The ‘optionally insured person working abroad’ (in Greek: ‘προαιρετικά 
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ασφαλισμένος εξωτερικού’) is only entitled to the social grants (i.e. birth grant and funeral 
grant).255  The idea of accessing different benefits based on the classification of the worker into 
a category deviates from the universal coverage for social protection for all, which is fiercely 
promoted by the human rights institutions (ILO and CoE).  
It appears that the distinction between ‘salaried worker’ and ‘self-employed worker’ creates 
problems.  The Supreme Constitutional Court under article 146 of Constitution of Cyprus has 
the exclusive jurisdiction to examine any application that deals with actions or omissions that 
are ‘made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in the Administrative authorities (i.e. the 
Department of Social Insurance).256  The Constitutional Administrative Court (CAC) shall: 
confirm the act or omission; declare it null and void and no effect or whatsoever; or request the 
omission to be performed.257  The CAC had to decide in multiple cases whether the 
administrative bodies had acted properly, however the CAC is not entitled to decide on the 
merits of the case – i.e. who is employee.  In Tritonia Developers, the applicant claimed that 
the Department of Social Insurance wrongly categorized him as ‘salaried worker’ as described 
in Law 59(I)/2010, because the applicant inter alia did not receive 13th salary and did not pay 
any contributions as the rest of her employers.258  Whereas, the Manager of the Department 
claimed that the applicant was rendered as ‘salaried worker’ because he was receiving a fixed 
monthly salary, he had a fixed working time schedule and his performance was supervised by 
the Director.259  The CAC held that thee Administrative Body acted properly and collected all 
the necessary evidence, which prove why the applicant was considered as a ‘salaried 
worker’.260  The fact that the CAC referred to the Prousi judgment, in which the Supreme Court 
discussed the concept of employee, illustrates the cognitively open feature of social security 
system.261  The definition of employee and the required tests were developed by the Cypriot 
labour system. However, the social security system, in a process of self-reflection, adjusted the 
definition of employee in its context.  
However, this communication between the systems, in which social security system uses a 
concept (the concept of employee) as developed in the employment security system, is not 
consistent because in A/FOI Papalazarou Ltd., the CAC did not refer to the definition of 
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employee as set in Prousi.  Instead, the CAC examined the allegations of the applicant, who 
claimed that the Administrative authorities should have categorized him as ‘a salaried worker’, 
since he was supervising the rest of employees.262  In other words, it appears that the CAC, 
which held that the Administrative authority omitted to collect all the appropriate evidence 
before categorizing the worker as ‘self-employed worker’, acts only within the limits of its 
discretionary power.263  
There are cases where the Administrative Authority of Social Insurance Fund failed to 
categorize the worker properly as a ‘salaried worker’.  Such cases could create two problems: 
firstly, the employer-the employee or the self-employed worker will not pay the appropriate 
contributions holding them criminally liable; and secondly, the worker, who was mistakenly 
considered as a self-employed worker will be excluded from unemployment and employment 
injury benefits.  It appears that even the CAC, which is competent to decide on cases on social 
security law as they fall into the scope of administrative law, has jurisdiction to annul an action 
of the Social Insurance Department, the IDT has no competence over social security disputes, 
which may also affect employment security norms.  In Stephanis Antoniou, the applicant was 
working as aesthetician (beautician) for Christiana Aristidou, who announced her dismissal 
over the phone without notice.264  After her dismissal, the applicant lodged an application for 
unemployment benefit before the District Labour Office, where they informed her that her 
employer was Dremasol Enterprises, who did not pay the obligatory contributions to the Social 
Insurance Fund.265  The IDT held that it has no competence to issue an Order, according to 
which the employer would be obliged to pay the required contributions to the Social Insurance 
Fund or pay the amount of unemployment benefits that the applicant did not receive because 
her employer failed to sign the required documents by the Social Insurance Fund, so that the 
applicant would have been able to receive the appropriate unemployment benefit.266  This 
shows that the two autopoietic systems, which  developed divergent judicial procedures, set 
the boundaries of their competence, illustrating that they are not enough cognitively open.  
The fact that a self-employed worker is not entitled to receive unemployment benefits 
according to Law 59(I)/2010, means that the self-employed person, who does not gain an 
adequate amount of wages, might not be able to pay the compulsory contributions, which is 
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quite a large percentage (14% of his earnings).  Since the failure to pay the contributions could 
hold the individual criminally liable, as laid in the Cypriot Criminal Code (Chapter 154), the 
worker might choose one of the options: to find another job as self-employed, or to stop being 
self-employed and either to make a transition from self-employed to salaried worker or remain 
as unemployed person if it is not possible to find another job.267  Educational benefits and 
ALMPs could play a key role at this point to enable the worker to remain in the labour market, 
illustrating that social security requires a mixture of techniques (social assistance and social 
insurance).  In Cyprus, the educational benefit, which is a type of benefits that is not regulated 
at the other systems (ILO, EU, CoE), appears as student grant (in Greek: ‘φοιτητική χορηγία) 
that is tightly linked to the status of ‘full-time or part-time student’, but it excludes distant 
learning and language learning programmes.268 
The unemployment benefit, which acts as a safety net and facilitates the transitions of workers 
in the labour market, only lasts for a period of 156 working days for each interruption of 
employment.269  This provision is in line with ILO Convention N.102 that refers to ‘qualified 
period’, however, the Convention fails to describe this term or set minimum standards.270  This 
means the system forces the individual to return to labour market and accept any job offer made 
by the Human Resource Development Authority (HRDA).  The question that arises is to what 
extent these job offers of HRDA enable the individual to make the transition from 
unemployment to employment or creates a vicious cycle, which entail the following sequence: 
unemployment-HRDA programme-return to unemployment.  The current schemes (of 2019) 
by the HRDA are addressed to people: who are entering the labour market for the first time, 
who are long-term unemployed (i.e. job-seekers for more than a year), who are holders of the 
Minimum Guaranteed Income or graduates from tertiary education.271  However, none of these 
programmes set an obligation for the employer to recruit the individual after the end of the 
schemes, which lasts between 3-12 months.272 
According to Vys, ‘the difficulty of integrating social and economic policies depends to a large 
extent on the state of the socioeconomic well-being of society’.273  This seems correct because 
the realization of Cypriot ALMPs (i.e. the Schemes Developed by the HRDA) as soft-law 
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processes, is tightly depended on the public budget, which means the ALPMs take the form of 
re-regulation.  Since the regulatory framework of systems is confronted by social prejudices – 
e.g. the older workers are not productive enough, soft-law policies aim to mediate this 
normative gap.  The main source of funding of ALMPs for the period 2014-2020 is the 
European Stability Finance (ESF).  In the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Cypriot ‘Employment, 
Human Resources and Social Cohesion Programme’, which entails investment of more than 
163 million euros, aims inter alia to improve Public Employment Services (PES) and 
employment opportunities.274 
The system adopted protective measures to reduce the risk of facilitating transition from 
employment to inactivity, since there is an imminent risk as there is no minimum income for 
all occupations.  The eligibility for Minimum Guaranteed Income (MGI) requires registration 
of the individual as unemployed in the PES, acceptance of any job proposed by the HRDA that 
can perform and non-voluntarily termination of his employment.  The MGI was introduced by 
Law 109(I)/2014 as part of the 2013 MoU measures to decrease the rate of poverty.275  Even if 
the MGI does not play any key role for facilitating transitions from job to job, it acts as a barrier 
for transition from unemployment to inactivity, the MGI requires the beneficiaries to act as 
job-seekers and take part into ALMPs.  Apart from MGI, Law 95(I)/2006 on social assistance 
excludes from the scope of protection the people that choose to remain inactive.276   
Employment Injury  
The employment injury benefits are divided into three categories: temporary incapacity benefit 
that covers a 12-month period, disability pension or grant and death grant.277  There are no 
conditions to be met for granting the employment injury benefits, apart from the following: the 
accident occurred in the workplace or in transit to/from workplace and occurred within the 
working hours; or he suffered from an occupational disease.278  In accordance with ILO 
Convention N.121, Cyprus adopted the Regulation 4437 of 2010 to set out the occupational 
diseases and the types of injuries that fall in the scope of Law 59(I)/2010.279  The 
Administrative Authority decides whether the applicant is eligible for disability grant or 
pension based on the degree of disability.  Disability grant is paid to applicants with 10-19% 
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of disability.280  Whereas disability pension is granted to the applicants with disability degree 
between 20-100%.281  The full amount of pension is payable to beneficiaries with 100% 
disability, whereas when the disability degree is less than 100%, the amount is proportional to 
the actual degree of disability.282   
As prima facie these norms seem to be clear and promote the right to social security benefits 
in case of employment injury, as enshrined in ILO Convention N.121, the ESC/RSC and the 
EU Framework Directive 2000/78.  Instead, these norms entail practical complexities as the 
entitlement of the grant or pension and the amount of the benefit is tightly depended on the 
disability degree that is at the discretion of the Insurance Fund Authorities.  ILO Convention 
N.159, which was also ratified by Cyprus, describes the disabled person as ‘an individual 
whose prospects of securing, retaining and advancing in suitable employment are substantially 
reduced as a result of a duly recognised physical or mental impairment’, however, it does not 
deal with disability degrees.283  In this context, the CAC dealt with many cases, in which the 
Administrative Authorities cut the grant of benefits because the applicants did not satisfy the 
conditions.284  
Maternity benefit and maternity allowance  
The maternity allowance as described in Law 59(I)/2010, is payable to an insured person within 
the period of absence from employment (i.e. 18 weeks or an additional week for every 21 days 
if the infant is hospitalised).285  Law 59(I)/2010 embraces the principle of universality, as 
reflected in ILO Convention and ESC/RSC, since it covers all mothers (i.e. biological mothers, 
mothers with an adopted child and surrogate mothers).286  This means the domestic system 
goes a step beyond the EU, which does not cover infants through surrogate arrangements as 
illustrated in Z. (C-363/12) and C.D. (C-167/12) (for further analysis, see chapter 5).  Similarly, 
the maternity benefit, whose amount is 6% of the wages, is granted to any mother if the 
applicant or her spouse has completed the appropriate period of qualification.287  
The flexible approach of the EU towards social security seems to be realistic.  The EU 
regulation on social security aims to coordinate a diversity of non-homogeneous social security 
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systems. Understanding that these domestic social security systems are normative and 
procedural complex systems, which evolved their own internal social security standards to 
address similar societal problems, such as infertility and ageing, the Member States self-
regulate, embracing the EU principle of conferral. This approach reflects the functional 
differentiation of social security systems. 
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman (in Greek: Επίτροπος Διοίκησης και Ανθρωπίνων 
Δικαιωμάτων), which was established by Law 3/91, examined 130 complaints in 2016 that 
refer to maternity issues, which did not reach up to the Court.  15% of the complaints were 
dealing with issues regarding work-life balance of working mothers, which shows that the 
labour market fails to adjust the needs of working mothers into the working environment.288 
This reflects that soft-law procedures could fill the gap of hard-law procedures, since such 
procedures are more time-consuming and expensive.289 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks   
 
The labour system of Cyprus, which appears as an autonomous and self-regulatory system, 
reflects its own peculiarities and attempts to respond to its own new social risks or societal 
problems.  It combines a range of legal sources, although the influence of each source is not 
homogenous.  The three regulatory systems: the UN/ILO, the CoE and the EU, which 
communicate with the domestic system through hard-law and soft-law procedures, have 
different strengths of influence in the domestic normative labour framework.  The stronger 
influence of the three systemic mechanisms belongs to the EU.  The ILO, which diachronically 
constitutes the classic pioneer of social justice and labour protection, appears as a polite actor, 
whose regulation is softer and sometimes covered (or replaced) by the influence of the other 
institutions.  In addition, the CoE, which promotes human rights at regional level, appears 
almost as non-existent in the domestic context.  The reasons that lie behind the strong influence 
of the EU include the binding force of the instruments and the judicial mechanisms of the EU, 
whose decisions create binding norms.  Despite the existing divergences between the systems 
(e.g. who is entitled maternity benefit), all systems set the principles of equality and non-
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discrimination in their foundational domains to respond to the social aims of injustice and 
poverty. 
Employment security appears as a complex concept, which entails the interaction with the 
social security system.  In modern times, there is a perceived need to shift from job security to 
employment security to flexilibilize the labour market and achieve better employment 
opportunities.  Job security is successfully promoted by the Law 24/67 and the Cypriot Courts.   
It seems that hard-law norms of job security have a stronger impact on the society in Cyprus.   
Nevertheless, it appears that the systemic deficiencies of the Cypriot systems still create vicious 
circles and fail to secure workers decent jobs.  This happens because, inter alia, the social 
security system depends on public resources, which have been limited in the Cypriot economic 
crisis.  Through these interactions, social dialogue could act as a reflexive mechanism and 
mediate the tensions created between job security and employment security – e.g. regarding 
the period of notice.  It is therefore curious that social dialogue including collective bargaining 
and industrial action, which has such considerable significance for Cyprus, appears to be 
neglected in EU hard and soft law norms. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
This research study has explored the multi-level regulation of employment security and social 
security systems, applying a systems theory of reflexive law as developed by Gunther Teubner 
and Ralf Rogowski.  The central claim advanced in this thesis has been that the regulatory 
systems have the capacity to learn from each other, but as self-referential systems, they set 
‘systemic limits’ on their procedural norms.1  The transnational and national regulatory 
systems, which are examined in this study (i.e. the UN/ILO, the CoE, the EU and Cyprus), are 
‘functionally different’ and produce their own procedures as their core elements.2  However, 
they correlate in different ways and endorse the mutual principles of equality and human 
dignity in their foundational domains,3  as they seek to reach wider social goals that are related 
to their environment (e.g. combat poverty, unemployment and social exclusion).  
From a flexicurity perspective, employment security, which constitutes the ability to enter, 
remain in, or re-enter employment, could be achieved through reflexive communication with 
social security systems.  As Manfred Weiss articulated: ‘The modern world of work is 
characterized by instability of employment. […]  A satisfying legal response to such a 
challenge […] needs a close interaction between rules of labour law and social security law’.4  
However, flexicurity, which is an EU-oriented form of re-regulation, tends to promote the bare 
notion of employability (the commercial flexicurity aspect), rather than the over-arching aim 
of employment security (as set in the 2007 EC Communication).5  It seems that flexicurity, 
which aims to make workers more adaptable or employable to ensure that they can swiftly 
transition in the labour market, would not necessarily encompass job security protections.  
In this thesis, I suggest that the Republic of Cyprus, which aims at further recovery in the post-
crisis era, should shift its focus from job security and the bare notion of employability (as a 
way to increase competitiveness) to the promotion of employment security (integrating the 
concept of decent work).  This shift is not easy because employment security and job security, 
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which are intimately inter-connected concepts, could sometimes collide.  In 2019, the 
Government of Cyprus announced that the rate of unemployment decreased, reaching its lowest 
levels in the last eight years.6  The push of the Cypriot Government to tackle unemployment, 
ensuring swift transitions from unemployment to employment, does not necessarily mean that 
individuals will be able to remain in employment.  As social security is dependent on public 
funds, there is an increased pressure on these resources to curtail public deficit through tackling 
unemployment.  However, this thesis suggests that this push, which is driven by budgetary 
interests, shall set as its over-arching aim to promote an inclusive labour market for all, in 
which all individuals will be able to swiftly transition in the labour market, without being 
exposed to the risk of unemployment or a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms and conditions of 
employment.   
Employment security, which includes the ingredient of employability, remains a complex and 
contested concept from a terminological and normative perspective. The transnational 
regulatory systems that are analysed in this study (UN/ILO, CoE, EU), developed their own 
procedures to promote employment security.  It appears that the UN and the CoE endorse 
employment security standards as part of the human rights regime, and they are primarily 
interested in the regulation of employment security in the field of non-discrimination.  The EU 
also protects against discriminatory dismissals, there is also further regulation of the procedures 
for economic dismissals in the EU labour market through Directives 98/59, 2001/223 and 
2008/94, and attempts to increase workers’ protection in this context.   
The UN human rights treaties (such as ICESCR and CRPD) integrated employment security 
as a constituent component of the right to work, whose normative content is interpreted by the 
treaty bodies (such as the CESCR) in the light of ILO instruments.7  As Rogowski stated 
‘human rights are invidualistic and inclusive and play an important role in the establishment of 
a world legal system’.8  This articulation reflects the approach of the UN human rights treaties, 
which seek to ensure that UN Member States shall respect, protect and fulfil the right to work.9  
In this spectrum, the ILO, which is ‘seen as the universal basis of the international body of 
 
6 Official website of the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, 
<https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/labour_32main_en/labour_32main_en?OpenForm&sub=2&s
el=1> accessed 5 August 2019.  
7 See in section 3.2. more about the UN, the employment security and the right to work.  
8 Rogowski (n.1), p.17.  
9 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 18: The Right to 
Work (Art. 6 of the Covenant), 6 February 2006, E/C.12/GC/18, p.4. 
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labour law’,10 sets minimal standards for employment security.  Furthermore, the ILO 
Termination of Employment Convention N.158, which is inevitably a landmark transnational 
regulatory instrument for job protection, does not seem to adopt an inclusive approach because: 
first, the Member States could exclude specific categories of workers from the scope of 
protection (for example, public servants in Cyprus); and second, only some of the prescribed 
categories of workers could be excluded after prior consultations and negotiations.11  The 
Cypriot Law 24/67, which endorsed the principles of ILO Convention N.158, is a key example 
of this regulatory deficit.  As explained in chapter 6, Law 24/67 provides weak protection to 
newer workers because it excludes from its scope of protection the workers who completed a 
period of employment no less than 26 weeks of employment.12   
The CoE appears more concerned with human rights protections and less worried about 
employment security.  The ECtHR through its evolutive interpretative approach (which sees 
the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’),13 extended the scope of the ECHR, which primarily 
protects civil and political rights, to cover job security safeguards when they fall in the ECHR 
substantive provisions (articles 8-11 ECHR).  The ECHR set two conditions for justification 
of dismissals in violation of Convention rights: the interference shall be in accordance with law 
and the measure shall be necessary in a democratic society.14 These conditions are interpreted 
ad hoc by the ECtHR.  To explain, the ECtHR takes different factors into account to examine 
whether the determined measure (dismissal) is legitimate and proportionate in a democratic 
society, balancing individual rights and collective interests (e.g. public order).15  For example, 
the ECtHR in the Fuentes Bobo case examined whether the dismissal of the applicant because 
he criticized in public his employer (exercising his right under article 10 ECHR) was necessary 
in a democratic society.16    In this context, the ECtHR decided that the applicant did not breach 
the professional duty of loyalty,17 which is recognized as a valid reason for dismissal under 
ILO Convention N.158 (article 5) and Cypriot Law 24/67.  
Furthermore, the ESC and the RSC, which provide a comprehensive list of socio-economic 
rights, enshrine ingredients of employment security in the composite right to work, which 
 
10 Weiss (n.4), p.51.  
11 ILO Convention N.158, article 2. 
12 Law 24/67, article 3. 
13 Tyrer v The United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1. 
14 ECHR, articles 8-11.  
15 See more examples in section 4.2.1.2. 




includes access to employment and job security protections.18  The ESC/RSC provide inter alia 
the right to notice of dismissal, which could create tensions between job security and the 
facilitation of transitions in the labour market (employment security).19  In addition to the latter, 
the RSC provides further protection for termination of employment appears (job security) as a 
distinct right.20  The recognition of job security as a separate right, which seems to be a 
remarkable development, is also endorsed in the EUCFR.21  However, the EUCFR further 
reflected the need to expand the conceptualization of employment security by endorsing article 
15 EUCFR (right to choose an occupation and right to engage in work) and article 16 EUCFR 
(right to conduct business).   
Regarding economic dismissals, the EU procedures for Collective Redundancies (Directive 
92/85) and Transfer of Undertakings (Directive 2001/223) primarily promote job security.  
Whereas Insolvency Procedures (Directive 2008/94) promote employment security through 
guaranteeing payments of individuals, which aims to provide protection of outstanding 
payment to workers rather than persuading employers that are in the state of insolvency to 
preserve job security.  By way of contrast, article 28 RSC, as interpreted by the ECSR,  includes 
termination due to bankruptcy or insolvency.22  Whereas, the ILO, which does not distinguish 
the normative framework for individual and collective dismissals, just introduces two 
procedures that are required to be followed in case of operational ‘economic, technological, 
structural or similar nature’ (i.e. consultations with workers and employers’ representatives and 
send a notification to the competent authority).23   
In this context, this thesis also suggests the need to promote collective bargaining (which 
includes the right to strike) as a stronger form of social dialogue in this context, as opposed to 
mere information and consultation.  Through collective bargaining, it would be more likely for 
social actors to change the existing procedures as they will possibly have equal bargaining 
power.  The procedures of negotiations and consultations (as a form of social dialogue) could 
be used a way to represent the interests of workers and mitigate the risk or the negative impact 
from economic dismissals (such as, reduce the number of dismissals or suggest LLL as a way 
to increase competitiveness and avoid dismissals).24  However, the absence of access of 
 
18 See more about the ESC/RSC rights and employment security in section 4.2.2. 
19 ESC, article 4(4); RSC, article 4(4). 
20 RSC, article 28. 
21 EUCFR, article 30.  
22 Finnish Society of Social Rights v. Finland (Complaint No. 107/2014), para.49. 
23 ILO Convention N.158, articles 4 and 13. 
24 See more about the forms of social dialogue in section 2.3.3. 
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collective bargaining as a precondition for economic dismissals, seems problematic.  In the 
Cypriot legal system, social dialogue, including collective bargaining and industrial action, has 
such considerable significance, which appears to be neglected in EU hard and soft law norms.25   
The Cypriot legal system showed its strong prevalent capacity to self-regulate as Cypriot 
Courts favour job security protections.  The IDT and the SCC, applying the reasonableness 
test, have repeatedly confirmed that dismissal is as a measure of last recourse.26  For example, 
the IDT in the case of Stephanou Pitsillidi, held that, even if it has been proven that the cash 
shortage was caused by the employee’s misconduct, the employer should have taken alternative 
measures, before taking the final decision to dismiss the applicant.27  The concept of 
employment security, which is not fully accepted in the Cypriot system, is more complex than 
job security protections.  In the era of economic crisis, it seems that austerity measures, which 
were promoted in the realm of fiscal Programmes by Troika, prioritized competitiveness and 
budgetary interests over labour and social security protections.28  It is interesting that Cyprus, 
which is a Member State of the ILO that fiercely promotes decent work through its Agenda, 
did not accept article 24 RSC that safeguards the right to decent work.   
This thesis also argues that a sustainable recovery solution for an inclusive labour market in 
Cyprus, in which all individuals will be able to swiftly transition in the labour market, entails 
a shift from the Aristotelian formal type of equality to the ‘multidimensional concept’ of 
substantive equality.29  It appears that the transnational regulatory systems are more interested 
about non-discrimination rather than employment security.  The UN human rights treaties and 
ILO Conventions N.158 and N.111 provide similar non-valid grounds of discrimination.30  
However, ILO Convention N.111 sets non-discrimination grounds to ensure transitions in the 
labour market, which includes protections from prohibition from dismissal and access to the 
labour market.  Whereas, ILO Convention N.158 just prohibits unfair dismissals on different 
discriminatory grounds (sex, race, nationality and sexual orientation). 
 
25 See more about social dialogue in Cyprus in section 6.3. 
26 Ekdotikos Oikos Dias Ltd. v. Giorgou Kogia (2006) 1B C.L.R. 1227 – as stated in the Ekdotikos Oikos case, 
instant dismissals should be justified only in cases of serious misconduct; Kanika Developments Ltd. v. Louca 
(2004) 1 C.L.R. 603; Anastasia Kasapi v. Technoplastics Ltd. (1992) 1 C.L.R. 919. 
27 Panayiotis Panayiotou v. The Regis Milk Industries Ltd. (12/3/2013) App. N. 211/09; Panayiotis Panayiotou v. 
The Regis Milk Industries Ltd. (12/3/2013) App. N. 211/09; Emily Stifler v. ERMES DEPARTMENT STORES 
PLC. (5/10/16) App. N. 803/2012. 
28 See section 6.2.3 for further details about the Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) and the Post-Programme 
Surveillance (PPS).  
29 Fredman S., ‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2016) Human Rights Law Review 1, pp.9-11. 
30 See more about the non-discriminatory grounds in ILO Conventions N.111 and N.158 in section 3.2.3. 
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Article 1(2) of the ESC/RSC as interpreted by the ECSR provides prohibition of all forms of 
discrimination in employment.31  The RSC provided additional discriminatory grounds, which 
includes disability (article 15 RSC), sex (article 20 RSC) and acting in the capacity of a 
workers' representative (article 28 RSC).  It appears that article 28 RSC converges with article 
5(a) of ILO Convention N.158, which explicitly prohibits dismissals on grounds related to trade 
union membership and collective bargaining. 32  However, trade union membership and 
collective bargaining are not within EU competence or protected under EU law as a protected 
ground for dismissal.  
The EU adopted multiple dispersed instruments to regulate individual dismissals in the field of 
non-discrimination, which are implemented at the domestic (Cypriot) level.  Equal Treatment 
in Employment and Occupation Directive 2006/54,  which sometimes examines matters that 
fall in the scope of Maternity Directive 92/85 and Parental Leave Directive 2010/78 (which is 
revised by the New Directive on Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers) provides 
protections against discrimination on the grounds of sex in regards to dismissals, access to 
employment and access to vocational education and training.  In addition, EU Directives 
2000/43 and 2000/78 provides these protections against discriminatory practices on grounds 
related to racial or ethnic origin, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief.  In this context, 
it appears that there are cases where the regulatory systems learn from each other, such as in 
case of family responsibilities, however this could take some time.  For example, ILO 
Convention N.156 of 1981, which is not ratified by Cyprus, provides protection for workers 
with family responsibilities.  However, Cyprus, which transposed Directives 92/8533 and 
2010/18,34 provides protection for mothers (i.e. biological mothers, mothers with an adopted 
child or under surrogate arrangements), married fathers and parents.  Now Cyprus must 
implement the new 2019 Directive on Work-Life balance for Parents and Carers, which extends 
its protection to carers.  There are also cases where the ILO has appeared cognitively closed 
and did not endorse standards from the EU, such as in case of age discrimination.  As explained 
in chapter 5, direct or indirect discrimination based on grounds of age is prohibited under 
Directive 2000/78, which was implemented in Cyprus by Law 58(I)/2004.  The EU Directive 
2000/78 also adopted a two-fold test to distinguish discriminatory practice from difference of 
treatment (‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim’ and ‘the means of 
 
31 ECSR, ‘Conclusions II, Statement of Interpretation on Article 1(2)’, p.4. 
32 ILO Convention N.158, article 5(a). 
33 Law 100(I)/1997.  
34 Law 47(I)/2012. 
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achieving the aim are appropriate and necessary’).35  In contrast, the ILO places the ground of 
age in the ILO Recommendation N.202, which as a soft-law instrument facilitates the 
implementation of ILO Convention N.158.  In this context, this thesis suggests that it is about 
time to fill this normative gap and ensure that age is included in ILO Convention N.158 as 
discriminatory grounds for dismissals. Otherwise, younger and older workers (in non-EU 
Member States) could be exposed to increased risk of unemployment and social exclusion.  
Furthermore, it appears that there are cases where individuals are not covered by Equality 
Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78, because there are practices that are not discriminatory and fall 
in the scope of ‘difference in treatment’ (such as in case of Abercombie & Fitch Italia Srl).36   
In such cases, individuals may struggle to access employment, which means it is crucial to 
ensure that individuals will have access to ALMPs and LLL so that they will be able to enter, 
re-enter or transition in the labour market, while guaranteeing an income through these 
transitions.   
As explained in section 2.4.2, employment security systems aim to facilitate employment 
transitions, which might entail removal of job security, and social security systems act as a 
safety net through these transitions.  In other words, social security responds to social risks 
(such as, unemployment, maternity, sickness) to ensure that individuals can obtain the 
wherewithal through transitions in the labour market.  However, it seems that employment 
security and social security appear as distinct concepts in the UN/ILO human rights context.  
At international level, the UN human rights treaties enshrine the right to social security (e.g. 
ICESCR, CRPD),37 whereas the ILO sets a baseline for social security standards.38  However, 
the ILO provides a two-tier protection to convince States to comply with some of the minimum 
standards.  To provide a brief reminder, the State can select the branches of ILO Convention 
N.102 and there is the basic instrument (ILO Convention N.102) and other specialized 
instruments (e.g. ILO Convention N.130 and N.121).  
The ECtHR integrates contributory and non-contributory benefits in the spectrum of the right 
to property (A1P1 ECHR), because if functions only within a human rights framework.  
Nevertheless, the ECtHR established a set of controls for A1P1 ECHR (assertable right and 
proprietary interest),39  however, the States have a wide margin of appreciation that could 
 
35 Ibid, article 6(1). 
36 Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v Antonino Bordonaro [2017] OJ C300/4, paras.16,26. 
37 See more about the UN human right treaties and social security in section 3.3.1. 
38 See more about the ILO and social security regulation in section 3.3. 
39 Stec and Others v. United Kingdom App nos 65731/01 and 65900/01 (ECtHR, 12 April 2006), para.54. 
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substantially restrict the right to property (such as in the case of Aldeguer Tomás v. Spain).40  
The ESC/RSC, which enshrines the right to social security (article 12) and the ECSS (soft-law 
means of regulation), adopt norms that sometimes converge or diverge with ILO instruments.  
For example, the ESC/RSC converges with ILO Convention N.183, as they both cover the right 
of mother to return to work after maternity leave.41  However, they diverge as to family 
responsibilities, because ILO Convention N.156 on Workers with Family Responsibilities 
covers ‘responsibilities in relation to other members of their immediate family who clearly need 
their care or support’, whereas the ECSS solely covers ‘maintenance of children’.42 
Furthermore, the EU social security regulation aims to coordinate divergent social security 
systems to facilitate transitions of individuals and their families in the EU labour market (article 
45 TFEU), while respecting the ‘internal differentiation’ of each legal system.  In this respect, 
EU social security coordination procedures have developed two major constraints.  First, EU 
Regulation 883/2004 does not define unemployment and family benefits, which reflects the 
EU ‘deficit’ to set minimum standards for social security protection; and  second, the conditions 
of nationality and residence act as restrictions in the facilitation of these transitions in the EU, 
because they act as prerequisites for granting social security benefits.43  In the field of non-
discrimination, it appears that the EU has set double standards for social security protection of 
individuals.  As explained in section 5.4.2, EU Directive 2000/43 (race and ethnicity) and EU 
Directive 2006/58 (grounds of sex) explicitly protect the right to social security in their 
normative framework. Whereas, EU Directive 2000/78 just provides protection against 
discriminatory practices on grounds of sexual orientation, disability, age, religion or belief in 
relation to occupational social security schemes or entitlement to retirement or invalidity 
benefits.   
The ‘mixed legal system of Cyprus’ complicates the relationship between labour and social 
security systems, because these two systems are regulated through different procedures, 
endorse different principles (civil law and common law traditions) and entail participation of 
different actors.44  The Cypriot social security system appears functionally closed, because of 
 
40 Stedman v. the United Kingdom App no 29107/95 (ECtHR, 9 April 1997). 
41 ILO Convention N.183, article 8; ECS, article 8(2); RSC, article 8(2).   
42 ILO Convention N.156, article 1(2); ECSS, article 40. 
43 Regulation 883/2004 on the Coordination of social security systems, Regulation N.574/72 on the application of 
social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, Regulation 1408/, 
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States. 
44 Hatzimihail N., ‘Cyprus as a mixed legal system’ (2013) 6(1) Journal of Civil Law Studies 37, p.1. 
214 
 
the complicate way that it operates.  It seems that Cyprus showed its cognitively open nature 
by recognizing the transnational legal systems in its constitutional order.  However, it did not 
show the same enthusiasm to adopt all transnational social security standards at domestic level.  
Cyprus may have ratified the key UN human rights treaties on the right to social security (e.g. 
ICESCR, ESC/RSC),45  however, it discretely selected which transnational minimum standards 
are encompassed in the normative content of social security.  As explained in chapter 6, Cyprus: 
a) selected aspects of  ILO Convention N.102 and from the specialized Conventions (N.121 
and N.130);46 b) did not ratify the European Convention on Social Security;  and c) did not 
accept some provisions of ESC/RSC, which are related to social security.47   
In this context, it is noteworthy that the transnational regulatory systems through their social 
security regulation (except from the European Code of Social Security (ECSS) that is a soft-
law instrument), do not cover educational benefits.  This seems to be a key normative gap as 
educational benefits could play a catalytic role in facilitating transitions in the labour market 
and mitigate the risk of exposing workers to dismissal.  Hence, the Cypriot legal system 
develops its own procedures and communicates with the other transnational systems only 
through reflexive indirect means of regulation to regulate educational benefits – as prompted 
by the EU Social OMC.  From a flexicurity perspective, social dialogue (either through 
meaningful negotiations or collective bargaining) could be used as way to convince the 
interested actors to invest and engage them more actively in the realization of ALMPs and LLL 
(such as, financial contributions).48  Nevertheless, the CJEU established a key protection, by 
including individuals that serve traineeship or apprenticeship, in the scope of protection under 
Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59, regardless of the origin of funding of remuneration 
or the legal framework of the vocational training.49   
The existing ‘doctrinal divergences’ between the systems of employment security and social 
security at multi-level contexts, as the theory of legal pluralism explains, could converge 
through procedural norms (‘normative convergence’).50  In other words, hard-law and soft-law 
 
45 See more about UN human rights treaties and Cyprus in section 6.2.1. 
46 ILO official website, 
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103070> 
accessed 3 August 2019.  
47 Laws 64/1967, 5/1975 and 203/1991 (ratified by Cyprus 7 March 1968); Law 27(III)/2000 and Law 17(III)/2011 
(ratified by Cyprus 27 September 2000). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Case C-229/14 Ender Balkaya v Kiesel Abbruch- und Recycling Technik GmbH [2015] OJ C294/11, para.50. 
50 Thomas C., ‘Convergences and Divergences in International Legal Norms on Migrant Labor Chantal’ (2011) 
32 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 404, p.440. 
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procedures can be complementary rather than contradictory.  Following the UN maxim of 
‘human rights are universal, interdependent and indivisible’,51 this thesis suggests that systems 
could converge through soft-law reflexive mechanisms.  It is remarkable that the UN/ILO and 
the EU share the same development plan of SDGs.52  SDGs and the Decent Work Agenda 
(DWA) promote labour and social security standards that could be endorsed at national level. 
However, it appears that even SDGs provide labour-related human rights-based approach, SDG 
8 on decent work is focused on employability (as a way to increase economic growth) rather 
than on employment security and does not seem to deal with job security protections.53  It is 
interesting that the EU means of regulation shifted from hard-law to soft-law.  The EES and 
Social OMC as ‘mechanisms of interest coordination’, could facilitate an interplay of different 
actors and ease power imbalances.54  However, it appears that the EES, which endorsed in its 
core normative context the promotion of flexicurity, and the Social OMC have turned from 
reflexive to ‘dry’ bureaucratic processes. 
As a concluding remark, regulatory systems as autopoietic systems, which combine the features 
of cognitive openness and functional closure, develop their own procedures.  Cyprus showed 
its strong prevalent capacity to self-regulate employment security and social security systems.  
As Cyprus gradually enters the recovery phase, Cyprus has taken significant steps, such as the 
launch of NHS and the adoption of MGI.55  However, more need to be taken to ensure that 
individuals can swiftly transition in the labour market, such as to include unmarried fathers in 
the scope of Paternity Law.56  In terms of distinction between employees and self-employed 
workers, it is crucial to ensure through collective bargaining that these two categories, which 
pay different percentage of contributions to the Social Insurance Authorities (i.e. salaried 
workers (7.8%)57 and self-employed workers (14.6%))58 are not blurred,   because such practice 
could leave workers exposed to increased risk of social exclusion and poverty. 
 
51 Baderin M. and McCorquodale R., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University Press 
2007), p.6. 
52 EU, Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, ‘The new European consensus on 
Development: Our world, our dignity, our future’ <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-
consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf> accessed 5 August 2019. 
53 See more about SDGs and Decent Work Agenda in section 3.4. 
54 Rogowski R. and Wilthagen T., Reflexive Labour law (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1994), pp.7-8. 
55 See more about NHS (or GESY) and MGI in section 6.5. 
56 Paternity Law 117(I)/2017; President of the Republic v. House of Parliament (6/2/2019) App N.2/2018 and 
3/2018. 
57 Social Insurance Law 59(I)/2010, article 5(1). 
58 Ibid, article 12. 
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In conclusion, this thesis has considered the Cypriot system’s reflexive regulation of 
employment security and social security with reference to international and European norms 
in other systems.  It tells a tale of normative communication but also divergence.  There are 
important choices ahead for Cypriot government and the social partners in developing a future 
legal and practical framework which meets the needs of the country post-austerity.  Procedural 
reflexive mechanisms like the EES and Social OMC may enable reflection on these options 
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